50 Comments

1. Teresita:

W: Perhaps it is fallacious to believe that intelligence operations and diplomacy can be neatly separated from military activity in the age of terrorism. Intelligence work and diplomacy — even law enforcement — cannot long survive without security.

The clandestine nature of the CIA’s UAV strikes, combined with their primary role as a gatherer of real-time surveillance, puts them, together with special forces ops, squarely in the realm of intelligence work in regards to the war on terrorism.

Military activity of the sort that involves uniformed Marines and soldiers on the ground in the political vacuum that is the Afghan-Pakistan border area ends up, more often than not, being tasked solely with its own force protection, and they serve as a visible symbol of “occupation” and thus a rallying influence for Jihad.

The Rand Corporation, in their report titled “How Terrorist Groups End – Lessons for Countering al Qaida” looked at the factors that result in the termination of terrorist activity after studying 648 terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006. They concluded that 43% of the time the terrorist groups convert into mainstream political movements. Forty percent of the time law enforcement activity and intelligence work bring them to heel. Ten percent of the time, the terrorists quit because they achieve their stated goals, while only 7% of the time does military action (since 9-11-01 the primary emphasis of the US War on Terrorism) neutralize the terrorists.

Aug 3, 2008 - 7:22 pm 2. 49erDweet:

I have no idea how quiet those UAV’s might be high above the steep ridge of a barren mountain, as in Pakistan, but its got to be where any faint buzzing or droning noise must churn up the ‘guts’ of OBL’s “freedom fighters” something fierce. Maybe we should be tracking the Mylanta shipments into the hills through Islambad.

Aug 3, 2008 - 7:23 pm 3. Fat Man:

“Abu Khabab Al-Masri is dead”

Now they call him Shish Khabab.

Aug 3, 2008 - 7:25 pm 4. NahnCee:

Waiting for Pakistan’s ululations of protest, that they have sovereign sovreignity over everything within Pakistan, tht they are perfectly capable of handling their own terrorist infestation, and how dare any other country step foot or drone into their homegrown “lawless regions”.

Oh, the humiliation!

Buncha lying thieving useless whippersnappers.

Aug 3, 2008 - 7:32 pm 5. Richard Fernandez:

I read the RAND paper and wrote an article on it at the Pajamas Media main site. The RAND corporation talks about the way terror groups end, not necessarily the way they are defeated. The decision of many of these terror groups to join a peace process or throw in the towel was inseparable from the end of the Cold War, and the RAND report gives examples of these. To argue that these terror groups would have folded if the Soviets had won the Cold War isn’t very convincing and the RAND report doesn’t make it. It talks about how terror groups end. That’s not to be confused with how they lost.

It makes the more forceful argument that because al-Qaeda attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan increased after September 11 ergo military action against it was ineffective. This is a flawed argument because al-Qaeda operations are perfectly correlated with operations against it. So sending forces to fight al-Qaeda would have the effect of increasing hostile contact but not necessarily mean al-Qaeda was getting stronger. Japan launched more attacks on the US between 1942 and 1945 than before that, but that didn’t meean Japan was gaining strength. It was in fact losing. The end state (the Japanese surrender) was the real metric of effectiveness. Similarly, the argument that because al-Qaeda launched more attacks against the US in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 ergo it got stronger is not necessarily true. They were fighting for their lives. But if you look at the end state in Iraq today, it’s hard to conclude, “right. Military force was ineffective. That’s why al-Qaeda is beaten.” If US action were so futile, then why is the end state thus? This is not necessarily a refutation of the RAND argument, but you can see why their assertion need not logically follow.

RAND also argued that al-Qaeda attacks in Muslim countries or in European countries with large Muslim populations increased after 9/11. The implication is that military action didn’t put a damper on this either. But consider for a while why it al-Qaeda failed to significantly attack the US after 9/11. Why would they attack Muslim countries instead? So you can read the RAND evidence to explain al-Qaeda’s efforts to keep their base in line. Make a show of strength in their bailiwicks. That is more indicative of weakness than strength.

