71 Comments

1. NahnCee:

What would we do if Pakistani tribes and/or troops using American-supplied weapons were responsible for the deaths of these 9 soldiers?

Or Afghan soldiers turned around and started shooting at Americans from behind?

I refuse to believe that the Americans would ever have died in a normal fight with the Taliban unless there was some heavy=duty cheating going on.

Jul 13, 2008 - 5:16 pm 2. TmjUtah:

Believe it.

Just looking at the map shows that the outpost was probably a compromise position. Traffic via drainages and mountain trails is actually more important to monitor/interdict than the roads. This could explain the presence of what sounds like maybe a reinforced platoon sized unit (+40 men) of mixed Afghan and international forces.

The story doesn’t say how long the position has been in use.

I’d say the local government uses the village to base patrols all along a generally western arc, probably even over the predominant crest to the west and beyond. There’s a lot of traversable ground there. Not easy, but doable.

“Command outpost” sounds like something a journalist coughed up. An outpost means a presence for specific purposes – IMO suveillance first, liaison with the locals second. Not intended for strikes (unless possibly the ISAF folks were newly arrived, and prompted the Taliban to try a spoiling attack…?) but rather to gather intell and/or identify targets for supporting arms.

The terrain here looks ugly for CAS and very favorable for light infantry… which means it could be ninety nine out of a hundred places in Afghanistan.

Jul 13, 2008 - 5:51 pm 3. Lifeofthemind:

Cue the media announcing this is Dienbienphu in 3, …. 2 ….. 1. Not a happy position to be in. If they are making a big issue out of our being there either 1. it is a real threat and they fear our getting linked to the locals and monitoring comms, and eventually running operations over the border. In other words maybe very high value targets are nearby. Or choice 2 is it is a sucker punch to get us to reinforce a trap. Those who know a lot more than me can figure this out, if it is worth it then we will take the high ground.

Jul 13, 2008 - 6:09 pm 4. Cannoneer No. 4:

Long War Journal

Taliban launch deadly attack on a combat outpost in Afghanistan’s Kunar province

Today’s attacks plays directly into al Qaeda and the Taliban’s propaganda and military strategy. The Taliban have launched a series of assaults on US and Afghan bases and patrol and government centers throughout the eastern regions of Afghanistan that border Pakistan’s tribal areas. The extremists hope to destabilize the Afghan government and overrun an outpost or district center as a show of strength.

Jul 13, 2008 - 6:54 pm 5. Cannoneer No. 4:

Bill and Bob’s Excellent Afghan Adventure — Information Operations

Jul 13, 2008 - 7:14 pm 6. Cannoneer No. 4:

Why Nuristan Matters

Interesting discussion on infiltration routes.

Jul 13, 2008 - 7:30 pm 7. programmer:

NahnCee says:

I refuse to believe that the Americans would ever have died in a normal fight with the Taliban unless there was some heavy=duty cheating going on.

programmer responds:

Reminds me of a news item a couple years ago where a shark off the coast of California, I think it was, killed a diver and the experts stated it probably happened because the diver was wearing a wet suit and was mistaken for a seal. Experts know that sharks don’t eat humans, only if they look like seals.

Never underestimate the hunger of sharks or the combat skills of the enemy, especially a lot of the enemy. Look up George Armstrong Custer on the web.

Jul 13, 2008 - 7:58 pm 8. wretchard:

Until we get more information on the engagements we won’t know what happened. The village of Wanat itself looks like a terrible place to be in, like being fish in a barrel. However we don’t know how the guys were actually deployed; whether they had outposted the hills; whether we are looking at a meeting engagement between a unit operating in an offensive capacity out Wanat and the Taliban.

We ought to know more soon.

Jul 13, 2008 - 8:23 pm 9. Teresita:

Since al-Qaeda is being rolled up in Iraq, and since the news is based on the principle of “If it bleeds, it leads” you can expect to see non-stop hand-wringing over events in Afghanistan, right up to January 20, 2009. Then all of a sudden you will see all the stories about soldiers, under the enlightened guidance of our new Commander-in-Chief, building schools and running midnight basketball programs.

Jul 13, 2008 - 8:34 pm 10. Doug:

Pakistan Marble Helps Taliban Stay in Business

Reporting in a Danger Zone: Held First by the Taliban, and Then by Pakistan

9 Americans Die in Afghan Attack

Jul 14, 2008 - 12:17 am 11. Doug:

“Studying the Soviets won’t ensure success in Afghanistan”

Jul 14, 2008 - 12:34 am 12. Cannoneer No. 4:

Spectacular, but futile, attacks like this are mainly playing to the Western media. On the ground, the Taliban have suffered another defeat and killed a lot of civilians and destroyed much property. The Taliban are doing much worse than last year, taking heavier casualties and controlling less territory. So attacks are made that can be pitched to the Western press as victories. After a few days the “victories” fade away, but there are no Western reporters around to record that. If the Taliban can create an illusion of victory, they believe they can create a sense of hopelessness in NATO countries, and increased calls for withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. As plans go, it’s a long shot.

Jul 14, 2008 - 2:58 am 13. Wadeusaf:

“July 10, 2008: Taliban” attempts to expand beyond the border area, north of Kandahar and Kabul, have been unsuccessful. Up north, the Taliban are hated big time, and the people there react violently when the Taliban show up. In northwest Afghanistan, a Taliban attempt to kidnap aid workers (a favorite target) was interrupted by armed tribesmen who freed the aid workers, killed the Taliban leaders and drove the rest away. Such incidents are more common, even in border areas

What is completely maddening is the Pakistani Government’s response to situations in the provinces generally. They appear to have fallen back on old ways of trying to buy their safety, having been completely cowed it appears by the Taliban and Al Qaeda assassination of former President Benazier Bhutto. It is a completely illogical and cowardly response to the situation, that is leading to greater violence and greater disdane for the Pakistani Government. Where is this leading? A civil war between Taliban and anti Taliban tribes is inevitable, but the Pakistani Government’s stance so far appears to favor the Taliban and disdane the loyal tribes who are their natural base of support.

It appears something very ugly and very unnatural is going on in Islamabad. I cannot figure out what.

Jul 14, 2008 - 5:16 am 14. Wadeusaf:

July 10, 2008: Taliban

Jul 14, 2008 - 5:25 am 15. wretchard:

You will recall that some weeks ago US forces were criticized for blasting a bunch of Taliban who opened fire on them and who turned out to be Pakistani tribal militia. UAV footage was released to back up the US claim. A whole bunch of Pakistani politicians got up and thundered in indignation over the event. I recall commenting on a post that maybe the politicos in Isalamabad were going to both give up practical control over the NWFP and stand on their dignity. And there were others who wrote that the trick would be figuring out how to fill the vacuum caused by or even abetted by Pakistani security forces without creating an open breach with those ever-sensitive politicians who are jealous about sovereignty they may be in no position to exercise.

But be that as it may, the key problem is how to clean up the Pakistani side of the border without a) escalating the level of operations severalfold; and b) driving the Taliban down into Swat and other points east until they impinge on the heartland of Pakistan. So far the approach has been to work through Pakistan, and maybe that’s like trying to push a wet noodle. In other words, the attack on the border post is a reminder of the shortcomings of the current levers that can be safely pulled. Something’s got to change. The question is what?

Jul 14, 2008 - 5:41 am 16. exdem13:

This is why some of our troops are getting shifted to Afghanistan, right? Al-Quaeda in Iraq is down for the count, Mookie’s boys have been smacked down, we have a breather for a while, time to mend fences in Afghanistan.

For wretchard, I would say that haing the Taliban “impinge” on Pakistan is worrying about the open barn door. The Taliban has many supporters & allies in the Northwest Provinces. Based on some of the past news reports, the tribal areas are Talibanistan, since the tribes emphasize kinship & religious ties over national & political ties. Pakistan is having a difficult time redressing this situation because many important figures on the Pakistani national level support the Taliban for their own reasons. It bears remembering that Al-Quaeda is supported by wealthy & influential Saudi Arabs, so the Taliban has the support of wealthy & influential Pakistanis.

