Ledeen answers Fernandez on Iran
Michael Ledeen thanks PJM editor Richard Fernandez "for that rarest of acts: an intellectually honest critique" of Ledeen's new book %%AMAZON=0312376553 The Iranian Time Bomb%%. But the author disputes Fernandez and reiterates his conclusion - that an internal revolution against the mullahs' regime is possible with American encouragement.
Support Pajamas Media; Visit Our Advertisers
Many thanks to Richard Fernandez, for that rarest of acts: an intellectually honest critique. Obviously I’m happy that he likes “The Iranian Time Bomb,” but I’m particularly stimulated by his doubts about some of my analysis and most of my policy recommendations.
My belief that Iran is the root of a lot of the trouble in Iraq and Afghanistan seems to me to have been abundantly confirmed by the torrent of information coming from Coalition officers over the past several months. As I have long insisted, Iran has been supporting both Sunni and Shi’ite terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan, an idea held to be anathema by the “intelligence community” for years and years. And yet, the linkage between Iran and (Sunni) al Qaeda is no longer fanciful; it’s proven by recent interrogations of both al Qaeda and Iranian Revolutionary Guards officers captured in Iraq, it’s proven by material found on captured terrorist and RG computers in Iraq, and it’s proven by the long history of close working relations, going all the way back to Sudan in the mid-nineties. We know that al Qaeda terrorists were trained by Hezbollah (think “Iran”) in Lebanon, that Abu Musav al Zarqawi created a European-wide terror network while he was living and working in Tehran, that al Qaeda’s current military commander, Saif al Adel, is living and working in Iran, and that-as the 9/11 Commission discovered to its astonishment-several of the “muscle terrorists” traveled from Saudi Arabia to Beirut on a plane along with Imad Mughniyah, the operational head of Hezbollah.
On Afghanistan, one of the top terrorist figures, Gulbadin Hekhmatyar, is paid by Iran, and I personally attended the debriefing of informed Iranians who gave American officials detailed information about Iranian killers in Afghanistan, with orders to kill Americans.
So I don’t think my claim that Iran is at the heart of the terror war in the Middle East should be dismissed.
On the prospects for democratic revolution in Iran, Richard generously says that “not everyone” will accept my conclusion that the country is in a pre-revolutionary state. Indeed, hardly anyone in Washington does. On the other hand, Amir Taheri agrees with me, and he’s very good. Richard’s objections remind me a lot of the debates in the latter years of the Soviet Empire. Some of us-very few-believed that the Soviet Empire was hollow, and would fall if given a good shove. Reagan shoved, and the Empire collapsed. But we were constantly told that we were nuts, that the Soviet Empire would last a long time (Professor Kennedy, very much in vogue in those years, forecast that the Soviets would outlast us), and that we should not be so confrontational.
And yet…it fell. It fell in large part because we supported the dissidents, and a great democratic revolution swept the commissars into history’s garbage pail. I think the same can be accomplished in Iran, where we have far greater popular support on our side than we did in the Soviet Empire. Millions of Iranians have demonstrated against the regime, and thousands or tens of thousands do so just about every week, despite all the repression.
The most interesting criticism is that “the viability of Ledeen’s recommendations are contingent on at least partial success in Iraq.” Yes, the two are linked; they are both part of the real war, the larger regional war, and I argue at some length in “The Iranian Time Bomb” that we cannot expect satisfactory security in Iraq so long as the mullahs rule in Tehran, and their puppet Assad remains in power in Damascus.
Richard argues that a defeat of the Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq-who is opposed to the Iranian doctrine that requires a cleric at the head of the Islamic Republic-would spell doom for the Iranian clerical opposition to the regime. I don’t see that, frankly. The battle between the two schools of Shi’ism is far greater than a single person, no matter how important. Iraqi Shi’ites by and large detest their Iranian coreligionaries, Sistani or no Sistani, and that will surely survive the Ayatollah in Najaf.
I totally agree with Richard when he says that “a humiliating US defeat in Iraq will probably spell the end of any regime-change project in Iran for at least a decade,” and he is right to point to our weaknesses in confronting the mullahs, including the catastrophe in our intelligence ranks, but our intelligence was also very weak vis-a-vis the Soviets, and the strategy of bringing down tyranny from within was nonetheless successful.