Finally, the question is why, if diplomacy and intelligence alone are so effective, 9/11 itself occurred and why afterward it was never repeated when diplomacy and intelligence was augmented by military force. I think the common sense answer is that diplomacy, intelligence and military action together are the most effective. It’s a triad. Military action in Afghanistan has provided a superior base for gathering intel which would otherwise not be obtainable using pre-9/11 methods. This is not to disparage intel gathering or diplomacy. It is merely an observation that intel and diplomacy are enhanced by the judicious military operations. It’s not either or. It’s a cocktail of policies that is the best countermeasure against terrorism.

Aug 3, 2008 - 7:39 pm 6. Roy Lofquist:

Dear Teresita,

Perhaps it would be more enlightening to read the news rather than reports from the Rand Corporation. I have been reading Rand for forty five years. Sometimes right. Sometime not so right. Fact: the bastards are dead.

Regards,
Roy

Aug 3, 2008 - 7:47 pm 7. wretchard:

I find arguments that the Surge worked “because we made better use of intelligence” or “because the Sheiks turned against al-Qaeda” unpersuasive. It assumes those activities were possible without the cover of military force. Al-Qaeda would kill informants, often brutally and through vicious torture. And it is a matter of record that any Sheik who denounced al-Qaeda was marked for death — and his family besides.

Just as there is no such thing as a “purely military” solution, there is no such thing as a “purely political” solution. Why are there Marine Guards at embassies if diplomacy were all? Military force, as Clausewitz once observed, is the continuation of politics by other means. They are different aspects of statecraft. Philip Bobbitt in his book The Shield of Achilles observes that the mythical shield depicted religion, culture, law, economics and bronze-armored warriors in one continuum. That is the Shield of Achilles. Information and culture war represent on end of conflict, but the bronze spear represented the other. It is only natural to find that intelligence, diplomacy and war are all part of the same package. Together they strengthen each other. Separately they fail.

Aug 3, 2008 - 7:48 pm 8. dla:

Advantages ebb and flow, but 10th-century thinking is really hurting Al-Qaeda. My guess is that less than $100 of materials is required to destroy a $250K 100mph UAV. But by holing up in the most backwards of nations, they find themselves at the mercy of video-game players. They don’t need something like a Stinger, which can take down a jet. They need something only slightly more advanced than a hobby rocket to take down a UAV.

Aug 3, 2008 - 7:49 pm 9. fred:

I find it more plausible that the RAND Corporation receives money from the Kingdom and from the Gulf States. There is no shortage of policy wonks and academics in this country who have no qualms about going easy on the Ummah.

Jihad is war, not a criminal enterprise. In war, you either bring your heavy hitters or you go home in body bags or tail between your legs.

If it takes unmanned drones to zap ‘em, well, whatever it takes. And who cares if we stray somewhat into Pakistan? I swear to God some people still haven’t learned the lessons from the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Aug 3, 2008 - 8:21 pm 10. F:

Wretchard:

Having been assigned to 9 different embassies over the 27-year course of a US diplomatic career, I’ll have to take exception to your example of the US Marines in embassies. They are not there to fight the locals, and in fact one of the toughest tests they have to face is unruly mobs or similar action that they could easily put down with a little more SPE (diplospeak for Special Protective Equipment = guns). No, they are there to give the folks inside time to destroy certain files and equipment that are deemed too sensitive to fall into other hands. They’re there to hold the defensive lines at the front door while the rest of us burn our secrets.

A good example of what happens when those secrets are compromised comes from the embassy takeover in Teheran, were files of embassy contacts were captured by the Revolutionary Guards and the people in those files ruthlessly hunted down and killed. We have destruction capability for our files, but it requires some time to work.

When I first went overseas the destruction capability was 55 gallon drums lined with some kind of intense oxidizer. Dump paper files inside the drum, throw a match on top and inside 30 seconds you have a fireball 25 feet high. One embassy where I worked had a drum go off inadvertantly — it burned through several concrete floors (they were usually on the embassy roof, as crowds would take the longest to arrive there).

We used to hold “bag-and-drag” drills where we’d put old files in a bag (diplomatic pouches, actually) and drag them to the communications vault, where they’d be destroyed by a large machine that pulped everything you put into it. The purpose of the exercise was to determine how long it took to destroy 12 linear feet (or some such number) of top secret files, only the exercise was routinely held with unimportant office documents.

