Why Southern Iraq Won’t “Awaken” Like Anbar
With the situation seemingly turning the corner in Anbar --and even Baghdad-- it's tempting to think that the same will apply in the southern provinces of Iraq. Not so fast, says PJM Baghdad editor Mohammed Fadhil, explaining why the regions are very different.
There is growing popular dissatisfaction with the poor performance of local administrations across Iraq’s southern provinces and the growing pressures practiced by clerics who are trying to Islamize the society.
To make matters worse are the atrocities committed by some militias and the bitter fighting among ruling parties in which ordinary citizens pay the highest price.
I think clerics and politicians in Prime Minister Maliki’s United Iraq Alliance realize this dissatisfaction may lead to an awakening movement similar to the one that has taken place in Anbar province in the western part of Iraq.
In order to make a comparison, and try to predict what’s likely to happen in the south, one needs to first understand exactly what happened in Anbar.
The core of the struggle there is an old conflict of interests between clerics and tribal sheiks. The two groups competed for leadership of the society for centuries. Even though the sheik might show loyalty to the cleric he still hides enmity for him; they’re each other’s nemesis.
This conflict of interests was evident in what happened during the revolution of 1920, less than a century before the division between those who supported the clergy’s revolt and those who kept their allegiance to the tribe and preserving its interests.
The difference between clerics and sheiks is huge; the first do not believe in negotiation and speak in terms of “halal” and “haram” claiming to be representative of heaven’s justice. Obviously you can’t negotiate deals with God so as far as the clerics are concerned, society must follow them, without asking questions.
By contrast, the tribal sheik was raised and taught to know how to lead productive negotiations. Tribal leaders have long played the role of judges to settle disputes among individuals within the tribe or between different tribes and when they do so they try to make sure that decisions are reached through consultation with the two sides of the dispute and would acceptable to both as well. In other words a sheik has to be a good negotiator, willing to hear both sides of the story and convince them to make concession in order to contain the problem and restore order-it’s an important part of his job.
Now let’s take a look at the difference between the Iraqi west and south.
First: In the west, the situation was much worse than the south. The suffering of the populace under al-Qaeda was intolerable and this was a factor that made anti-al-Qaeda sentiment grow fast and speeded the emergence of the awakening movement.
Secondly: the Sunni clergy represented by the association of Muslim scholars in a fairly recent organization cannot be compared to the long-established Shia clergy in the south. Therefore there was no strong ideological and spiritual connection between the clergy and populace in the west and the struggle between the two organizations (tribe and mosque) intensified.
In the case of the west, the Islamic Party, which was the only political body representing the Sunnis, was opposed to the association. In turn, the clergy turn did not offer the Islamic party blessings during the elections but instead declared it a renegade infidel body. By contrast the Shia clergy offered invaluable support to Shia parties and made their climb to power much easier.
Third, the Islamic state that al-Qaeda sought to establish followed the Salafi doctrine which still represents a minority faction among Iraq’s Sunni community which largely follows the Hanafi doctrine.
These three points summarize why the west and south have some very distinct differences.
From this, I think that the emergence of a tribal awakening against the dominance of religion in the south would run a serious risk of being smeared as a treacherous revolt against the sect-as a community-itself at a time when the Shia are for the first time enjoying the rise of their sect’s role in Iraq’s politics. The pan-nationalist Arab Salafi hostility toward them could make their “awakening” a double-edged sword - it would weaken their unity in the frame of the sect at a time when they still don’t feel completely secure in a pluralistic country.
What happens then?
Both Shia clerics and politicians feel the growing unrest and they know that awakening is coming. Maybe more slowly, because of the factors I mentioned, but surely. This is why they want to stay ahead of the rising tide.
We are therefore likely see a race take place within the UIA towards taking over the coming awakening - even though the UIA itself is the target. In other words, some parties in the UIA will try to maneuver quickly to tame and lead the awakening instead of standing in its way.
Last week or so the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) praised the efforts to establish awakening councils from among the tribes of the south “to fight outlaw Shia groups” but on the condition that the government, not the Americans, oversees the process.
Politicians and clerics are trying to avoid a scenario similar to that in the west and also to avoid repetition of what happened in the past when some tribes sided with the British administration and hampered the change called for by the clergy.
What the people in the UIA, particularly the SIIC, are thinking is the following ‘if there’s going to be an awakening that can be diverted from attacking us and exploited to serve our interests at the expense of our rivals then so be it!’
Here I think the SIIC is planning to shape the awakening to be exclusively an effort against Sadr movement which rejects the SIIC’s federal project and its control of local administrations to the extent that bloody skirmishes between the two are not uncommon.
This could be the case if the SIIC succeeds to put the awakening under the supervision of the Iraqi government, not American troops, and consequently under the leadership of Badr brigade.
If this happens the process would end up involving more infighting for partisan gains than awakening against the project to build an Islamic state.
The winner then would be the SIIC and to a lesser extent the Dawa, their grip over the region would become stronger, the position of the clergy preserved and popular dissatisfaction dissipated.
Mohammed Fadhil is PJM Baghdad editor. His own blog is Iraq The Model
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7 Comments
1. dougf:Last week or so the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) praised the efforts to establish awakening councils from among the tribes of the south “to fight outlaw Shia groups” but on the condition that the government, not the Americans, oversees the process.
The problem with this analysis (if it is a problem and I hesitate to contradict Mohammed) is that SIIC is deeply involved with the administration of the Southern Provinces. They ARE the problem the people are complaining about. It is very hard to lead a ‘protest’ movement when your people are the incompetent, corrupt, and violent officials that the protest movement is in fact protesting.
In order to lead’ would they not have to then agree to give the boot to their own corrupt leaders in the South, and agree to reform the police so that they became more police-like and less militia-like ?