Finally, Richard warns that Iran will be at least as tough to topple as was Saddam. I wonder. Saddam’s grip on his society seemed to me to be more secure than the mullahs’ grasp. Certainly there was nothing in Iraq that remotely resembled the mass demonstrations against the Iranian regime, and Iraq did not have the long history of self-government that Iran has. I think Richard is unduly pessimistic, and I remind him that Machiavelli-who’s right about almost everything-teaches that tyranny is the least stable form of government. We’re living in a period of global revolution, and I’m optimistic that revolution can succeed in Iran if only we would support it.
One thing is as certain as anything can be in a world inhabited by human beings: if we do not attempt to bring them down from within, the mullahs will one day soon demonstrate they have nukes. And on that day we will be faced with two terrible choices: either accept that fact, with all its frightening geopolitical consequences, or bomb them. Sarkozy recently put it in those words, in fact. In my opinion, that would constitute a massive policy failure, and I am trying hard to convince people that there is a better way.
| Comment |  Digg This |
 del.icio.us |
 |
 |
 PJM Home |
16 Comments
RevJim:Unfortunately, we seem to be losing the psychological war in Iran. The US needs to find some way to actively, and overtly, support the opposition there. It would greatly help if there weren’t so much anti-Iraq war propaganda coming from the United States, because the Mullahs and Achmedinijad use that to show how “weak” the US is.
Sep 7, 2007 - 1:24 am Michael van der Galiën:We need to gain the trust of the Iranian people.
Keep on trying to convince people that there is a better way, Mr. Ledeen–I’m sure you’ll find plenty of support.
Michael,
Although I understand where you are coming from, I must ask what you think the result will be of American support for pro-democracy movements in Iran? Wouldn’t you agree that they run the risk of being considered puppets of the US instead of potential liberators? Although many Iranians detest their regime, wouldn’t it be fair to say that even more greatly detest the US? They’ve not forgotten that the US supported the Shah for one.
Sep 7, 2007 - 2:00 am Banafsheh:Apparently Mr. Fernandez is not at all familiar with the extreme hatred of the 92% of the Iranian people and is discounting the fact that Iranians are not and have never been since day one, silent about the destruction that the Mullahcracy has wrought on Iran. I suggest Mr. Fernandez speaks to some SERIOUS Iranian activists and scholars and focuses a little on the very tenuous (at best) nature of the relationships between the various Mullah groups themselves AND takes a deep look at the fact that if the people of Iran have not been able to topple that regime, they have however made it darn uncomfortable for the last 29 years of it’s wicked existence. Americans should appreciate their friends INSIDE Iran and stop discounting them like they don’t count. That attitude only comes across as rather elitist.
Sep 7, 2007 - 4:33 am michael ledeen:Michael vdg: Remember that two-thirds of living Iranians are thirty years old or less, and thus have no memory of the shah. Most of them will have asked their parents, ‘what was it like under the shah,’ and their parents will mostly have answered ‘better than this crowd.’
Tom Friedman, no neocon he, has described Iran as the Middle East’s only Red State. If we call for peaceful regime change, those who wish to participate will do it, and those who don’t, won’t. Most Iranians–judging from the regime’s behavior and its public opinion polls–want to be part of the Western world, and are pro-American (although bitterly disappointed with Bush). My guess is that non-violent democratic revolution would succeed.
At the moment, we are headed for the ultimate Hobson’s choice: appease a nuclear Iran, or bomb it.
Sep 7, 2007 - 6:56 am Richard Fernandez:Banafsheh,
You might well be right in asserting that 92% of the Iranians hate the current regime. But how are those without direct experience or contact with a large number of Iranians to know? One reason why “hardly anyone in Washington”, as Michael puts it, believes Iran is in a pre-revolutionary state is the difficulty in getting this knowledge and conveying it to an American audience.
But it’s knowledge worth getting. So how do we go about getting it? One way is to simply to test the waters, in a non-military way. This is what intel agencies are supposed to do anyhow. And it’s a good thing to do anyhow. In the open source field, I know that there are efforts to get more information out of Iran via bloggers and disseminate that information into the US blogosphere.
Many of the things we ought to do in order to determine the attitude of the ordinary Iranian toward the present regime is stuff you would have to do if you were eventually to work for a regime change anyway. There’s no disadvantage to going that far and much to recommend it.
It’s very hard to convince people to take a big step, but relatively easy to convince the listener to take a small step, when there is a probability it might be in his interest. Therefore without prejudice to what the final goals towards Iran might be, it seems reasonable to sell a larger intelligence effort, both of the normal type and in open source, as a prelude to whatever action comes next.