With the development of other technologies (microfiches, computer disks, etc), different destruction methods were developed. But they all require a certain delay from the moment the person in charge says “destroy”.

Anyway, the Marines aren’t there to shoot at the bad guys, they’re there to hold the bad guys at bay with tear gas and the like.

F

Aug 3, 2008 - 8:45 pm 11. Mike Sylwester:

This probably is the greatest time ever to be working in the US military intelligence organizations supporting military operations. All the equipment works superbly, and the coordination of IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, etc., is practiced and polished. Our maps of Waziristan probably show every structure, with relevant data. The personnel is professional and experienced.

It’s the Ritz! It’s whiz-bang! It’s perfection!

Furthermore, NSA must by now have thoroughly mastered the entire electronic communication network of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Every telphone conversation and every e-mail of every radical Moslem organization in those two countries is being captured and evaluated.

Most of the young Pashtun jihadists trying to sneak across the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan are doomed. They are being watched from above as soon as they walk out of their Pakistani mosque and climb into their truck to begin their ride toward the border.

Our ability to target top leaders is especially devastaing. In their administration of their forces and resources, relatively little is written down, so when any such leader is killed, much organizational policy and information perishes forever.

There are about 40 million Pashtuns, but a few thousand of our soldiers are controlling them.

Aug 3, 2008 - 8:55 pm 12. slade:

Now they call him Shish Khabab.

Hoisted by his own petard.

Aug 3, 2008 - 9:12 pm 13. NahnCee:

Most of the young Pashtun jihadists trying to sneak across the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan are doomed. They are being watched from above as soon as they walk out of their Pakistani mosque and climb into their truck to begin their ride toward the border.

Odd how all this sooper-dooper eye in the sky surveillance didn’t prevent Bhutto’s assassination. Or perhaps we’re just focusing on young jihadists flitting back and forth over that border, and really don’t care if Pakistan’s politicians off each other right and left.

Aug 3, 2008 - 10:24 pm 14. Eggplant:

dla said:

“My guess is that less than $100 of materials is required to destroy a $250K 100mph UAV.”

dla maybe thinking of a different UAV. $250K seemed too cheap for a MQ-1 Predator. I just did a quick look at Wikipedia and found:

“Cost for an early production Predator was about $3.2 million USD.”

An AGM-114K Hellfire II costs about $65,000.

dla also said:

“But by holing up in the most backwards of nations, they find themselves at the mercy of video-game players. They don’t need something like a Stinger, which can take down a jet. They need something only slightly more advanced than a hobby rocket to take down a UAV.”

Actually, I think it requires somthing like a Stinger to take down an MQ-1 Predator. There’s no way something powered with an Estes rocket is going to take down a Predator.

The good news is: We’re killing bad guys with Hellfire armed Predators.

The bad news is: It’s expensive.

It’s unfortunate that we couldn’t simply bribe the bad guy with $65,000 to give up Islamic facism and live out his life as a moral human being. Unfortunately because he’s an Islamic fascist, he’d simply spend the $65k on Chinese made Ak-47s, RPGs and suicide vests. The only real solution is to track him down and kill him.

Aug 3, 2008 - 10:45 pm 15. wretchard:

Maybe I should have picked a better example than Marine guards at embassies.

Aug 3, 2008 - 10:56 pm 16. Kirk Parker:

dla,

You’d better be one genius hobbyist to take down a Predator (100mph cruising speed at 25000ft ceiling) with your hobbyist rocket!

Aug 3, 2008 - 11:12 pm 17. Elroy Jetson:

NahnCee,
Are you requesting 24/7 365 surveillance across the entire globe? It was not our place to have a squadron of UAVs buzzing around Rawalpindi that day. I think Pak would have had a fit if we tried it w/o clearance from the ISI. Fat chance.
Pashtun jihadists trying to sneak across the border to do the good guys harm? I say zap’em until they realize jihad is a game for ignorant fools.

Aug 3, 2008 - 11:43 pm 18. Wadeusaf:

“Anyway, the Marines aren’t there to shoot at the bad guys, they’re there to hold the bad guys at bay with tear gas and the like.”