I have no real idea, but if this ‘awakening’ is the result of popular dissatisfaction with incompetent and violent leaderships, I don’t see anything less than a campaign that targets these defects as being viable. It might start out as an effort against Sadr and his low-rent goons (and who would shed many tears for these guys?), but how would the Government then say — OK boys, we dealt with THAT group of ‘useless’ people, but THIS group of equally ‘useless’ people is just okey-dokey. Nothing to see here — please move on.
That might work at some point but the Great Satan will still be around for some time to come and he has cards to play as well. Not the least of which are MONEY and FORCE.
I think in fact it is a good idea for the Government to get involved in this. There needs to be a house-cleaning. I just don’t think that the Government can just arbitrarily turn off the taps once it has helped to initially open the faucets.
In any event, ANY kind of ‘awakening’ is a very good thing. Shows that the ‘people’ are tired of being ’sheeple’. Never a bad thing when the rulers can’t take the ‘ruled for granted.
Nov 7, 2007 - 7:41 am 2. Curious Texan:I’m curious what the impact has been of the three-hour meeting in Ramadi on October 14 between about 40 Shiite leaders and the Anbar Awakening Council. I noticed that Ammar Hakim of SIIC was among the attendees. Have there been any rapprochement between the Sunnis and Shiites or any effect on the Shiite Awakening as a result of this?
Nov 7, 2007 - 10:44 am 3. Math_Mage:It doesn’t help that the British troops in the south of Iraq are following a completely different strategy from the Americans in the west, pulling back to their fortress-like bases rather than going out and engaging the enemy (and the people). That’s given the militias and insurgents mostly free rein in the area AFAIK. Instapundit has a link.
Nov 7, 2007 - 10:03 pm 4. M. Simon:You have left out the solvent qualities of “cell phone culture”.
What some would call American culture.
Admittedly it takes time, so far none has resisted.
Seven years ago I knew nothing about jihad, Sunni, and Shia. Now I’m learning Southern Iraqi tribal politics.
Along with our understanding and support come a little secret. Liquifaction. Funny thing is, the secret of the American secret is that we make people beg for it. No pushing allowed.
Did you know that Gillette now has a Arabian branch selling its Fusion Razor. Not only beg, but pay well for the chance. America seeps into the dreams.
Nov 7, 2007 - 11:12 pm 5. Chip:I’ve read articles which claim the Iranians are already de facto rulers of southern Iraq.
Nov 8, 2007 - 5:27 pm 6. Neo-andertal:The flip side of your analysis Mohammed is what does all this do to the SIIC as an organization. Where this faction ends up in the end, and what sort of organization it ends up as, is an open question. On the one hand, it is unlikely to become a political party in the Western sense, but is there anywhere in the Middle East where such parties truly exist. On the other hand, they definitely aren’t anything near the Iranian funded and backed opposition in exile they once where. They could have chosen Iranian backed direct control over the south and the Americans would have found no allies during the insurrection of 2004. Instead they spurned direct control by Iran and worked toward governance with the Americans. This doesn’t make our goals coincide, it makes it an alliance of necessity for both sides. The Americans haven’t gotten the sort of government in Iraq that they really want but possibly have gotten one they can live with.
The necessity of governing and protecting itself has had a profound effect on the SIIC and DAWA. The inability to protect themselves and their reliance on the Americans has already pushed them away from Iran and to moderate their views. Not what we would call moderate but not where they began either. If they wish to further their aims in governing Iraq, they will have no choice but to adapt. So you say the various government ministries are incompetent, factional and largely non-functioning. I agree, but I must point out that last year the government ministries were little more than armed camps for the various militias. Not exactly a resounding improvement but at least you have some progress clearing criminal gangs out of the government buildings and starting to pay salaries and starting rudimentary tasks.
So once again what does all this do to SIIC. It finds itself in the process of transforming from the dominant militant faction to the dominant governing faction. It’s more of a change than many suspect. It’s probably more of a change than the SIIC suspects. Some effectiveness will be expected, they will have to learn to govern. The other question is a governments exclusive monopoly on armed force. I think they will have to accommodate on security too, and don’t think they will get an exclusive situation anytime soon. They will eventually need allies, deals, and compromises if they wish to achieve that though. Some will have to just be dealt with by force. I don’t think either JAM or the criminal organizations that operate as Sadr’s armed faction will be amendable to any sort of political accommodation. Sadr may well survive as a political figure but I doubt if most aggressive armed parts of his organization can be tolerated.
So how will the awakening play into this. I agree that both the SIIC and American interests would like to see it aimed at Sadr’s people. At least for now. Whether the SIIC will be able to avoid scrutiny is yet to be seen. Like any other ruling party at some point they risk their base of support if they consistently come short of supporters expectations. They will find themselves in a position where they will either accommodate others wishes or rule by dictate. I’m not so sure the entirety of Iraq can be ruled by dictate anymore. I’m not even sure to what extent the portions of Iraq are rule-able by dictate. At least not without some sort of mandate even if that is only at the tribal level. Then there is the problem of Baghdad, the mixed center of Iraqi society. There are a limited number of options to rule in Baghdad, find some sort of accommodation, or have a huge force of hundreds of thousands, or take that plunge into the violent abyss. If the Shiites even try to rule Baghdad strictly by force they will have another uprising on their hands.
The real peace is a long way off and the real war has hardly begun. Let’s hope Iraqi’s having seen the abyss will turn away from it.
Nov 9, 2007 - 8:17 pm 7. Pajamas Media » Blog Archive » Iraq’s Moment of Truth in Baghdad and Basra:[...] a similar awakening among the Shia — of course, with the main difference we outlined in an earlier post; that is, while in the west we had a tribal uprising against extremist religious powers, in the [...]
Apr 15, 2008 - 1:21 am