The Obamessiah has said before that he would support an invasion of Pakistan to clear out Taliban positions. Even though he promptly got the raspberry from a lot of us on this, he (or McCain) may yet be called upon to do just that. Without shutting down the Taliban bases in the tribal areas, Afghanistan will in truth become another Vietnam, as we play by rules that the enemy has no reason to follow. Rather than kill & kill illiterate Pathan tribesmen until we get cross-eyed, how’s about attacking the problem at the source? Of course, that ultimately means interference in Islamabad….

Jul 14, 2008 - 6:32 am 17. John Samford:

Nanchee, you cannot cheat at war. Since everything is allowed and there are no rules, you cannot cheat.
I figured from the map, it’s about 800 meters to the top of the western ridgline. That is within rifle and LMG range and a easy shot for a medimum mortar. Either the Major that ordered that strong point put there had his head up his arse or there was supposed to be fire support pre-arranged to cover the crest of the hill to the West.
I think we got lucky in that only 9 died, if that is the final number.
Of course, they could have just re-occupied an OLD fort built to control the intersection of those two valleys back before gunpowder.
I would bet that someone got lazy. Those hills are pretty steep. 1 to 1 or there abouts. Not an easy climb with enough water food and ammo to make it worth the climb. Or at least the Ami’s thought that, The Taliban thought different. They had better leaders, so they won the scrimmage. That is normally the way it works.

“A pint of sweat, saves a gallon of blood.”*
*
_General George S Patton Jr,

Some US Officer really screwed the pooch on this one.

Jul 14, 2008 - 6:39 am 18. Marine 83:

As the saying goes “If you find yourself in a fair fight…your tactics suck”! I suspect John is right in that someone got lazy. And even though our troops tend to be head and shoulders above the competition, it doesn’t mean that the enemy is entirely stupid and incompetent. Although 9 Americans died, according to Strategypage.com today, they still managed to open up a whole can of whoop @#$ on the bad guys. God bless those guys.

Jul 14, 2008 - 7:04 am 19. Broadsword:

“This is all speculation based on map reading.” Wretchard, it is commendable that you base your speculation on something real. Waiting for more news to come out excludes, I hope, those in the press, (spit!) who news speculates on the made-up, the imaginary, the hoped for and the fabulous. Heh.

Jul 14, 2008 - 7:45 am 20. twolaneflash:

My first bet for America to get help in the area would be for India to press Pakistan militarily. China and Russia are also in a position to exert pressure on Pakistan, and they don’t have delicate sensitivities about dealing harshly with religions. Link to map below:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Kashmir_2007.JPG

Jul 14, 2008 - 8:47 am 21. Old Blue:

The initial report that I read was that the Americans were killed in an ambush returning from a patrol and that the attack on the COP came the following early morning. It was described as a complex ambush.

Current reports tie the deaths to the attack on the COP (Combat OutPost.) This is where the MSM news becomes confusing. The AP reporter whose story appears even in “Stars and Stripes,” Jason Straziuso, seems to report accounts given by ACM sources without any skepticism.

He also uses Afghan stringers. Where did he get those pictures of the Taliban executing women? How can an AP photographer hang out with the Taliban without fear? Hey, it’s neat to see the Taliban from the inside while they’re performing heinous acts and pretending to have execution authority, but why aren’t we asking how this guy can hang with the Taliban? And how does Straziuso know this guy?

This is where ACM/Taliban information operations begin to make ground. Straziuso is now reporting the alleged “wedding party bombing” as a fact of a week gone by. This is not the case. I contend that this is an IO victory on the part of the enemy at this point. They have fed a lie to the media which has been repeated often enough to become accepted.

And our diligent AP stringer-using, Taliban picture-getting reporter is right there with it. Hmmmm. He does have his name in every major paper in the US, though.

The first account, of the casualties being the result of a complex ambush, is more likely true. Any accounts beyond that did not come from NATO/ISAF, who tend to be more close-mouthed about things due operational concerns and a high degree of distrust of the press.

Nuristan is the best ambush country that I’ve ever seen. The point was made above that sometimes the other guy is good. This may just be the case. Nuristan and Kunar are areas with easy access to the Pak border, and where you are mostly likely to run into people who have the benefit of training.

They are more likely to know how to shoot, move, communicate, and have well-developed tactics. There are quite often foreign fighters in these areas as well.

One of the “rules” of warfare is “never come back the same way you went out.” This is not possible in Nuristan, or in most places in Afghanistan. This fact made the ambush way too easy to set.

Do not make assumptions based on a map analysis of the terrain that the position chosen was a bad one, and do not forget to factor in the slant ranges involved from the surrounding terrain. The map analysis referenced above gave a straight line range of 800 meters. RPG’s self-detonate at approximately 900 meters. A slight miscalculation on the homespun analysis can easily be 100-plus meters on the ground, making that self-destruct range more of a factor. You’re working too hard with imprecise materials.

The 173rd are not amateurs, and they have been in theater for a long time. There are no lazy soldiers in that area, so don’t make that assumption, either. Afghanistan is a very hard place to fight, and very dangerous.

It is certainly frustrating, but until those who are there eventually share their stories, we are being fed the only information that is available. This information is coming from opposition sources at this time, who are claiming to have overrun the site.

I did not ever, from my personal involvement in events that were reported by NATO/ISAF/US sources, find them to be lying. They did, perhaps, “dumb things down” a bit in order to not become too detailed, but they did not deliberately conceal facts to make anything appear to be more advantageous than it was.

Remember also that the Army/NATO/ISAF have tremendous sensitivity to the casualty notification process being given time to work. Patience, Prudence.

All US non-official information systems and phones in the entire area will be blacked-out until the last family is notified and that information makes its way back to the 173rd. In a situation like this, ISAF becomes a black hole of information. NOTHING gets out, certainly not to the AP.

The loss of 9 soldiers at one fell swoop is certainly a high loss of life, especially in an area of small unit actions.

As for the comments of NahnCee, my personal experience was working with the ANP, the least well-trained and reliable troops on the IRoA side of the house. We conducted many operations in conjunction with the ANA under Army, Marine and French mentorship. I NEVER saw or heard of any instances of Afghan soldiers shooting their American or French counterparts.

My Afghan counterparts saved my life and kept me alive. It would have been easy for them to kill me or sell me down the river in the Tag Ab Valley or even in Nuristan. It seemed that the thought never occured to them. I categorically reject that comment.

More likely was that the ISAF (American) troops were in the lead on the movement and part of the Afghan forces was not in the kill zone, explaining the less severe casualties. Once CAS was on station, or even near station, or artillery began to impact in the area, the Taliban would break contact. Remember, they were planning the attack on the COP itself and needed to protect their force.

It is hard to be patient, and the urge is to jump on the story and analyze it; but the information that is given is inaccurate and incomplete. I may (say again, MAY) be wrong, but I contend that:

1) The “wedding party” bombed in that same area last week was not a wedding party but a good kill on a mortar team and their support. Same for the “wedding party” southeast of Jalalabad in Deh Bala.

2) The new COP is drawing fire because they are a)small and b)interfering with an infiltration route.

3) The American casualties were the result of a well-executed complex ambush in great ambush terrain. It’s easy to be good in that kind of terrain. It’s the scariest ambush country I’ve ever seen.

4) The COP is not ill-situated, and was at no time overrun. It is not, however, invulnerable.

5) While studying the Soviet experience does not ensure success, it is ignored at your own peril. The Soviets are one of the few countries that are worse counterinsurgents than we are, but the Afghans never reinvent the wheel.