Embassy duty may ultimately come to such holding actions, however the daily routine of the embassy guards involves a lot more than shredder practice. While not necessarily deal makers or breakers, the pomp and ceremony of military custom adds great meaning to some diplomatic events, and just as a show of strength can be an asset, so too can the show of restraint be used to advantage by an ambassador.

While the functions do not include interacting with the locals, the fact that the Marine Guard has multiple functions and multiple tasks augments one minor aspect of military and diplomacy working together for common cause. Just my .02.

Aug 4, 2008 - 12:01 am 19. Wadeusaf:

“Military activity of the sort that involves uniformed Marines and soldiers on the ground in the political vacuum that is the Afghan-Pakistan border area ends up, more often than not, being tasked solely with its own force protection, and they serve as a visible symbol of “occupation” and thus a rallying influence for Jihad.”

But that vacuum is not the only, nor the most likely situation our uniformed soldiers find themselves in. In many areas of that border, the harsh rules of the Taliban are not accepted as the way it ought nor needs to be. Pashtun (as well as Peshmergah) have found other options, and when allowed to choose rarely opt for the very conditional forms of Taliban rule. It is governing under duress, and is not the optimal form of government or social structure for that culture. Despite the harsh environment the punitive nature of the Taliban works against them in dealing with local long established custom and civil order. I places where our forces have been allowed to operate, the locals see us as a balance against the agitation caused by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Even when the local Taliban and Al Qaeda are members of the tribe or clan.

It can get dicy due to the customs and close familial rules and ties, but it is not by any means something that cannot with good intel, good dipolomatic advice and strength evolve into a society that is advantageous to the Afghanis and us. Heck, it can even advance much of Paks causes too.

Aug 4, 2008 - 12:16 am 20. Ledger:

I congratulate our forces for liquating bomb maker al-Masri.

From Bill Roggio description it sounded like a well coordinated operation.

I do have a problem with co-author Phil Peterson description of a scrubbed mission to eliminate terrorists who could kill our guys because of civilian being in the area.

The problem is manifold. But, first, al Qaeda adapts to threats and letting our Rules Of Engagement be know will probably result in to al Qaeda leaders simply toting around women and children.

Second, it hard to put a price on letting top terrorists escape only to kill another day (and probably our guys).

I would suggest that unless there were undercover moles whose lives would be lost and said lost lives would hamper our surveillance methods (recruitment of moles) then the strike should have gone forward.

Al Qaeda could careless about killing women and children – hence there is little to gain from scrubbing a mission because of a few civilian casualties.

Sure, that is harsh but so are the terrorists. Who knows when the chance to liquidate the bad guys will return? A bird in the hand is worth two in bush.

Aug 4, 2008 - 1:08 am 21. Panday:

Terestita said: The Rand Corporation, in their report titled “How Terrorist Groups End – Lessons for Countering al Qaida” looked at the factors that result in the termination of terrorist activity after studying 648 terrorist groups between 1968 and 2006. They concluded that 43% of the time the terrorist groups convert into mainstream political movements. Forty percent of the time law enforcement activity and intelligence work bring them to heel. Ten percent of the time, the terrorists quit because they achieve their stated goals, while only 7% of the time does military action (since 9-11-01 the primary emphasis of the US War on Terrorism) neutralize the terrorists.

Interesting, but a better study by Rand would have been to broaden the scope and not look at just the termination terrorist groups but the termination of fanatics.

I point out constantly to colleagues of mine that, especially, the Left is mistaken and ignorant of history when they say that a war against terrorism can never be won. That one can’t fight an ideology. And that for every terrorist one kills, several more take his place.

They all forget, which is a shame because it was so recent, that United States fought the most ruthless fanatics in the history of the world and won: the Imperial Japanese. Compared to the Japanese of WWII, the goatherds of al Qaeda and the Taliban are relatively tame. These people invented the suicide bomb, worshiped a living god every bit as real as Pharaoh was to the Egyptians, and still were arming 8 year old girls and boys with spears to repel an American invasion even after the first atom bomb was dropped.