Sep 7, 2007 - 8:57 am Tom Grey:Wow! Both Michael L. AND Richard F in comments — great work! (competing with Cato Unbound? …)
While I thought Richard’s critiques were stronger than Michael thinks, I totally agree with Michael’s conclusion: stop Iran from getting a nuke, or live with them having one.
Bad or terribly worse.
Richard implicitly agrees with some attempt at fomenting rebellion in support.
But both are a bit mild, for me. Look at Michael J. Totten on Iranian Kurds — it’s time for the US to push for autonomy and human rights for all Kurds. In Iraq, Iran, Syria … and Turkey. Let each country with a significant Kurdish population allow the creation of a semi-autonomous region / province, with significant not-quite-state local government authority.
Finally, when the Iraqi Arab Sunnis join the Iraqi Army and, together with Iraqi Arab Shia & Sunni Kurds, they will be able to pacify al Qaeda in Sunni Iraq.
It’s quite possible there will be some Iraqi general/ politician who begins anti-Iran talk — why should the Iranians be able to murder Iraqis?
The US should be arming the Iraqi Army with non-nuclear cruise missiles and bombers and other means for the Iraqis to defend themselves against the aggressive acts of war that the Iranians are perpetrating.
Sep 7, 2007 - 9:33 am Nick Guariglia:Richard, the regime’s own polls indicate the overwhelming majority of the Iranian citizens oppose its rule. We don’t need intel. services to tell us this. It should be overt, not covert, in my opinion.
Havel’s movement started in a small drama theater. Walesa’s movement began in a humble shipyard. Even if only 2% of the population — 1.4 million — was “active” in the revolution, that’d be more than enough to oust a few hundred old smelly men.
We need to help create that magnet, and once its there, most people will gravitate towards it. That doesn’t mean every Iranian will take to the streets — but they will certainly encourage, and not block, an internal change once it’s underway.
Sep 7, 2007 - 3:01 pm Richard Fernandez:Readers may find excerpts from an interview by Gen. Petraeus by the Arabic magazine al-Watan al-Arabi on the role of Iran interesting. Although he views al-Qaeda as the biggest short term threat he explicitly views Iran as the biggest long term threat. If the interview is accurately quoting Petraeus.
Petraeus elaborates on the links between Hezbollah and events in Iraq. In other words, between Lebanon and Iraq, implying that he too sees Iran as waging a regional war.
As they say, read the whole thing.
Sep 7, 2007 - 4:33 pm Nick Guariglia:The link doesn’t work, at least for me. But it’s hard to differ with that conclusion. Iran’s playing both cards in Iraq — jihadist and political “parties” — and is trying to make Sadr into another Nasrallah.
Iran was caught backing the Wahhabis of the ICU in Somalia. It funds Sunni Hamas. It backs the “secularists” in Damascus (who back al Qaida-linked Fatah Islam in Lebanon). It’s arming the Sunni Salafist Taliban. It’s playing Sunni vs. Shia, Shia vs. Shia, Arab vs. Kurd, etc. in Iraq. We could go on and on.
My good friend’s brother is a Green Beret. He was working in Dahuk province, up north, and he told me even the most “Westernized pro-American Kurdish official” is receiving hefty offers from Tehran to convert against us. Khamenei feels everyone has their price.
So, yes, I agree with Dr. Ledeen and Gen. Petraeus: Iran is the epicenter, it’s the primary reason why there is violence everywhere in the region.
If 100 economists looked at the cost-benefit ratio of regime change in Iran, empirically and not politically, I’d bet they’d all come to the same conclusion.
Sep 7, 2007 - 4:55 pm Richard Fernandez:There appears to be a problem with the way the link is rendered. Just go to
http://beirut2bayside.blogspot.com/
and look for the entry for September 4
Sep 7, 2007 - 5:07 pm winston:Hi
I believe Richard wasn’t in Tehran when right after the capture of Saddam in that spider hole, people called for invasion of Iran in the streets ( I witnessed many) or that people in cabs and buses called US President Bush “Emam Zaman” of our time.
Iranian people want the change but can’t do it without the outside help and this assistance must come directly from no one other than the United States in any possible way. The Iranians will rise up if they see they have an ally in their side that will help them all the way along. If this help doesn’t come from the US, the chance of overthrowing the clerics is little.
Sep 7, 2007 - 11:06 pm davod:Winston:
We thought the Iraqis just needed outside help as well. The US should be helping finance the Iranian opposition without being too visible.
The US should also be conducting PsyOps to destabilise the regime, and reduce support from the West.