Great point about “if it bleeds, it leads,” but this is another good example of our press contributing to the effectiveness of enemy IO. Afghanistan has always been there, but for several years was overlooked in the press. Last year began to change that, and this year with Iraq a little calmer, Afghanistan is getting some attention again. The MSM, again, is reporting Taliban IO without question. Please keep that in mind as you analyze these events.

Jul 14, 2008 - 9:36 am 22. Cannoneer No. 4:

John Samford, unless you know what the purpose of the COP was how in the hell can you be so certain the officer who selected the location for it has his head up his arse? The COP is only about a week old. The officer who built it may well have died in it.

Are you some kind of unsung military genius?

Jul 14, 2008 - 10:30 am 23. Eggplant:

Cannoneer No. 4 said:

“Spectacular, but futile, attacks like this are mainly playing to the Western media.”

Isn’t “playing to the Western media” the Name of the Game? If the bad guys can demoralize us through the MSM then they’ve won.

This sort of garbage is the main reason why B. Hussein is a serious contender for becoming President.

Jul 14, 2008 - 11:32 am 24. NahnCee:

Nanchee, you cannot cheat at war. Since everything is allowed and there are no rules, you cannot cheat.

Yes, of course, you are right. Nevertheless, I still frown upon shooting someone in the back, or claiming to be an ally so you can obtain superior weaponry and then using those guns against the guys who gave them to you. Stuff like that is not the cowboy way.

And if Pakistan and its benighted tribes are involved (again), I’m *really* frowning a lot. And wanting very bad things indeed to happen to Musharref NOW.

Jul 14, 2008 - 12:18 pm 25. Old Blue:

The bad guys in that area do bring in their weapons from Pakistan, no doubt about it. However, much of that weaponry is purchased with money from a) drug sales, b) gem sales, and c) foreign (read Arab) money.

Foreign money is also used to pay local unemployed men to perform, as one officer I worked put it, “stupid human tricks.”

The “benighted tribes” in the area are mostly Pashtun, the tribe being split between Afghanistan and Pakistan by the arbitrarily drawn Durand Line which is still the border between the two countries.

This line is a major source of resentment among Afghans in general and Pashtuns in particular. It is a tangible sign of foreign meddling going back to the 1840’s, although the line was drawn in the 1890’s.

To the Pak Taliban, there really isn’t much of a difference between Pak Pashtuns and Afghan Pashtuns.

Most Afghans that I spoke with (and they were legion,) just accepted it as a matter of course that the Pakistani ISI was involved heavily with the Taliban and were still active in supporting them, including forays into Afghanistan.

One sure way to get detained by either ANSF or coalition forces was to be a Pakistani man found wandering about in Afghanistan. Afghans who had recently visited Pakistan were also suspect.

The Afghans seem to “know” that the Pakistanis meddle in Afghan affairs. They believe that Pakistan does not really want a stable Afghanistan. This is simply accepted as fact by street-level Afghans, whereas we do not take that as face value here in the States.

Jul 14, 2008 - 12:41 pm 26. John Samford:

“John Samford, unless you know what the purpose of the COP was how in the hell can you be so certain the officer who selected the location for it has his head up his arse?”

Because he put it in a valley surrounded by hills. Ever hear of Little Big Horn?
How about Dien Bien Phu? Lots of other battles where somebody got caught in a low spot surrounded by high spots. Thousands, most likely. Hard to tell, since mostly there are no survivors, although sometimes, the fortunes of war smile on the fool that got stuck in that position. It’s the sort of thing one does to an enemy that is stupid enough to put themselves in that position.
No, any OP ( excuse me, nowdays a COP) needs to be on the highest and most defensible terrain around.
In high rough country, it is normal to use the vallies as roads, since it save time and energy. If you have ever humped a 90 Lb. pack up 45 to 60 degree grades you will know what I’m talking about.
This is the ‘gan. Men have been fighting there for the last few thousand years. That little gully ( not sure it’s big enough to call a valley) going East has prolly been a smugglers trail for thousands of years, ever since somebody declared themself King and put out a list of banned thingies.
If we were to do some digging thereabouts, I woldn’t be surprize to turn up Greek, Persian and Mongal artifacts.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dien_Bien_Phu

Here is another you might have heard about. This worked out better then most, since the hills were only on one or two sides.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rorke%27s_Drift

You don’t have to be a genuis to know that setting up a defense where you can be shot at BUT NOT SHOOT BACK is folly.
Back on the map, where that E-W gully hits the valley there is a nice sized hill (2200 meters) that would be ideal for an OP. You have LOS up the gully and perhaps a little ways along the valley. Site a small mortar there and you can put rounds on any smugglers coming your way. Getting water and ammo up there will be a bitch without a helio, but it’s doable.
I was thinking lazy because there might not be heilo support and the zero in charge might not want to climb that hill. I know the grunts didn’t.

Jul 14, 2008 - 12:58 pm 27. Morton Doodslag:

So far, only Americans are numbered among the dead in every report I’ve read, despite the presence of many other troops. NYT lists Afghan forces as receiving a few “slight bullet wounds”. If this is true, then it is highly probable that a deep betrayal by the vile Muslims caused this shocking number of US deaths and shocking lack of Muslim deaths. Our military and political leadership still stumbles under the deadly delusion that Muslims can be trusted in this Islamic war against civilization.

Jul 14, 2008 - 3:02 pm 28. Tony:

Old Blue, thank you for your service, sir.

In “Lone Survivor” Marcus Luttrell provides a terrifying description of ambush in this nearly vertical terrain by overwhelming numbers of locals who know every goat trail.

The question is how long are we going to be the only ones to respect this invisible border? It sounds so much like the similar imaginary borders and ROE that did us so much harm in the early years of Vietnam.

Not to be a war-monger, but how long before Arclight over Waziristan?

Jul 14, 2008 - 3:05 pm 29. Doug:

Would have been REALLY nice to see about 3-4 years ago, Tony, but better late than never!
—
Old Blue:
I tend to have more faith in the much reviled NY Times, concerning choice of stringers than AP, which seems to be the bottom of the barrel.
I’d be interested in your opinion of these reports.

Reporting in a Danger Zone: Held First by the Taliban, and Then by Pakistan

Pakistan Marble Helps Taliban Stay in Business

9 Americans Die in Afghan Attack

Taliban Breached NATO Base in Deadly Clash

Officials gave new details about the deaths of nine U.S. soldiers in an attack on a base in Afghanistan.

Jul 14, 2008 - 3:10 pm 30. Peterike:

Isn’t “playing to the Western media” the Name of the Game? If the bad guys can demoralize us through the MSM then they’ve won. This sort of garbage is the main reason why B. Hussein is a serious contender for becoming President.

Absolutely, and AQ is very well aware of the presidential race, and they want their guy to win. The MSM wants the same guy to win, and for some of the same reasons. It is any surprise that we’re starting to hear “well we may be winning in Iraq but we’re losing in Afghanistan, which is the REAL problem…”

Ahh yes, stupid President Bushitler wasted all that time, money and blood in Iraq — wise Barry knew all along it was a waste of time! — while the “real” war was slipping away from us. Wise Barry knew all along Afghanistan was the real war!

The actions of AQ so accurately map to Democratic Party election strategy that you’d swear there were planning meetings between the two sides. But then, you don’t need meetings when you see the world through the same lenses. Both sides know just what they need to do. They understand their roles.

Back in 2004 I thought it would make a nice ad to show John Kerry’s face with the tagline “Endorsed by Al Qaeda!” One could do the same with Barry, but that’s an ad you’ll never see.

Jul 14, 2008 - 5:13 pm 31. Morton Doodslag:

According to the NYT, the force which came under attack consisted of 45 Americans, and 25 Afghans. Of that number, 9 Americans were killed, and another 15 Americans were wounded. Only 4 Afghans are reported as being wounded, and later those wounds are referred to as “light”. In addition, those wounds are implied to have happened during the initial bombardment by AQ, which happened prior to the storming of the base.