If anything, history shows that fanatics can certainly be beaten, but it all depends on how far and how hard one is willing to fight. Sean Connery’s line to Elliot Ness in “The Untouchables” comes to mind: what are you prepared to do?

It seems we’re not prepared to go all the way. Not yet, at least. We want our cake and eat it to and want the world to like us while we play whack-a-mole.

Aug 4, 2008 - 2:04 am 22. RWE:

The most interesting analysis of this hit I have seen was this:

“Dia’a Rashwan, a Cairo-based expert on terrorism and Islamic movements, said al-Masri’s death could hurt morale among al-Qaida’s followers, but it wasn’t a huge loss for the terror group, especially in Afghanistan.”

‘Al-Qaida might be facing setbacks in Iraq, but not in Afghanistan … and any loss will appear (to its fighters) as a triumph against the enemy, not a defeat,’ Rashwan said.”

Okay, so getting your butt blown off while you are having lunch is a “triumph.” Now, maybe this is the front line fighters taking joy in the fact that a REMF got taken out – but probably not.

I would question this “it’s a triumph when we lose” analysis, but I nonetheless think we should give them reasons to celebrate such “triumphs” as much as possible.

After all, the Kamikazes considered it a triumph to dive into a US ship, but it only meant they were losing big time. And the more sane members of the Japanese military knew it, too.

And Wretchard: Perhaps a better example is the cruise missiles and upgraded Pershings we put in Europe in the 80’s, thus ensuring that the diplomacy associated with the INF treaty had a chance to work.

Aug 4, 2008 - 5:51 am 23. We Swear » Blog Archive » The Internet and such… - figuratively. literally. irregardlessly.:

[...] http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernande … he-ghosts/ [...]

Aug 4, 2008 - 6:06 am 24. Doug:

“dla,

You’d better be one genius hobbyist to take down a Predator (100mph cruising speed at 25000ft ceiling) with your hobbyist rocket!”
—
…or a Reaper at twice that altitude.
Then again, you’d need a hell of a booster rocket on a stinger to take down either!

The original Stinger had a max altitude of ~ 15,000ft. and a cost of ~ $76,000.
Not that many block 2’s with a max altitude of ~ 26,000ft are out there on the market, at much higher cost.

Additionally, the terrorist would need a handy dandy portable radar setup to find either the Predator or the Reaper prior to arming the Stinger.
—
UAV’s are incredibly cheap compared to manned platforms, esp manned systems capable of 24 hr lingering time:
The fuel for them and the tankers alone render UAV costs insignificant.

Aug 4, 2008 - 6:07 am 25. DougRek:

A Stinger has about a 3 mile range, and a 10,000 foot altitude capability. The Predator operates at more than twice that altitude and is not vulnerable to Stinger (or comparable Russian) missiles.

Aug 4, 2008 - 6:32 am 26. Jay:

The Rand Corp is no longer one of our elite “think tanks”. I can accept the premise that the Rand “experts” received funding from a foundation whose funds originated from the Saudis (our oil money). Read Walid Phares’s book Future Jihad (Palgrave Press).

Aug 4, 2008 - 6:35 am 27. cjm:

a stinger won’t reach a predator uav at operational altitude. from reading, the stinger is used when planes are landing or taking off; maybe a range of 3+ miles (iirc).

Aug 4, 2008 - 6:43 am 28. 49erDweet:

“Back in the day” wasn’t the RAND Corp. just a CIA front? I’m talking Korean War era now. If so, how the once mighty have fallen.

Or maybe they still are and “Saudi paymasters” tell more about who runs today’s CIA than we want to know? Nah, probably not.

Aug 4, 2008 - 6:55 am 29. Doug:

“Back in the day” Rand made a heck of a typewriter!

Aug 4, 2008 - 6:59 am 30. Michael:

“The good news is: We’re killing bad guys with Hellfire armed Predators.

The bad news is: It’s expensive.”

Perhaps, but nearly so expensive as not.

Aug 4, 2008 - 7:10 am 31. Former Marine:

F said:

“Having been assigned to 9 different embassies over the 27-year course of a US diplomatic career, I’ll have to take exception to your example of the US Marines in embassies. They are not there to fight the locals,. . . They’re there to hold the defensive lines at the front door while the rest of us burn our secrets.”