Sep 8, 2007 - 12:52 am michael ledeen:I don’t have any confidence in our intelligence agencies, and moreover I think they are viscerally opposed to any support for Iranians against the regime. Steve Kappas, then the Deputy Director for Operations at CIA, urged me to “take it easy on Iran” a few years ago, saying that things were going well there, and if we left it alone Iran would be free in a decade or so. I took that to mean that he and his colleagues were not prepared to act, and wanted me to shut up in case someone in the White House was listening.
He needn’t have worried, of course. Nobody was listening then, and nobody is listening now.
I come back to my basic rhetorical question: if it was possible to bring down the Soviet Empire with a tiny fraction of the people on our side, how can anyone be pessimistic about chances for a democratic revolution in Iran, where we’ve got huge numbers of people with us?
All those people who say that the Iranians don’t want our help, and that any American support would only make things worse, are echoing the voices saying the same thing during the Cold War. But when the wall came down, all the dissidents came and thanked us for helping them, and said our assistance was decisive.
Ask Sharansky and Bukovsky.
Sep 8, 2007 - 10:37 am Richard Fernandez:I don’t have any confidence in our intelligence agencies, and moreover I think they are viscerally opposed to any support for Iranians against the regime. Steve Kappas, then the Deputy Director for Operations at CIA, urged me to “take it easy on Iran” a few years ago, saying that things were going well there, and if we left it alone Iran would be free in a decade or so.
If the intel agencies are broken it would almost be an argument for not undertaking a regime change project. This is one thing that should be fixed or worked around as a precondition to forceful action. And maybe it will make little difference whether the US embarks on a non-military regime change attempt — attempt a “soft kill”. Any sufficiently effective effort, whatever means are employed, will represent an existential threat not just to the present regime in Iran, but to the Islamic Revolution. While we can hope for a Velvet Revolution there is no guarantee they will take it lying down. The Ayatollahs have freedom of action, whether we ignore them or embark on a regime change project. We should be ready for anything, especially if we effectively declare the intent to end the Islamic Revolution.
Sep 9, 2007 - 12:42 am David P.:If 92% of Iranians hate the regime that’s thrived over the past 30 yrs. and any attempt to modernize the political climate is violently crushed, wouldn’t Iranians cautiously welcome the forceful dislodgement of their ‘repressive’ government? Couldn’t this generate the greatest “probability” of change which Iranians have been unable to accomplish on their own?
Sep 9, 2007 - 8:15 am Brian H:R & M, I’d be interested on your take on the relevance of the writings of Bueno de Mesquita, who analyses tyrannies and democracies etc. on the basis of their “selectorates” and their “inner coalitions”, the latter being the Private beneficiaries of the reaping of Public goods. In brief, when the latter reaches a significant proportion of the former, and the former reaches a significant proportion of the adult public, you are de facto democratic, and vice versa. Normal tyrannies fall or go through severe succession crises when the tyrant dies or is diagnosed with some fatal disease, such as cancer; the “inner coalition” loses its guaranteed access to Public good(ie)s, and the new guy will have his own coterie of beneficiaries, normally with little overlap. Tyrannies by committee, like Communism and theocracies, still have their Ultimate Leaders, and so are only partially insulated from these succession upheavals (vide the Politburo shakeups and shenanegans when the USSR changed Secretaries).
So Khomeni->Khameni, Rafsanjani->Amadinejad, and the recent election of Rafsanjani to head the Council of Experts, are shuffle-points where everything (almost) is up for grabs, and a Yeltsin or Havel or similar had/has a shot at upsetting the apple cart. The answer to the current “Qui bono?” question in Iran seems to be the mullahs, the Qod, and the Revolutionary Guard. That looks stable enough, but the ground is rotten; not only is public sympathy against them, the economic and physical and intellectual/technical infrastructure of Iran has been egregiously neglected, and is by some estimates 10-20 years of dedicated and enlightened rehabilitation away from adequacy — which is not currently in prospect.
Foreign adventurism can only go so far in keeping an enterprise like that together, but waiting for inevitable implosion is risking acquisition of a nuclear option, however primitive and clumsy, and other dramatic pushes by proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, or elsewhere.
Inducing and/or exploiting a succession crisis would seem an attractive option, but not necessarily easier to pull off than other hypothetical destabilization options. All assuming Iran doesn’t pull off the same trick in the U.S. come the 2008 elections, of course!
Sep 9, 2007 - 5:21 pm