It initially appears as if the Afghans contributed little during the actual fighting, and time will tell whether they sat it out, or abetted in the AQ in attempting to overrun the base.

Much surprise is being evinced by commentators from the military and the press about the frontal attack. As a sidenote, one wonders if such an costly attack was designed to secure US hostages for the upcoming political season in the US. Simply overrunning a base seems implausible.

Jul 14, 2008 - 5:41 pm 32. RWE:

I heard Marcus Luttrell describing the mission on which the rest of his team was wiped out and I thought that it was the stupidest idea I ever heard of. And believe you me, that is saying a lot; I worked in the Pentagon at one time.

That SEAL team apparently was supposed to sit up there on a mostly barren hilltop and monitor the movements of some known hostile leader. Maybe that will work in downtown New York or in some virtually uninhabited dense forest, but based on pictures of the terrain it would seem to be insane at best and a suicide mission at worst. I mean, what were those guys supposed to do, pretend to be from the Fuller Brush Company or Dominos Pizza? I don’t think we have invented a cloaking device yet and that is what it would take.

Admittedly, that was pretty early in our involvement there. I guess the engineer in me is showing but I think that remote instrumentation is the way to go with that. We did quite a lot with that in Vietnam, including along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and it was successful to some degree.

Jul 14, 2008 - 5:43 pm 33. Old Blue:

Thank you, Tony. It was an honor and a privilege.

Excellent point about Pakistan. If you were to put together a “recipe” for a successful insurgency, the Afghan insurgency has all the makings of a successful one, including a safe haven in which to rest and reorganize, and outside support/funding.

My ANP used to get a big kick out of my reaction when they asked about Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“Afghanistan hoobus? (Is Afghanistan good?/Do you like Afghanistan?)”

“Bali, (Yes,)” I would reply, “Afghanistan bisyar hoobus. (Afghanistan is very good.)”

They beamed, then posed another query in the form of a statement.

“Pakistan horrobus. (Pakistan is bad.)”

“Pakistan horrobus. Musharraf ‘yak yak yak’” (making talking hands in two different directions… he’s talking out of both sides of his mouth.)

Laughter all around.

They got a huge kick out of that, because to them it was obvious; yet they see us pandering to the Paki’s while the ISI plays silly games with Afghanistan’s future.

Again, I disagree with the likelihood of American troops being engaged from behind. I’ve worked with the ANA and found them to be enthusiastic soldiers with a warrior ethos, improving tactical capability, and an intense dislike for the Taliban.

Mentors are embedded within the Afghan units. I was a mentor. ISAF units like the 173rd operate as a unit, not mixed in with Afghans, but often in conjunction with them.

The current TTP is to cause casualties to 1) coalition forces and 2) ANSF in that order according to the capability of the attacking unit. Often the ANSF are the softer target, as when they are vehicle-mounted. The ANP are always softest. Most likely, the American ISAF element was the element isolated in the kill zone, perhaps by design, and therefore bore the brunt of the fight. This isolation is not impossible in such terrain (it’s SCARY ambush terrain!) Also, the ambush was most assuredly initiated with the highest casualty-producing weapon, possibly even an IED, if not massed RPG and machine gun fire.

Having worked with the Afghans, I feel qualified to say that they are the least likely source of the American casualties. It is so unlikely, in my frame of reference, as to be a waste of analytical energy.

Because of poor muzzle discipline, the Afghans are somewhat more likely to shoot each other by accident. They are getting better about that, though.

Jul 14, 2008 - 6:00 pm 34. NahnCee:

But then, you don’t need meetings when you see the world through the same lenses.

WHy on earth does Al-Q need to go to the expense and effort of flying to America (and the embarrassment of being made to wait in line at airports although not actually searched) to attend meetings with the progressive left, when our Mainstream Media is so obliging as to print *all* the planning notes so they can keep up?

Jul 14, 2008 - 6:03 pm 35. sirius_sir:

Tony, I agree with your comment regarding “the similar imaginary borders and ROE that did us so much harm… in Vietnam.” The Taliban use the sanctuary of Pakistan as did the Vietcong in Cambodia and Laos from which to plan and launch attacks. To my mind that destroys the concept of sanctuary (and possibly sovereignty) and makes it enemy terrain, pure and simple. But what to do about that state of affairs is perhaps not so pure and simple.

Iraq was never Vietnam, much as the major media might have liked it to become. The irony is that so many in this country pretended an allegiance to the fight for Afghanistan as a way to protest our commitment in Iraq, never suspecting Afghanistan all along held the real potential to become the quagmire they feared. It’s quite possible ten years from now Iraq will be universally acknowledged a success while Afghanistan still struggles. Those who wanted to prematurely leave Iraq because it was a distraction from the war they said they supported will probably wish they could go back and choose over.

Jul 14, 2008 - 6:24 pm 36. Wadeusaf:

“the key problem is how to clean up the Pakistani side of the border without a) escalating the level of operations severalfold; and b) driving the Taliban down into Swat and other points east until they impinge on the heartland of Pakistan. So far the approach has been to work through Pakistan, and maybe that’s like trying to push a wet noodle. In other words, the attack on the border post is a reminder of the shortcomings of the current levers that can be safely pulled. Something’s got to change. The question is what?”

Historically, most of Pakistan’s populace is not willing nor able to take on the denizens of the NW Frontier. these very able fighters are the backbone of the Pakistani Military and also the membership of the Frontier Corps (as well as their leading officers). The division in the various tribes along pro and anti Taliban sentiments sounds to me to be a fight in the making, one with the potential to eliminate the Hard line Islamists. But the Government, Herf=http:”//www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2008/07/ap_pakistanfighters_071008/”>appears cowed or at least it is unable to determine how to take advantage of the split. I do not think the members of Bhutto’s party nor most of their coalition have much sympathy for either the Taliban or Al Qaeda, both of which figure in the death of Benazir Bhutto. So why the reluctance to take the NW radicals to task?

Recently, (herf=”http://www.topix.net/content/ap/2008/07/ap-impact-pakistan-militants-focus-on-afghanistan”>according to the AP both the NE Islamists, and the NW Islamists got together forChai, (HT to Cannoneer No. 4)the result appears to be the resurgence of Pakistani generated trouble for Afghanistan. Add to the increase of Foreign Al Qaeda fighters in the frontier regions that is quite a cocktail to be had.

But as Mullen subtly understated, the Pakistani government is still new and wrestling with the problem. I don’t completely buy it. They know the problem, they’ve been there before. I just cannot reconcile Bhutto’s sacrifice to the lack luster performance of her party thus far. If their hands are tied by ISI It seems to me the government response would be something different. At least until they could plot a way around that very much all ensnaring obstacle.

In my mind it raises the question of who really Governs Pakistan, the Military, the ISI, or the Civilian government. Did Musharrif have that much say or was it really just the ISI?

Jul 14, 2008 - 7:45 pm 37. MlR:

Studying the Soviets will not unlock the way to go. It will, however, give some perspective regarding just how bad things can get if we’re not careful. (And they’re on their way.)

Jul 14, 2008 - 10:04 pm 38. Old Blue:

To address the comment above; while I agree that studying the Soviets will not unlock the way to go, the value is not in gaining perspective on how bad things can get. Not at all. The value is tactical.

Knowing the Soviet experience in whatever province and district in which you are operating tells you where the ambush sites are. It’s really that simple.

We are NOT reliving the Soviet experience. I met many mujahideen from that war who are sitting this one out or participating in the government.

We do not behave like the Soviets did. The Soviets were totally clueless counterinsurgents because they tried to suppress the insurgency with sheer force. While they killed hundreds of thousands, the insurgency could not be quashed by brute force. 90% of successful counterinsurgency warfare is non-kinetic.