Twenty-seven years with State and F thinks “hold[ing] defensive lines at the front door” will not involve “fighting the locals.”

That’s State for you.

Aug 4, 2008 - 8:57 am 32. cjm:

uav’s are now being armed with sniper rifles, with all that implies.

i know it is wrong, but i have visions of u.s. “free booters” logging in from home, and plinking at terrorists; sharing vid captures. terrorism and terrorists follow a viral model; when they get too virulent they “burn out” the available hosts and dissapear. ebola kills many fewer individuals than AIDS, for just this reason.

Aug 4, 2008 - 10:12 am 33. newtland:

Panday’s evocation of “The Untouchables” reminds me that perhaps the real debate is our willingness (or lack thereof) to knowlingly go to hell for God.

We don’t fool ourselves with phantasms of a truckload of virgins (how good looking could they be, anyway?), and counting the cost is no fun.

It’s the blessing and the curse.

They have no Prince of Peace so of course they think we’re weak.

The “going to hell for God” theme was masterfully revisited in the new telling of the Batman fable. To catch the evil one, Alfred’s platoon had to burn down the forest.

We’re trying real hard not to do the same and it’s cost us lives but perhaps saved our souls. Perhaps.

Tell that to the (families of the fallen) Marines.

Aug 4, 2008 - 10:17 am 34. exhelodrvr:

Ledger,
“I would suggest that unless there were undercover moles whose lives would be lost and said lost lives would hamper our surveillance methods (recruitment of moles) then the strike should have gone forward.”

The problem with that logic is that 1) it will create additional distrust within the locals and 2) it will be used by the MSM against the anti-terror forces, with the end result of making the job harder.

In a lot of cases, probably most, the “civilian” casualties cost more than the value of the target. There are obviously exceptions, but in most cases it is better to wait.

Aug 4, 2008 - 10:35 am 35. NahnCee:

I think Pak would have had a fit if we tried it w/o clearance from the ISI.

Oh, dear. And here I was thinking that a “ghost drone” meant silent and invisible, which would in turn mean that neither Musharref nor ISI could possibly know what-all we were watching unless someone [in the State Department? does State necessarily know who-all's being surveilled?] was demented enough to tell them.

Silly me.

Aug 4, 2008 - 10:57 am 36. sirius_sir:

I would suggest that unless there were undercover moles whose lives would be lost and said lost lives would hamper our surveillance methods (recruitment of moles) then the strike should have gone forward.

Ledger, I am sympathetic to the thrust of your comment concerning hitting the enemy whenever and wherever we are able. But I think you may here have uncovered a vital element that seems to have gone otherwise unnoticed. “The detail and near real time nature of the information which coalition forces now have on al-Qaeda cells inside Pakistan” indicates just the kind of close association you point to. Such a supposition could be supported by the quote from the Long War Journal. “I watched them pass on taking out some bad guys because they were in a compound with other people and there might also be collateral damage to the surrounding structures, possibly causing civilian deaths or injuries,” reports the correspondent. Read carefully, the report seems to indicate the unidentified ‘other’ people sharing the compound with the bad guys were differentiated from civilians housed in “surrounding structures” which might also be damaged.

Perhaps this is only an incidental and unimportant distinction, perhaps not.

Aug 4, 2008 - 11:12 am 37. sirius_sir:

The LA Times sources believed that counterterrorism had chopped off al-Masri’s tentacles and ground down his networks. With the decimation of his henchmen, the master bomber was forced to venture out himself and train volunteers who were often of indifferent quality.

Volunteers who were presumably also easy to trail and surveille. Thus the remains of his network was decimated from the outside in. Could it also be the case with other leaders of al Qaeda? Could that explain the, until now, presumptive survival of bin Laden and al Zawahiri?

Aug 4, 2008 - 12:10 pm 38. cjm:

“Oh, dear. And here I was thinking that a “ghost drone” meant silent and invisible”

run NahnCee, run!

Aug 4, 2008 - 12:11 pm 39. Roderick Reilly:

I’ve always maintained that there are limits to the powers and endurance of fanaticism, and events in Iraq and elsewhere have proven me right.

