Don’t make any conclusions about who planned and organized it. By the sheer numbers of RPG rockets employed, it was a very serious effort that was well-planned. Arab-speakers operate in this area, so any effort of this magnitude would very well have had their involvement. Remember also that there is information that the Jaish e Mohammad has shifted from the Kashmir to Afghanistan. They are used to fighting against the Indian Army and would be pretty proficient.

I was in the Tag Ab, Nijrab, and Ala Say districts of Kapisa Province at this time last year. The terrain isn’t nearly as tight there, but it is mountainous, and it was daylight by 4:30… at least BMNT. Not having night vision, the ACM would need at least BMNT to engage with that accuracy. It is also a local TTP to attack after morning prayers. That’s why they attacked when they did.

The locals usually aren’t very accurate with their weapons. AK zeroing requires a specific tool, and they don’t shoot the AK’s much. Ammo is too precious and it draws attention. Same with the RPG’s… little practice, and they tend to do the old “spray and pray… Allah will guide my bullets.” Fighters in Kunar tend to be more accurate, from what I know, than most, but it’s very possible that there were some outsiders involved; even likely, given all the other variables that point in that direction.

They were making a statement.

Yes, COP’s are usually covered by indirect, but they would always hesitate to fire indirect into a village.

Side note; I read that they arrested the Police Chief of Waygal. I met that guy once (if they haven’t changed him out since then.)

Interesting.

Again, these guys lived the nightmare. We very often operate in very small teams in remote locations. Many times we survive at the pleasure of the locals and/or the amount of resources they have at hand and their commitment to use it. All of those factors came against Chosen Company. They clearly fought like hell. That 1LT clearly did his best that morning, and he died going outside the wire to reinforce the OP.

No, those men were not victims. They were warriors who fought in the worst imaginable scenario in Afghanistan. I am awestruck.

1. Dawn on the day of the fight was around 04.50 hrs local. The attack is said to have started at 04.30, which is just before daybreak (although in steep valleys, light often depends on when the sun clears the surrounding peaks) Assuming the platoon adopted normal practice, they would have been all awake “standing to” from 04.20 to 05.20. So why would the ACM attack at the exact time the defenders should be most on the alert?

2. Overrunning the base in daylight guarantees that the ACM would be vulnerable through the day to NATO close air support. So was the idea just to kill americans, grab some loot and vamoose? If the ACM advisers were chechens, a night attack would be more likely. I conclude this was a locally organised affair.

3. The battle is said to have gone on all day. So where were the “cavalry”? I’d expect a Quick Reaction Force via helicopter to be dropped into the ACM lines of withdrawal.

4. Relying on CAS to save your ass can get it bitten badly in poor weather. The only reliable all weather support is pre-registered artillery. Thought that lesson was learnt in Vietnam. Perhaps “Old Blue” can tell us if outposts are covered by fire base guns?

5. May have got it wrong, but I get the impression that Wanat is difficult to access by vehicle – but there were US vehicles there (heloed in?) Bumping up & down on the only route possible is a sure fire recipe for ambush. [Probably used up one of my nine military lives learning that; my 8 ambushers left the dry river bed track blocked with rocks when they got bored of waiting for me. When I reached the next outpost half an hour later, I found the 5 survivors in chains! They'd walked straight into a patrol from that outpost] So why were the vehicles there?

Good photos of the general area here http://pa-bashore-afghanistan-2.blogspot.com/

“These guys have fought for 15 months, and they have fought harder, and I mean this literally, they have fought harder and (had) more engagements, more direct-fire engagements, than any brigade in the United States Army in probably the toughest terrain. These guys are absolutely veterans and they know what they’re doing and they have that airborne spirit and they fought a very, very tough battle and held the ground and did everything they were supposed to do” and they don’t need kibbitzing pogues to presume to teach them how to suck eggs.

This is not AP, John Samford, this is Steve Mraz.

“It was some of the bravest stuff I’ve ever seen in my life, and I will never see it again because those guys,” Stafford said, then paused. “Normal humans wouldn’t do that. You’re not supposed to do that — getting up and firing back when everything around you is popping and whizzing and trees, branches coming down and sandbags exploding and RPGs coming in over your head … It was a fistfight then, and those guys held ’ em off.”

“Just hardcoreness I guess,” he said. “Just guys kicking ass, basically. Just making sure that we look scary enough that you don’t want to come in and try to get us.”

Old Blue: Knowing the Soviet experience in whatever province and district in which you are operating tells you where the ambush sites are. It’s really that simple.

Knowing old Soviet strategy will help us break our ingrained habit of “fighting the last war”. This becomes important when one realizes that—due to limited arms quality and low technology—the Taliban still are “figting the last war”.

The other part is due to a resurgent Taliban training in a safe haven, fueled with support from as far away as Saudi Arabia and individual citizens of many countries, including ours.

This is the One Big Thing™ that’s got to change. Saudi Arabian financing and Islamic zakat both need to be choked off, even if we have to “strangle” some Saudi Princelings in the process.

The hawala (or hundi) financial transfer system also needs to have its spine snapped.

I wonder if bombing out the roads that connect to Ziarat’s white marble quarries (as Doug commented about), might take a little starch out of some Taliban turbans as well.

Jonathon Brostrom’s death reminds me of Kipling’s poem “Arithmetic on the Frontier” See http://www.readbookonline.net/readOnLine/2739/ written at the time of the 2nd Afghan War. For those who don’t look it up, an extract:
“A scrimmage in a Border Station–
A canter down some dark defile–
Two thousand pounds of education
Drops to a ten-rupee jezail*–
The Crammer’s** boast, the Squadron’s pride,
Shot down like a rabbit in a ride!

No proposition Euclid wrote,
No formulae the text-books know,
Will turn the bullet from your coat,
Or ward the tulwar’s downward blow
Strike hard who cares–shoot straight who can–
The odds are on the cheaper man.”

* a jezail is a locally made musket carried by all tribesmen in the 1800s – until they could get their hands on a military rifle.
** Crammer, a tutoring institution specialising in getting potential young officers into Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst – the Brit’s “Westpoint”.

We can’t second guess the 2/503rd commander, but I suspect he was told to pull out of Wanak, which I consider a mistake. We have to drain the pond in which the insurgent fish swim… Time to remove the inhabitants, C4 the village and put in a company sized post with its own fire support, and saturate the area with patrols. In my experience, you have to call their bluff – otherwise they do not respect you. Measured enforcement is the issue; tribesmen love talk fests, but they have their own honor about keeping agreements, which are not necessarily the same as yours.

And the odds ARE on the cheaper man, viz. AK-47, RPG, with some captured russian HMG and mortars in support.

I’ve been wondering how much the other NATO partners have to say in these issues, too — when to hold ‘em and when to fold ‘em.

I could empathize with the troops in Kunar. I’ve had those same types of conversations with local elders and villagers, with much the same results. I’ve written about that; about sitting in shuras where the lies were told, debunked, and then self-excused, only to find that some of those elders had sons who were Taliban.

While I am not the commander on the ground, the worst thing to my mind is abandoning an outpost following an attack. What was a costly tactical victory is now a strategic defeat on many levels.

The message is that if you punch us hard enough in the face and make our nose bleed, we will acquiesce to your wishes and leave that area.

Periodic patrols and visits just don’t have the same impact on the ability of the ACM to infiltrate along that route as the establishment of a permanent presence and an ongoing relationship with both the local population and the local governmental entities, such as the ANP.