To address the idea that things are on their way in that direction: I couldn’t disagree more thoroughly. With the exception of areas like Helmand, Paktika, Kunar, for example, where the insurgency has been under pressure and active without pause for years, a big part of the increase in violence is in areas that were formerly not active.

The reason for the new activity is the growing presence of IRoA agencies in areas that were previously ungoverned.

Since last August, there have been literally hundreds of engagements in the Tag Ab and Ala Say districts of Kapisa Province. Prior to that, clashes were relatively rare. The police hid in the district center and were afraid to venture out because the Taliban ruled these two districts.

Strategically important, Tag Ab is the closest staging point to Kabul for Taliban attacks. It is also a historic smuggling route for drugs and timber. It is a western terminus for an infiltration route leading from Pakistan through Nuristan and Laghman provinces.

Today the police patrol vigorously. Checkpoints dot the road that will probably be completely paved from the Provincial capitol all the way to Tag Ab by the end of the summer. There is a coalition firebase just outside the village of Tag Ab itself. Key Taliban leaders have been killed.

The Taliban and HiG are engaged in a desperate, losing struggle in Tag Ab.

That’s just one example.

I can tell you how much progress I saw made in 2007 in the various places all over southeast Afghanistan where I worked, but it would take hours and wear my fingers out.

Please do not be fooled by the MSM’s depiction. Don’t even listen to that nimrod retired general who saw nothing much of the country outside of Kabul except through windows and pronounces as if he actually knows what it meant. Now and for the foreseeable future is a turning point for Afghanistan. We can always go backwards, but much of the new violence is due to government encroachment into traditionally ungoverned areas.

The other part is due to a resurgent Taliban training in a safe haven, fueled with support from as far away as Saudi Arabia and individual citizens of many countries, including ours.

Jul 15, 2008 - 6:38 am 39. Doug:

- ‘Heroic’ fighting repels Afghan militants

The official said militants didn’t get into the outpost but they did overrun a small U.S.-led observation point outside the base, where it is believed most of the American and Afghan fatalities and injuries occurred.

Laity described the insurgent strike as a “major attack” by a “large group of insurgents.”

“What there was was a combat outpost had a major attack on it by a large group of insurgents. They had infiltrated a neighboring village and they fired on the base from that village and then they attacked the base itself.”

He said severe fighting followed, resulting in the American casualties and the wounding of four Afghan service members.

“They attempted to break into that base. They did make some penetration.
But overall they were repelled and they took very heavy casualties themselves,” Laity said.

He indicated that the penetration or breach that media reports about the strike referred to was the attack on the observation post.

“We brought in air power to stabilize the situation in a fight that then lasted for several hours,” he said.

Watch more about the attack on the coalition base »

Jul 15, 2008 - 7:31 am 40. Cannoneer No. 4:

John Samford, how much of the population lives on the high ground?

You don’t know the difference between an Observation Post and a Combat Out Post, and you still don’t know the purpose the COP was meant to fulfill, and you base all your pontifications upon your map recon from 7000 miles away, and you think inapt references to Rorke’s Drift and Dien Bien Phu impress.

Take your armchair generalship and . . . use your vivid imagination.

Jul 15, 2008 - 8:27 am 41. John Samford:

Cannoneer #4, Why so hostile? Has Cannoneer # 3 been on your arse about something?
Back OT, do you have a better suggestion?
Back in the day, Wayyyy before your momma bagged and tagged your poppa, a Combat OP was a heavy OP. An OP would have 2 or 3 guys while a Combat OP would have a LMG section and a fire team. Of couse, doctrine should have changed over the last 3 decades. In war, one adapts or one dies. Tactically, an OP provides warning, with hte grunts manning it expected to fall back to the MLR ( if they still call it that) when they spot someone hostile coming. A Combat Op was used when there was more line to hold then troops to hold it. a Combat OP was expected slow up the hostiles long enough for the moblie reserve to get there. COPs were used when there is no MLR because of force to space ratios and a mobile defense was required.
I based my OPINION on the map and the US Army’s long history of Incompetent Officers.
Tactics (a little) and doctrine (a lot) may change but the US Army produces incompetent Officers by intent. The System is designed to produce a jr. Officer with the balls to lead a charge. It does that. The American body politics fears Competent Generals MORE then it fears defeat in war. So the entire Officer system is designed to weed out those generals that have the genius to become a tyrant and overthrow the US Government. So what you get are a LOT of officers that follow the book and punch their ticket until they get that flag.
That is OK, since the US Military has a very competent NCO corps and the tradition of using it. American style warfare is based on Strategic maneuver and attrition. The NCO’s take care of the tactics. The US doesn’t do very well at the operational level since that is where the military genius that Politicians fear becomes so important.
My favorite example of that is the air campaign against Saddam’s Iraq. On a tactical level, the US/UK forces were able to destroy SAM sites at will and completely control the airspace over Iraq. Our strategy was to remove Saddam. Nobody was every able to make the operational connection between our overwhelming tactical dominance of Iraq air space and our strategic goal of removing Saddam.

Enough. The facts are the US Army took a mild beating. From the Stars and Stripes article;
“The militants showered the small base – which had been established just three days earlier – with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortar shells, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to release the information.

Some of the militants breached the wall and got inside, killing nine American soldiers and wounding 15 others, he said.”
24 casualties out of how many?
On the stragic level, some US Commanders are getting the idea;
“A Western official with detailed knowledge of the area said the raid underlined questions about the military campaign against the Taliban.

There is “overwhelming evidence that anti-coalition elements are operating effectively and that our counterinsurgency strategy is not successful … because it has not addressed the most basic need to bring security to the people and devised a means to separate the people from the enemy,” said the official, who agreed to discuss the sensitive issue only if not quoted by name.”

So what we have here is “surge” tactics being applied to Afghanistan, which might or might not be the proper tactics for Afghanistan.
The ‘Surge’ itself is a modern adaptation of the thousands of years old tactics used by the Romans. Also called the “OIL spot” by the French and ‘Ink Blot’ by the Brits. General Crook used it very well against the American Indians post Civil War. As a tactic it worked best against a large but divided enemy.
I think a clear and hold ‘cordon sanitaire’ approach will work better in the ‘gan. Build roads and put heavy protection on the road building zones. Let the rest of the country burn. As the roads expand, so will the protection and civilized life. The Romans invented this tactic also. They used it in combination with the OIL spot. The Cordon approach takes a LOOOONG time. Not sure if the politicians would be able to provide the cover to get that done.
I don’t think the American body politic is ready for a war that will last longer then America has been a nation.

URL to Stars and Stripes article, which is an AP feed for fair use purposes;

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AFGHANISTAN?SITE=DCSAS&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2008-07-14-15-38-17
I tried to quote just the S&S parts and avoid the AP quotes for legal reasons. S&S didn’t do a very good job of delineating where AP left off and they began.

Jul 15, 2008 - 9:35 am 42. sirius_sir:

Old Blue, thank you for your insights and perspective. I fear we who see and hear things from afar (too much of which, as you gently suggest, may be less than accurate and reliable) are sometimes too easily influenced by “dire depictions.” Thanks again for lending much needed clarity.

Jul 15, 2008 - 10:46 am 43. Cannoneer No. 4:

Supercilious pogues second guessing the tactical decisions of the men on the ground and claiming they are incompetent piss me off.

You base your critique on what you read in the Stars & Stripes.

So the theme of your comments on this thread is that officers are stupid and the mothers of America need to know that. Thank you so much for your valuable contribution.

Were you an infantry NCO, John?

Jul 15, 2008 - 12:20 pm 44. Old Blue:

WOOOHOOO! Governor Nuristani was sacked!

I wouldn’t say it while he was still the governor of Nuristan, but that guy wasn’t really on our side. The quotes below prove that. He was the governor who was ranting about our planes killing 27 people in a wedding party that was apparently crammed into two cars. The mortars fired at the fledgling combat outpost were obviously party favors gone awry.