The notion that terror and insurgent groups can sustain the heavy losses they incurred at the hands of the U.S. military in particular indefinitely is bogus. The notion that the “Anbar Awakening” could happen without U.S. military might is also nonsense. The insurgents who turned on Al Qaeda were well-aware of the fire power and capabilities of U.S. troops, having suffered much higher losses than they inflicted, even with their effective use of IEDs. They had to have weighed in casualties, equipment, and property losses into their equation to switch sides. Also, where does the notion that the Anbar sheiks did this conversion spontaneously and independently without first being contacted by U.S. and Iraqi authorities come from? And what’s with giving the likes of Moqtada Al Sadr more credit than he deserves for supposedly “holding back” the Mahdi Army?

What kind of petty, twisted, resentful minds does it take to: 1) Deny that U.S. military power was necessary to affect this outcome in Iraq, 2)or that, similarly, to deny that the war was more than half-won militarily in Vietnam because of Tet, 3) first insist that the Iraqi Army was a formidable foe in the lead-up to the Gulf War, and then turn around and call them “rag-tag” and “3rd-World” when they lost decisively, or 4) that no credit should be given to Reagan and George H. W. Bush for the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Aug 4, 2008 - 1:42 pm 40. dueler88:

F/Wretchard/WadeUSAF/Former Marine:

Embassy & Consulate Marine Security Guard personnel are ready to roll 24/7/365, whether they’re in Dress Blues or digital camo. That being said, F is correct in that their mission is to protect classified assets inside the building. If that means holding off the bad guys at the door while the diplomats can burn & shred, then that’s what they do.

U.S. Embassies and Consulates are virtual U.S. soil, wherever they happen to be on the globe. U.S. Marines attacking a force that is *outside* a compound would diplomatically be equivalent to the U.S. military acting aggressively on foreign soil. Hence we have the situation that happened at the Istanbul Consulate a few weeks ago – a few guys with pistols and shotguns were (bravely) stopped by local police while everybody at the Consulate sat safely behind ballistic-resistant doors and windows.

Wretchard, your analogy of the MSG’s is not *too* far off base. MSG’s represent both the ability and necessity of the diplomatic wing of the U.S. Government to protect itself and its assets. While the MSG’s mission is clearly defensive, we’re still talking about the tip of the spear of U.S. military power. An M-16 is still a rifle, regardless of where you point it and why.

Aug 4, 2008 - 3:46 pm 41. Teresita:

Roderick: Also, where does the notion that the Anbar sheiks did this conversion spontaneously and independently without first being contacted by U.S. and Iraqi authorities come from?

No one is making that claim. But Righty talking points are making the claim that the February-July 2007 Surge somehow caused the Anbar Awakening, which the Pentagon first briefed reporters on in September 2006.

Newtland: We’re trying real hard not to do the same and it’s cost us lives but perhaps saved our souls. Perhaps.

Souls are saved by trusting in the atoning work of the Prince of Peace, not by trusting in the sacrifices of our own soldiers. No perhaps about it.

Doug: Additionally, the terrorist would need a handy dandy portable radar setup to find either the Predator or the Reaper prior to arming the Stinger.

And that would make the terrorist vulnerable to being taken out by a HARM missile following right back down his signal path.

RWE: Perhaps a better example is the cruise missiles and upgraded Pershings we put in Europe in the 80’s, thus ensuring that the diplomacy associated with the INF treaty had a chance to work.

Russia is threatening to pull out of the INF treaty if the US deploys missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia is also threatening to return in force to Cuba if the US deploys missile defense in the aforementioned countries. One gets the idea that Russia really doesn’t like missile defense.

Aug 4, 2008 - 5:47 pm 42. CSMBigBird:

I thought the Marines were there so the navy commo guys had someone to dance with, silly me…

30 plus year, Army Command Sergeant Major

Aug 4, 2008 - 6:03 pm 43. Mad Fiddler:

The criticism was NOT made for the decision to forego attacking known bad guys and causing collateral civilian casualties. The criticism was of the ill-advised decision to REPORT that datum in a widely-disseminated article, giving the bad guys a clear hint at how they might protect themselves in future.

