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	<title>Comments on: March Madness and Bear Stearns</title>
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		<title>By: March Madness &#187; March Madness and Bear Stearns</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/march-madness-and-bear-stearns/comment-page-1/#comment-28487</link>
		<dc:creator>March Madness &#187; March Madness and Bear Stearns</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 05 Apr 2008 09:31:39 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] Charlie Martin wrote an interesting post today on March Madness and Bear StearnsHere&#8217;s a quick excerptInvestments can be as random and as risky as a coin flip or a basketball game. Just ask Bear Stearns. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Charlie Martin wrote an interesting post today on March Madness and Bear StearnsHere&#8217;s a quick excerptInvestments can be as random and as risky as a coin flip or a basketball game. Just ask Bear Stearns. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Bear Stearns and March Madness &#124; Explorations</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/march-madness-and-bear-stearns/comment-page-1/#comment-27542</link>
		<dc:creator>Bear Stearns and March Madness &#124; Explorations</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2008 18:59:14 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] new article up at Pajamas [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] new article up at Pajamas [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Curly Smith</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/march-madness-and-bear-stearns/comment-page-1/#comment-27495</link>
		<dc:creator>Curly Smith</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2008 15:24:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/march-madness-and-bear-stearns/#comment-27495</guid>
		<description>I&#039;ve got a different theory that involves Bear Stearns creating their own bad luck.  I theorize that Bear Stearns adopted the &quot;Credit Card Model&quot; and failed to adjust it for the very real differences in Credit Cards and Mortgages.

When mortgage rates hit 30-year lows after 9/11, lending institutions made money hand-over-fist and rewarded themselves with huge bonuses.  When the pool of &quot;qualified buyers&quot; started to dry-up, which would have ended the huge bonuses, lending standards were relaxed to expand the borrowing pool.  When that pool started to dry-up, lending standards were again reduced and the process continued until banks were paying residents of skid row to borrow money that they couldn&#039;t repay.  

But the folks at Bear Stearns forgot two things:
- The massive increase in borrowing fueled a housing boom that artificially inflated housing prices (in many areas housing prices increased 15-20% per year) so the borrowers late to the party, the &quot;sub-prime of the sub-prime&quot;, had to borrow ever increasing amounts which increased the risk to the lenders drastically.
- The maximum that a Credit Card Company will lose on a borrower is defined by the Credit Limit.  Historically about 5% default on mortgages and the banks will sell a foreclosed home at a slight discount (maybe 10%) to limit the losses, so the banks had a historical perspective of how much risk they were taking.  But, what happens when the artificial housing bubble bursts and the home that you&#039;ve 100% financed for $250k is now worth $125k?  Even the people who can still pay the mortgage are inclined to walk and let you eat the loss because they don&#039;t have anything to gain, why should they pay $250k for a $125k house (plus all of the interest)?.  What&#039;s the downside to walking?  A bad credit rating?  The same bad credit rating they already had because they&#039;d previously walked away from their obligations?  Who could have foreseen that bad credit risks were bad credit risks?  

The &quot;experts&quot; at Bear Stearns either didn&#039;t understand the risk that they were taking or they figured that somebody else, namely the taxpayer, would get left holding the bag.  

As they&#039;ll say in 2021, &quot;A Bear and his Stearns are soon parted&quot;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ve got a different theory that involves Bear Stearns creating their own bad luck.  I theorize that Bear Stearns adopted the &#8220;Credit Card Model&#8221; and failed to adjust it for the very real differences in Credit Cards and Mortgages.</p>
<p>When mortgage rates hit 30-year lows after 9/11, lending institutions made money hand-over-fist and rewarded themselves with huge bonuses.  When the pool of &#8220;qualified buyers&#8221; started to dry-up, which would have ended the huge bonuses, lending standards were relaxed to expand the borrowing pool.  When that pool started to dry-up, lending standards were again reduced and the process continued until banks were paying residents of skid row to borrow money that they couldn&#8217;t repay.  </p>
<p>But the folks at Bear Stearns forgot two things:<br />
- The massive increase in borrowing fueled a housing boom that artificially inflated housing prices (in many areas housing prices increased 15-20% per year) so the borrowers late to the party, the &#8220;sub-prime of the sub-prime&#8221;, had to borrow ever increasing amounts which increased the risk to the lenders drastically.<br />
- The maximum that a Credit Card Company will lose on a borrower is defined by the Credit Limit.  Historically about 5% default on mortgages and the banks will sell a foreclosed home at a slight discount (maybe 10%) to limit the losses, so the banks had a historical perspective of how much risk they were taking.  But, what happens when the artificial housing bubble bursts and the home that you&#8217;ve 100% financed for $250k is now worth $125k?  Even the people who can still pay the mortgage are inclined to walk and let you eat the loss because they don&#8217;t have anything to gain, why should they pay $250k for a $125k house (plus all of the interest)?.  What&#8217;s the downside to walking?  A bad credit rating?  The same bad credit rating they already had because they&#8217;d previously walked away from their obligations?  Who could have foreseen that bad credit risks were bad credit risks?  </p>
<p>The &#8220;experts&#8221; at Bear Stearns either didn&#8217;t understand the risk that they were taking or they figured that somebody else, namely the taxpayer, would get left holding the bag.  </p>
<p>As they&#8217;ll say in 2021, &#8220;A Bear and his Stearns are soon parted&#8221;.</p>
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