His cheerleading for the ACM are pretty apparent below:

“The coordinated assault at Wanat sent a strong signal to other insurgent groups that “America cannot resist them anymore,” said Tamim Nuristani, who was fired as provincial governor last week by President Hamid Karzai’s administration for criticizing a U.S. airstrike that Afghan officials say killed civilians July 4 in the same area as Sunday’s attack.

Nuristani said the attackers at Wanat were a mix of Afghan- and Pakistan-based militants, some with al-Qaida links – a sign, he said, that cooperation is growing between what had been often fractious factions fighting the Western military presence in Afghanistan.

“The (attackers) were not only from Nuristan but from other districts,” Nuristani said. “They are not only Taliban. They were (Pakistan-based) Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Hezb-i-Islami, Taliban and those people who are dissatisfied with the (Karzai) government after these recent incidents. They all came together for this one.”

Okay… a bad on my part, apparently: First report I saw was a patrol ambushed. Then KIA in the attack, now killed during the penetration.

Oh, BTW ex-gov Nuristani, taking over the COP is winning. Getting there and getting thrown out is horshoes… close, but no banana. Nice cheerleading, though. Give that man some pom-poms.

The other part that is true is that we are really hit-or-miss when it comes to separating the insurgents from the population. We need to listen carefully to their messages and usurp or refute them.

Part of their message is that the government can’t protect them. Refute that by pushing local security. (Afghanistan is short thousands of mentors to help the police learn to function, now short ANA mentors to help the ANA to continue to develop.)

The other guy is right, too… it DOES show that we are “getting in their face.”

It also does show a resurgent insurgent. It’s nice to have a place to go, hang out, visit the ATM (Arab Teller Machine,) smoke some hashish and plan your next op; a place where you can actually see where you are going, the planes in the sky… but they can’t touch you. Lovely Pakistan. (cue music)

Figuring out the above and developing a functional counterinsurgency plan is the closest thing to rocket science that you can think of… and it not optional.

Tough work has to be done on the diplomacy side to open Pakistan to getting some help for that nasty infection that they have, but that needs to be done, too. The back door has got to be shut.

BTW, the cordon thing comes naturally when you build roads, which is happening all over the place there. The ink spot thing is working, too… but we are waaaaay short of mentors to help the Afghans develop viable governmental organizations, like the police.

When you fix the police in a district, it’s amazing what they can do for local security. Some areas, like those infiltration routes, are always going to require Army assets to keep it stoppered.

The tactics used in the surge are based on counterinsurgency doctrine, not Iraq-specific. Surge tactics are based on Galula’s tenet: The more safe you try to keep yourself, the less secure you will be.

The thing is that when you follow that, you expose yourself to the potential for this type of attack.

Jul 15, 2008 - 1:23 pm 45. Charles:

The first thing I thought was that taliban/aq put up a lot targets. The reports say a couple hundred were in on the attack. why weren’t more killed?

also the reports suggests that the aq/taliban had the element of surprise.

I think that this attack points to the obvious solution.

These forward bases need to be used as bait.

For every 5 outpost of 50 men each over a 200 mile range there should be a 500+ men available for back up-plus hair trigger air power. I may have the distances and numbers wrong. But the idea is deploy within 2-3 hours and to have sufficient force to take down aq/taliban forces of +-200-400 men

The bases should be set up with two things in mind. The first is that the aq/taliban will think them tasty.

The second is that there be a place where men & equipment can be deployed behind the taliban/aq and between them & the paki border. ie there should be a way to cut off aq retreat.

The outposts themselves need to have sensors in depth so that enemy combatants can’t get the drop on outposts. The sensors should be put up first–before the outpost is set up. obvious things like towns need to be monitored but also the goat trails in the back country that lead to the outpost.

so that not only will there be no surprise but the the back up will already be wind up for the counter strike before the enemy has hit in the first place.

Jul 15, 2008 - 2:43 pm 46. Old Blue:

Those ideas sound great on the surface, but you have to understand that you can’t hide a thing in Afghanistan. Even out in the most remote areas, there are people. Anything you put out will be found and either stolen or disabled. A sensor system designed to look like a rock was found and destroyed in one AO where I was operating. It literally looked like a rock. The Afghans figured it out.

You can’t hide anything there.

Predators, on the other hand, or a mast or even balloon-mounted RAID system would have helped. It helps elsewhere. IMO, there were waaaay too few predators in country.

As far as the hair-trigger QRF, there are a number of small Combat OutPosts in Afghanistan, and most of them are never attacked in mass. Rockets, mortars, a few RPG’s, yes; 200 Taliban, no. There is no reserve of that size available in country in the first place.

We used to get reports of 200 Taliban all the time. It was always 200 Taliban. The usual rule was to divide by 6 and that gave you more what the actual strength was. I’m not saying that’s the case here, just saying what our experience was.

One thing to point out about the latest NYT article about this whole mess is that at 4:30 am at this time of year, it is daylight in Afghanistan. The sun starts to come up at around 4. By 4:15 in the more open valleys, it is broad daylight. Even in mountainous country, it was pretty well lit by that time.

Early morning, just after morning prayers, was not an uncommon time for activity.

Also, a lot of “information” is coming from Tamim Nuristani, who obviously has an agenda and was just recently fired for “comments” that he made within the past week about the airstrike on the mortar crew in that same small area. He is still insisting on propagating the story that it was a wedding party. The NYT is publishing that as if it were true; IO success for the Taliban.

Again, I caution patience to see what the real story is. CJTF-101 has not put anything at all about it on their website, although they do mention the coalition soldier killed by an IED in another province over the weekend.

Jul 15, 2008 - 3:14 pm 47. MlR:

Jul 15, 2008 – 6:38 am

With all due respect – blah, blah, blah, blah.

Talk to you in 10 years.

Jul 15, 2008 - 3:29 pm 48. MlR:

We’re just passing through.

Jul 15, 2008 - 3:32 pm 49. NahnCee:

If someone gets fired in Aghanistan, do they remain fired?

Wouldn’t it be easier to simply nuke Pakistan at the same time we’re doing Iran, and let Afghanistan learn to grow up on their own? We’ve been there giving quite a bit of support for years now, not to mention gazillions of dollars, and they’re still backwards, misogynistic and dependent upon their poppy trade. I’m getting tired of the baby steps required to lead these heathen places into the 21st Century, and why we need to always be the responsible adults.

Especially now that we’re having bank runs and mortgage melt-downs back home and could use some attention and funding within our own 50 states.

Jul 15, 2008 - 4:40 pm 50. Charles:

ok same scenario with unmanned air reconn above the outposts 24/7–with back up in case one gets shot down.

It would probably be cheaper anyway to have unmanned air recon above the outposts anyway.

Not sure if aq would find the outposts interesting with drones buzzing above them.

That said, the encounter closer to the border a couple weeks back had the drones not only killing aq/taliban but giving photographic evidence that the bad guys killed were not paki border police in their huts–but aq/tali on the ridgeline firing down at americans. so the pakis had to stand down.

That’s a better scenario than the one we’re hearing about now.

Jul 15, 2008 - 6:35 pm 51. Doug:

US troops pull out of Afghan base after attack

Jul 16, 2008 - 4:35 am 52. NahnCee:

Captain Ed: “Ready to invade Pakistan?”

http://hotair.com/archives/2008/07/16/ready-to-invade-pakistan/

Jul 16, 2008 - 10:20 am 53. Charles:

Afghan NATO force hits targets inside Pakistan KABUL, July 16 (Reuters)

Jul 16, 2008 - 3:02 pm 54. Bukrafilmishmish:

A lot of the comments over the incident at Wanat seem to me to show some ignorance by commentators of the realities of this border area. It is entirely porous, has never been controlled by any “Power”, and is the most difficult country to fight in. About 6 million poeople live there. This is the North West Frontier about which Kipling wrote and in which the British Raj failed – so one can hardly expect Pakistan to do better.