Aug 4, 2008 - 8:07 pm 44. cjm:

russia is an old man in diapers, shouting “nurse!”

Aug 5, 2008 - 8:38 am 45. D.W. Drang:

As for that RAND Study, I believe it is a mistake to assume that conventional military forces are incapable of performing Law Enforcement duties. Essentially, what our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are doing is sort of an up-armored Community Based Policing. Yes, they carry, and can call for, a heck of a lot more firepower than my father had available to him in Detroit “back in the day”, but the techniques remain the same as patrolling a beat.

Also, I highly recommend Fred Burton’s GHOST: Confessions of a Counter-Terrorism Agent (Hope the link came through all right…) Finished it last night. Very good. Very educational, even to a retired Intel Geek, who was on the preiphery of some of the things he writes about.

Aug 5, 2008 - 8:43 am 46. Brian H:

As far as civ casualties, you might like to google “perfidy” and “Geneva”. If you dress like and operate among civilians, the onus for all civilian casualties incurred in attacking you falls squarely on you. Reasonable efforts to minimize civ deaths are required, but not to the point of holding off attacks.

Aug 5, 2008 - 1:28 pm 47. exhelodrvr:

Brian,
“Reasonable efforts to minimize civ deaths are required, but not to the point of holding off attacks.”

You’re making the mistake of equating “reasonable and ethical” with “realistic and practical.” In today’s world, with the MSM and unwillingness of many to support this effort, PR always needs to be considered. Unfortunate, but true.

Aug 5, 2008 - 1:50 pm 48. cedarford:

Mike Sylwester – Most of the young Pashtun jihadists trying to sneak across the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan are doomed. They are being watched from above as soon as they walk out of their Pakistani mosque and climb into their truck to begin their ride toward the border.

A wet dream of some almighty “eye in the sky” made by a young man utterly ignorant of military limits to US air surveillance capacity.
The few “birds” that scan a small fraction of the humanity below them are utterly ignorant to what is in the hearts of such people, what their intentions are. Nothing substitutes for human intelligence and winning the information, and ideological warfare outside the military’s sphere. Something the US has learbed to rue time and time again.

Our ability to target top leaders is especially devastaing. In their administration of their forces and resources, relatively little is written down, so when any such leader is killed, much organizational policy and information perishes forever.

More crap. Most terrorist groups except those foolishly aggragating power to a few charismatics (shining path, PLO) are learning organizations. The Israelis stupidly played whack a mole couterterrorism for years as they built up their Settlements, refused to address grievances, and relied on WMD and technical superiority.

All they did was provoke a Darwinian process in terrorist groups to make them fire-tested, more flexible, and weed out the unwary and stupid leaders for the likes of Nasrallah. They lost demographically, had to quit Gaza, and now face a weary USA and West not so interested in preserving Zionist nuclear and technical monopoly.

There are about 40 million Pashtuns, but a few thousand of our soldiers are controlling them.

Yeah, a few thousand of our red-blooded Jesus-loving high-tech, special ops supersoldiers are controlling 40 million born to fight mountain warfare Pashtuns.
In your dreams.

Aug 5, 2008 - 8:32 pm 49. Mike Sylwester:

The US intelligence community has been studying radical Moslem groups in Waziristan intensely for seven years. Our knowledge constantly improves.

Some particular places are under special observation. Information about them is being collected constantly by satellites. Every vehicle going in and out is watched. Every phone call and e-mail going in and out is captured and studied. Every electro-magnetic impulse is recorded. People associated with those places are being questioned and recruited.

The longer we do this, the more we improve. Sometimes we get some really big breaks and more insight, more penetration into their communications and planning. Success builds upon success.

Aug 6, 2008 - 8:22 am 50. Bill Befort:

I’ve been re-reading C.L. Sonnichsen’s “I’ll Die Before I’ll Run,” about the thirty years of bloody feuding that disfigured Texas in the wake of the Civil War. The parallels with post-invasion Iraq are striking. Eventually the surviving combatants themselves had to decide to bury the hatchet, but in case after case it was the Texas Rangers who helped them get to that point — not settling the the feuds, but providing an environment in which they could be settled.

Aug 6, 2008 - 9:39 am

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