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	<title>Comments on: Why?</title>
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	<description>Just another Pajamasmedia.com weblog</description>
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		<title>By: Mad Fiddler</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45429</link>
		<dc:creator>Mad Fiddler</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 05:28:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45429</guid>
		<description>It seems worth noting that FDR&#039;s administration made the ownership of gold by U.S. private citizens illegal, except for cases in which the gold could be proven to be a family heirloom. (Look up his executive order 6102 of 1933, based on a 1917 law restricting trade with enemies of the U.S.)  

As has been pointed out by writers far better than I, many governments have made ownership of firearms by law-abiding citizens a crime, then proceeded to murder those citizens. In the 20th century, about as many people were murdered by their own governments - because they were unable to resist - as were killed by aggression from outside their own countries.

Again, it is worth studying the history of Germany and the Soviet Union to note the patterns of behavior of a repressive government toward its subjects, so as to be able to recognize them unfolding around you. 

Anyone remember Sadegh Gobtzadeh, the primary spokesman for the new Islamic Revolutionary Government of Iran during the imprisonment of American Hostages in 1979? For years he&#039;d been an admiring assistant of Ayutollah Ruhollah Khomeini during his exile in Paris, and served as acting Foreign Minister for the new revolutionary government. At some point, he realized that the Ayutollah he&#039;d worshipped was helping impose a regime on Iran that was vastly more brutal to Iranians than the Shah and his secret police had ever been. He was executed by a firing squad after he became disillusioned, and was tortured into confessions of conspiracy by the government he&#039;d helped to install. (Of course the whole story is complicated...)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It seems worth noting that FDR&#8217;s administration made the ownership of gold by U.S. private citizens illegal, except for cases in which the gold could be proven to be a family heirloom. (Look up his executive order 6102 of 1933, based on a 1917 law restricting trade with enemies of the U.S.)  </p>
<p>As has been pointed out by writers far better than I, many governments have made ownership of firearms by law-abiding citizens a crime, then proceeded to murder those citizens. In the 20th century, about as many people were murdered by their own governments &#8211; because they were unable to resist &#8211; as were killed by aggression from outside their own countries.</p>
<p>Again, it is worth studying the history of Germany and the Soviet Union to note the patterns of behavior of a repressive government toward its subjects, so as to be able to recognize them unfolding around you. </p>
<p>Anyone remember Sadegh Gobtzadeh, the primary spokesman for the new Islamic Revolutionary Government of Iran during the imprisonment of American Hostages in 1979? For years he&#8217;d been an admiring assistant of Ayutollah Ruhollah Khomeini during his exile in Paris, and served as acting Foreign Minister for the new revolutionary government. At some point, he realized that the Ayutollah he&#8217;d worshipped was helping impose a regime on Iran that was vastly more brutal to Iranians than the Shah and his secret police had ever been. He was executed by a firing squad after he became disillusioned, and was tortured into confessions of conspiracy by the government he&#8217;d helped to install. (Of course the whole story is complicated&#8230;)</p>
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		<title>By: Ari Tai</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45311</link>
		<dc:creator>Ari Tai</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 23:20:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45311</guid>
		<description>How&#039;s what they are asking for different then the AT&amp;T &quot;single national carrier&quot; era when the government could indeed send a request (and did in times of natural emergency) that denied entire areas phone access (including people calling in)? (to insure government &quot;priority&quot; calls could get thru - and yet even back then hams saved far more than government agencies).  And they supported the ability of an investigator not just to trace and perhaps watch who was talking to whom after some event but to go back in time and look at whatever AT&amp;T had in their records (could go back years if people were willing to wait for the tapes to be mounted).  Arguably historical data is much more important to stopping an event and focusing scarce resources than attempting to figure out late in the game how to stop it.