Blog sniping at the US commander is grossly unfair. For all we know, some staff officer (”big fingers on little maps – that’s the way to kill the chaps”) miles away might have selected the position. In the best of all possible worlds,(in the appropriate FM) yes you always picket the heights and yes, you have DF on likely approaches and yes,the wire is up, the claymores set, and everyman has overhead cover. But things are seldom perfect.

I haven’t served in Afghanistan – but I have seen action in Yemen & in Oman in very similar terrain. Vividly recall the first time a tribesman took a shot at me – and my fury and frustration that I could not tell where he was. No one told me in training that you sometimes could not see the guy who was trying to kill you…

Jul 16, 2008 - 5:39 pm 55. John Samford:

“So the theme of your comments on this thread is that officers are stupid and the mothers of America need to know that. Thank you so much for your valuable contribution.”

No, have you ever considered a remedial reading course? You certainly seem to read things there I didn’t write.
I WROTE that most US officers are incompetent. That is NOT the same thing as stupid, not even close. The are incompetent because the system is set up that way, not thru any fault of their own. I think it was Ike that looked into changing the US Army to the same sort of staff system used by the Krauts when he was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. WW2 caused a LOT of changes in the US Military, War Department gone, DoD in, AAC gone USAF in, etc. One of the changes looked at was creation of a general staff system like the Germans had. Congress shot it down, according to Corson and Weigley. The LAST thing any American politician wants is a Military genius.
Despite that, America has produced several.
Lee, Mahan and McArthur foremost among them.
Lee was the heart and soul of a civil war, McArthur almost started one. Mahan was a naval person and it’s very rare for naval types to become tyrants. IIRC, there was one during the Roman empire, but I wouldn’t bet on that.
So the founding fathers and the politicians that followed them might be on to something.

I would never call anyone stupid for NOT being a genius. After all, being no genius, I could fit my peg in that hole. Talent can, genius MUST.
I seriously doubt that any mothers of the type I assume you are referring to frequent this blog. I could be wrong but if I am, I hope they read what I wrote and not what you think I wrote.
There is a simple and cost effective way to improve the officers corp of America. Rotate the future officers among the trade schools. For example; first year at West Point, second at Annapolis, third at Colorado Springs, then back to West point to graduate. This would round out the future officers and since the core at all the trade schools is about the same, it would get them thinking purple at an early age. Plus it would expand their contacts among the other branches. Right now the “Joint Tour” is a marginal waste of time.
This will never happen, due to the cherished fear America has of tyrants. The best way to avoid a military coup is to not have any military types capable of leading it.

Jul 16, 2008 - 7:35 pm 56. Cannoneer No. 4:

I notice in your response no reference to your vast military experience which might tend to lend credence to your assertions. I asked you if you had been an infantry NCO. Your silence I will take as a no.

Most officers are not incompetent.

I question your competence to judge them.

Jul 16, 2008 - 9:25 pm 57. Cannoneer No. 4:

An Alamo with a Different Ending

Perhaps the most important takeaway from that encounter, though, is the one that the mainstream media couldn’t be bothered to pay attention long enough to learn: that, not for the first time, a contingent of American soldiers that was outnumbered by up to a twenty-to-one ratio soundly and completely repulsed a complex, pre-planned assault by those dedicated enough to their cause to kill themselves in its pursuit.

Jul 16, 2008 - 9:57 pm 58. Bukrafilmishmish:

John Samford said “I WROTE that most US officers are incompetent. That is NOT the same thing as stupid, not even close. The are incompetent because the system is set up that way, not thru any fault of their own.”

Do I detect the smallest wood chip on his shoulder? Was he denied entry to ROTC or the Academy? Fess up, John.

On the point of officer education and Afgfhanistan, may I commend to you a book first published in 1896 which I’ve found most valuable in what was then called “hill warfare”: “Small Wars – their principles and practice” Delighted to see it is still in print. Read the modern reviews at http://www.amazon.com/Small-Wars-Their-Principles-Practice/dp/080326366X and you’ll see why.

Jul 17, 2008 - 1:17 am 59. Bukrafilmishmish:

This NYT article seems to me to tell it like it is for one US unit in the area http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1

Seems to me that NATO forces are somewhat hampered by their ROE. To democratise Afghanistan will take several generations, and they have to do it themselves. Meanwhile, let’s take a leaf out of the British RAJ playbook:

First, you negotiate with the recalcitrant tribes/villages/raiders. If more trouble, then you fine them heavily – and it’s a group fine. If they don’t pay (which they didn’t usually) then you seize all their livestock. Still more trouble, so threaten them that you will knock down their villages (threat most effective just before winter)Tell them when – so there’s the least chance of collateral damage. Still troublesome,then it’s “butcher, burn & bolt” time. You lay waste the valley – leave it a free fire zone – and your punitive expedition returns to base. Simple, effective and with no hiccups unless it’s the 21st century and the Press gets hold of the story…

PS. Don’t know if the 1st Lt who was killed at Wanak was in command.

Jul 17, 2008 - 6:16 am 60. Cannoneer No. 4:

Killed were:

1st Lt. Jonathan P. Brostrom, 24, of Hawaii.

Sgt. Israel Garcia, 24, of Long Beach, Calif.

Cpl. Jonathan R. Ayers, 24, of Snellville, Ga.

Cpl. Jason M. Bogar, 25, of Seattle, Wash.

Cpl. Jason D. Hovater, 24, of Clinton, Tenn.

Cpl. Matthew B. Phillips, 27, of Jasper, Ga.

Cpl. Pruitt A. Rainey, 22, of Haw River, N.C.

Cpl. Gunnar W. Zwilling, 20, of Florissant, Mo.

Pfc. Sergio S. Abad, 21, of Morganfield, Ky.

They were assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, Vicenza, Italy.

Jul 17, 2008 - 8:41 am 61. Cannoneer No. 4:

1st Lt. Jonathan P. Brostrom was incompetent, according to John Samford.

Jul 17, 2008 - 8:59 am 62. Old Blue:

The Brits lost in Afghanistan; more than once. The British didn’t learn to effectively fight a counterinsurgency until Malaya in the 1940’s and ’50’s. The Germans and Russians used brutalization tactics against insurgents and neither one found it successful.

I could empathize with the troops in Kunar. I’ve had those same types of conversations with local elders and villagers, with much the same results. I’ve written about that; about sitting in shuras where the lies were told, debunked, and then self-excused, only to find that some of those elders had sons who were Taliban.

While I am not the commander on the ground, the worst thing to my mind is abandoning an outpost following an attack. What was a costly tactical victory is now a strategic defeat on many levels.

The message is that if you punch us hard enough in the face and make our nose bleed, we will acquiesce to your wishes and leave that area.

Periodic patrols and visits just don’t have the same impact on the ability of the ACM to infiltrate along that route as the establishment of a permanent presence and an ongoing relationship with both the local population and the local governmental entities, such as the ANP.

Jul 17, 2008 - 10:40 am 63. NahnCee:

Wasn’t that the core of the Surge strategy? To *not* cede territory once it’s been won?

I’ve been wondering how much the other NATO partners have to say in these issues, too — when to hold ‘em and when to fold ‘em.

Jul 17, 2008 - 5:58 pm 64. Bukrafilmishmish:

As I understand it, the NATO commander, an american, sets the objectives – and the partners try to achieve those in their own particular area of operations, which differ widely in terrain and ACM activity.

Jonathon Brostrom’s death reminds me of Kipling’s poem “Arithmetic on the Frontier” See http://www.readbookonline.net/readOnLine/2739/ written at the time of the 2nd Afghan War. For those who don’t look it up, an extract:
“A scrimmage in a Border Station–
A canter down some dark defile–
Two thousand pounds of education
Drops to a ten-rupee jezail*–
The Crammer’s** boast, the Squadron’s pride,
Shot down like a rabbit in a ride!

