Comments on: Retreat to Afghanistan

By: Toward A Better Debate « Strange Monkey Doll

Toward A Better Debate « Strange Monkey Doll — Fri, 01 Aug 2008 05:43:04 +0000

[...] and not the Middle East was the strategic center of gravity of Islamic fundamentalism. In an earlier post I wrote: “In the debate over whether America should have focused its initial response on [...]

By: Belmont Club » The wrong place

Belmont Club » The wrong place — Tue, 29 Jul 2008 12:33:51 +0000

[...] and not the Middle East was the strategic center of gravity of Islamic fundamentalism. In an earlier post I wrote: [...]

By: Cannoneer No. 4

Cannoneer No. 4 — Tue, 29 Jul 2008 04:19:27 +0000

Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence agency really runs Pakistan. Gilani’s ‘humiliating’ about-face ISI fiasco It was Zardari’s decision to control ISI A state within a state SALVO IN KABUL - Democracy will not alter Pakistan’s strategic designs The Paks do not fear the Americans. That needs to change. It probably serves American purposes to publicly proclaim love and appreciation for the gallant efforts of our valued "ally", but the only thing they are really doing for us is letting us use their port, roads and air space. When they fall down on that job there won't be much reason left to tread lightly with them.

By: sirius_sir

sirius_sir — Sun, 27 Jul 2008 21:59:40 +0000

Al_Batross, I’m glad you elaborated and I would agree with the general tenor of your remarks. I do believe we had a moral obligation to secure the safety of the population once we’d entered upon this project. To my mind, that meant seeing it through to a successful completion. I can’t understand those who thought it better to leave, and leave the Iraqis to the tender mercies of the killers, than to stay and defeat our common enemy.

If we could have killed more of the enemy sooner I wouldn’t have objected. But somehow we got ourselves into a war where apparently the good guys weren’t supposed to do any killing. Which of course led to more deaths than required. I think part of the reason the Surge worked is that Petraeus incorporated a news blackout that allowed the things that needed to be done to be done. That, and embedding our guys among the population. After which it became a whole lot easier to gain the general population’s trust and cooperation, and thereby gain the human intelligence we needed to complete the mission.

By: Geeyore

Geeyore — Fri, 25 Jul 2008 13:53:07 +0000

vb said:

“I don’t really like this boots on the ground vs human int type of analysis.”

My thumbnail heuristic is a bit sloppy but it works: keep an eye on the MNF-I press releases to see how they’re identifying troop engagements. Conventional U.S. forces are identified as such, while the remainder are ID’d as “Coalition forces”.

Before and during the Surge there was a noticeable uptick in the number of press releases mentioning “Coalition forces” in things like snatch-and-grabs, Predator targeting, and similar activities.

When I see those phrases and contexts, it’s usually a good bet that Task Force 77 (or 121 or whatever they are these days) has been out hunting again.

By: Cannoneer No. 4

Cannoneer No. 4 — Thu, 24 Jul 2008 11:54:27 +0000

Modest goals for the other war What can we do? Intensify what we're already doing: Rely on intelligence, special operations and selective airstrikes for now. As long as we throw well-aimed punches and leave, Pakistan's government will complain publicly but will accept our actions privately — and be glad of them. The Taliban, or something like it, will always have a constituency in backward areas and among severe Islamists. We shall never see a fully peaceful Afghanistan — not even with the long troop presence a durably positive outcome will require. Nonetheless, if the Pakistan haven problem can be solved, all the other problems can be managed. We won't stop terror completely, but we can help the Afghans build a state that terror can't reclaim.

By: Noocyte

Noocyte — Thu, 24 Jul 2008 07:24:35 +0000

As usual, I have found the commentary over here to be extremely instructive. I’ve given much thought to the question of what exactly it would mean to shift the locus of COIN doctrine from the quasi-periodic space of Iraq to the chaotic domain of Afghanistan. I’ve found the (unsurprisingly) facile formulations of the Obama camp, with its unelaborated prescriptions for “sending in more troops” to be unnervingly unsatisfying.

While preserving the general principles of COIN doctrine, the specific applications to such a profoundly different AO as the Af-Pak theater will require such a level of sophistication and nuanced appreciation for the complexity of the battlespace that I shudder at the thought of the task falling to dilettantes.

I can only hope that the next occupant of the Oval Office will be canny enough to avail himself of the level of expertise and intelligence which is evident in the pages of this blog!

By: Charles

Charles — Thu, 24 Jul 2008 01:54:18 +0000

Sheikh Saeed/Abu Mustafa al-Yazid an Egyptian whom U.S. intelligence officials have identified as the al-Qaeda's third highest-ranking official, sat for an interview with Najeeb Ahmad, a reporter for Geo TV. Geo TV is a private Pakistani television channel.

By: Al_Batross

Al_Batross — Wed, 23 Jul 2008 20:19:29 +0000

sirius_sir:
Thank you for reading my comment. I was not meaning that there were insufficent troops to stop people running off with Baath property. Nor was I suggesting that force should have been used to prevent that, though now you mention it, allowing it probably did suggest weakness.
We were talking about sources of humint, and I was meaning that the lack of soldiers allowed really evil men to bomb, torture, rape and mutilate over a large part of Iraq, intimidating the general population and drying up the humint.
I am a total civilian, but I don’t have a problem with expressing an opinion on this because it is a moral issue and not just a tactical one. The first signs of that terror activity should have been crushed, mostly to show strength but mainly because it was the right thing to do, because it was wrong to leave the ordinary folk of Iraq so vulnerable.
While there many differences in the details between Iraq and Afghanistan, the big picture is the same. Show the strong horse, fighting like it means to win, because that is the right thing to do, both morally and tactically.

By: Old Blue

Old Blue — Wed, 23 Jul 2008 14:43:58 +0000

Cannoneer; Thanks! Very good article, I’m formulating a comment for them. That’s a subject that I have strong feelings/opinions about.