Perhaps we are in better shape now - with more privacy because (we think) the data is just not available - as it always was with AT&amp;T and other (free-world, first world no less) government run PTTs.  I don&#039;t think so, I think the key to privacy is laws and the charging the courts to protect us by denying &quot;conversation&quot; as more than hear-say, if at all, in court (and giving us redress if our protected information is used without our permission).  Free speech is just as important as privacy and courts must see that we can not be harmed by what we say, only by what we do.  And irrespective of how widely a citizen&#039;s secrets are published, their privacy violated, they must still be protected as if it had never happened.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How&#8217;s what they are asking for different then the AT&amp;T &#8220;single national carrier&#8221; era when the government could indeed send a request (and did in times of natural emergency) that denied entire areas phone access (including people calling in)? (to insure government &#8220;priority&#8221; calls could get thru &#8211; and yet even back then hams saved far more than government agencies).  And they supported the ability of an investigator not just to trace and perhaps watch who was talking to whom after some event but to go back in time and look at whatever AT&amp;T had in their records (could go back years if people were willing to wait for the tapes to be mounted).  Arguably historical data is much more important to stopping an event and focusing scarce resources than attempting to figure out late in the game how to stop it.</p>
<p>Perhaps we are in better shape now &#8211; with more privacy because (we think) the data is just not available &#8211; as it always was with AT&amp;T and other (free-world, first world no less) government run PTTs.  I don&#8217;t think so, I think the key to privacy is laws and the charging the courts to protect us by denying &#8220;conversation&#8221; as more than hear-say, if at all, in court (and giving us redress if our protected information is used without our permission).  Free speech is just as important as privacy and courts must see that we can not be harmed by what we say, only by what we do.  And irrespective of how widely a citizen&#8217;s secrets are published, their privacy violated, they must still be protected as if it had never happened.</p>
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		<title>By: Will the Feds Control Software Design? &#124; Behind Blue Lines</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45150</link>
		<dc:creator>Will the Feds Control Software Design? &#124; Behind Blue Lines</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 13:54:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45150</guid>
		<description>[...] over the Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S 773, sponsored by Jay Rockefeller, et als. Ed Morrissey, Wretchard, Jules Crittenden and others have discussed one aspect of the Act, namely, the president&#8217;s [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] over the Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S 773, sponsored by Jay Rockefeller, et als. Ed Morrissey, Wretchard, Jules Crittenden and others have discussed one aspect of the Act, namely, the president&#8217;s [...]</p>
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		<title>By: markb</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45143</link>
		<dc:creator>markb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 13:41:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45143</guid>
		<description>112. Doug:

I figure I’m due a discount for buying it sight unseen.

------------------------
I&#039;m hoping to convince Ms. T to model it. If so, it will cost you a pretty penny.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>112. Doug:</p>
<p>I figure I’m due a discount for buying it sight unseen.</p>
<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;<br />
I&#8217;m hoping to convince Ms. T to model it. If so, it will cost you a pretty penny.</p>
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		<title>By: Crocker</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45118</link>
		<dc:creator>Crocker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 10:51:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45118</guid>
		<description>In looking at the draft bill, what&#039;s more interesting to me are sections 6 and 7.  

Section 6 directs NIST to develop and implement standards for configuration architecture and specifications for any &#039;software&#039; that may be &#039;widely used&#039; by the feds or &#039;in private sector owned critical infrastructure information systems and networks&#039;.  What constitutes a &#039;critical infrastructure information system or network&#039; is undefined and is presumably in the eye of the presidential beholder.  

The draft goes so far as to specify a standard config language and settings for ALL software that may be used in the same &#039;critical&#039; systems, with the requirement that such software must run without changing any of the standard config settings. &#039;Software&#039; is undefined.  In the engineering world, there&#039;s configuration at every level of the system - network, OS, application and everything in between. The feds are now apparently going to be writing software specs for the entire industry, because configuration is at core of every system, at every level.  

Section 7 creates a mandatory licensing regime for anyone who provides &#039;cybersecurity&#039; services either to the feds or (that definition again) private &#039;critical infrastructure information systems or networks&#039;.  You won&#039;t be able to do work involving &#039;cybersecurity&#039; without certification and licensing (which, on contemporary systems is just about everything).

So, in one move, the feds regulate - and indeed create - the keys to the software design kingdom (namely, config) and arguably license anyone who comes near it. 