No proposition Euclid wrote,
No formulae the text-books know,
Will turn the bullet from your coat,
Or ward the tulwar’s downward blow
Strike hard who cares–shoot straight who can–
The odds are on the cheaper man.”

* a jezail is a locally made musket carried by all tribesmen in the 1800s – until they could get their hands on a military rifle.
** Crammer, a tutoring institution specialising in getting potential young officers into Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst – the Brit’s “Westpoint”.

We can’t second guess the 2/503rd commander, but I suspect he was told to pull out of Wanak, which I consider a mistake. We have to drain the pond in which the insurgent fish swim… Time to remove the inhabitants, C4 the village and put in a company sized post with its own fire support, and saturate the area with patrols. In my experience, you have to call their bluff – otherwise they do not respect you. Measured enforcement is the issue; tribesmen love talk fests, but they have their own honor about keeping agreements, which are not necessarily the same as yours.

And the odds ARE on the cheaper man, viz. AK-47, RPG, with some captured russian HMG and mortars in support.

Jul 17, 2008 - 7:13 pm 65. Zenster:

More heartfelt thanks from another fellow American, Old Blue. Your service and insights are priceless.

Old Blue: Knowing the Soviet experience in whatever province and district in which you are operating tells you where the ambush sites are. It’s really that simple.

Knowing old Soviet strategy will help us break our ingrained habit of “fighting the last war”. This becomes important when one realizes that—due to limited arms quality and low technology—the Taliban still are “figting the last war”.

The other part is due to a resurgent Taliban training in a safe haven, fueled with support from as far away as Saudi Arabia and individual citizens of many countries, including ours.

This is the One Big Thing™ that’s got to change. Saudi Arabian financing and Islamic zakat both need to be choked off, even if we have to “strangle” some Saudi Princelings in the process.

The hawala (or hundi) financial transfer system also needs to have its spine snapped.

I wonder if bombing out the roads that connect to Ziarat’s white marble quarries (as Doug commented about), might take a little starch out of some Taliban turbans as well.

Jul 18, 2008 - 6:47 pm 66. Cannoneer No. 4:

The Story Is About Honor & Valor, Not Victims

Jul 19, 2008 - 9:56 am 67. Cannoneer No. 4:

Soldiers recount deadly attack on Afghanistan outpost

This is not AP, John Samford, this is Steve Mraz.

“It was some of the bravest stuff I’ve ever seen in my life, and I will never see it again because those guys,” Stafford said, then paused. “Normal humans wouldn’t do that. You’re not supposed to do that — getting up and firing back when everything around you is popping and whizzing and trees, branches coming down and sandbags exploding and RPGs coming in over your head … It was a fistfight then, and those guys held ’ em off.”

Stafford offered a guess as to why his fellow soldiers fought so hard.

“Just hardcoreness I guess,” he said. “Just guys kicking ass, basically. Just making sure that we look scary enough that you don’t want to come in and try to get us.”

Jul 19, 2008 - 12:17 pm 68. Cannoneer No. 4:

“The soldiers were there on a reconnaissance mission to establish a presence and find a good location to connect with the local government, populace and Afghan National Police”, John Samford, which cannot be done from high ground where nobody lives.

“These guys have fought for 15 months, and they have fought harder, and I mean this literally, they have fought harder and (had) more engagements, more direct-fire engagements, than any brigade in the United States Army in probably the toughest terrain. These guys are absolutely veterans and they know what they’re doing and they have that airborne spirit and they fought a very, very tough battle and held the ground and did everything they were supposed to do” and they don’t need kibbitzing pogues to presume to teach them how to suck eggs.

Jul 19, 2008 - 3:54 pm 69. Bukrafilmishmish:

What really happened at Wanat will only emerge slowly. I have some questions in no particular order or connection, to which people could perhaps contribute their 2 cents :

1. Dawn on the day of the fight was around 04.50 hrs local. The attack is said to have started at 04.30, which is just before daybreak (although in steep valleys, light often depends on when the sun clears the surrounding peaks) Assuming the platoon adopted normal practice, they would have been all awake “standing to” from 04.20 to 05.20. So why would the ACM attack at the exact time the defenders should be most on the alert?

2. Overrunning the base in daylight guarantees that the ACM would be vulnerable through the day to NATO close air support. So was the idea just to kill americans, grab some loot and vamoose? If the ACM advisers were chechens, a night attack would be more likely. I conclude this was a locally organised affair.

3. The battle is said to have gone on all day. So where were the “cavalry”? I’d expect a Quick Reaction Force via helicopter to be dropped into the ACM lines of withdrawal.

4. Relying on CAS to save your ass can get it bitten badly in poor weather. The only reliable all weather support is pre-registered artillery. Thought that lesson was learnt in Vietnam. Perhaps “Old Blue” can tell us if outposts are covered by fire base guns?

5. May have got it wrong, but I get the impression that Wanat is difficult to access by vehicle – but there were US vehicles there (heloed in?) Bumping up & down on the only route possible is a sure fire recipe for ambush. [Probably used up one of my nine military lives learning that; my 8 ambushers left the dry river bed track blocked with rocks when they got bored of waiting for me. When I reached the next outpost half an hour later, I found the 5 survivors in chains! They'd walked straight into a patrol from that outpost] So why were the vehicles there?

Good photos of the general area here http://pa-bashore-afghanistan-2.blogspot.com/

Jul 19, 2008 - 8:09 pm 70. Belmont Club » Postscript:

[...] outpost in Kunar province. An initial map recon of the battlefield was featured in an earlier post, On the Pakistani Border. For those who didn’t read that post the Google terrain map showed the village of Wanat to be [...]

Jul 20, 2008 - 5:44 am 71. Old Blue:

First, I really feel for those guys. I’ve been out in the breeze and NOT gotten that treatment, but it was always our “nightmare scenario.” Those guys lived it, and some of them died in it. My heart goes out to all of them.

Don’t make any conclusions about who planned and organized it. By the sheer numbers of RPG rockets employed, it was a very serious effort that was well-planned. Arab-speakers operate in this area, so any effort of this magnitude would very well have had their involvement. Remember also that there is information that the Jaish e Mohammad has shifted from the Kashmir to Afghanistan. They are used to fighting against the Indian Army and would be pretty proficient.

I was in the Tag Ab, Nijrab, and Ala Say districts of Kapisa Province at this time last year. The terrain isn’t nearly as tight there, but it is mountainous, and it was daylight by 4:30… at least BMNT. Not having night vision, the ACM would need at least BMNT to engage with that accuracy. It is also a local TTP to attack after morning prayers. That’s why they attacked when they did.

The locals usually aren’t very accurate with their weapons. AK zeroing requires a specific tool, and they don’t shoot the AK’s much. Ammo is too precious and it draws attention. Same with the RPG’s… little practice, and they tend to do the old “spray and pray… Allah will guide my bullets.” Fighters in Kunar tend to be more accurate, from what I know, than most, but it’s very possible that there were some outsiders involved; even likely, given all the other variables that point in that direction.

They were making a statement.

Yes, COP’s are usually covered by indirect, but they would always hesitate to fire indirect into a village.

Side note; I read that they arrested the Police Chief of Waygal. I met that guy once (if they haven’t changed him out since then.)

Interesting.

Again, these guys lived the nightmare. We very often operate in very small teams in remote locations. Many times we survive at the pleasure of the locals and/or the amount of resources they have at hand and their commitment to use it. All of those factors came against Chosen Company. They clearly fought like hell. That 1LT clearly did his best that morning, and he died going outside the wire to reinforce the OP.

No, those men were not victims. They were warriors who fought in the worst imaginable scenario in Afghanistan. I am awestruck.

Jul 20, 2008 - 10:23 am

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