It&#039;s quite total.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In looking at the draft bill, what&#8217;s more interesting to me are sections 6 and 7.  </p>
<p>Section 6 directs NIST to develop and implement standards for configuration architecture and specifications for any &#8217;software&#8217; that may be &#8216;widely used&#8217; by the feds or &#8216;in private sector owned critical infrastructure information systems and networks&#8217;.  What constitutes a &#8216;critical infrastructure information system or network&#8217; is undefined and is presumably in the eye of the presidential beholder.  </p>
<p>The draft goes so far as to specify a standard config language and settings for ALL software that may be used in the same &#8216;critical&#8217; systems, with the requirement that such software must run without changing any of the standard config settings. &#8216;Software&#8217; is undefined.  In the engineering world, there&#8217;s configuration at every level of the system &#8211; network, OS, application and everything in between. The feds are now apparently going to be writing software specs for the entire industry, because configuration is at core of every system, at every level.  </p>
<p>Section 7 creates a mandatory licensing regime for anyone who provides &#8216;cybersecurity&#8217; services either to the feds or (that definition again) private &#8216;critical infrastructure information systems or networks&#8217;.  You won&#8217;t be able to do work involving &#8216;cybersecurity&#8217; without certification and licensing (which, on contemporary systems is just about everything).</p>
<p>So, in one move, the feds regulate &#8211; and indeed create &#8211; the keys to the software design kingdom (namely, config) and arguably license anyone who comes near it. </p>
<p>It&#8217;s quite total.</p>
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		<title>By: Doug</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45094</link>
		<dc:creator>Doug</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 06:53:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45094</guid>
		<description>mark,
Haven&#039;t been on ebay in quite a while.
Do they still have an auction with buy now option?
If so, I&#039;d appreciate the minimum bid, time left, and buy now price.
I figure I&#039;m due a discount for buying it sight unseen.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>mark,<br />
Haven&#8217;t been on ebay in quite a while.<br />
Do they still have an auction with buy now option?<br />
If so, I&#8217;d appreciate the minimum bid, time left, and buy now price.<br />
I figure I&#8217;m due a discount for buying it sight unseen.</p>
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		<title>By: Robohobo</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45084</link>
		<dc:creator>Robohobo</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 05:18:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45084</guid>
		<description>&quot;...is now hunkered down at home,getting fatter and having a pity party...&quot;

Most of us are also spending what time we can at the range sharpening our skills.

Shutting down the innertubes:

The &quot;loyal opposition&quot; and plain folks depend on this to communicate mostly. More things travel TCP/IP networks than most would imagine these days or via the same media (FO cable). Now that there is an &#039;0bamanation&#039; and they are in power, they have other means of communication. They don&#039;t need no stinkin&#039; internet. &#039;The Won&#039; IS the MAN now.

Be afraid.

Now, as far as the Chicoms and 5GW. They have lots and lots of people. Not much infrastructure. But they have built out their networks. So, because they are poor and lagging in high tech and know it, they have found ways to leverage the battlespace. Fight differently as it were. Makes the others you may have to fight adapt or really, really struggle in the battlespace. Lots of hackers can map lots of &#039;other&#039; network just by knocking on doors and seeing who answers as it were.

Everyone is scared of the nasty old EMP nuke. That science is settled. Really. Your computer may die but your car will run. The good old gov&#039;t will continue as will weapons systems. I can talk more via private conversations if wretchard pings me but do not want to say too much. Some things may still be dark.

The more interesting thing is that I am either becoming more and more paranoid OR the guys I used to call &#039;nutters&#039; were right. You know, those conspiracy theorists like infowars (Alex Jones). The &#039;0bamanation&#039; keeps checking off the things that really scare me. Not building camps in Kansas but things like this. Sheesh.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;&#8230;is now hunkered down at home,getting fatter and having a pity party&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>Most of us are also spending what time we can at the range sharpening our skills.</p>
<p>Shutting down the innertubes:</p>
<p>The &#8220;loyal opposition&#8221; and plain folks depend on this to communicate mostly. More things travel TCP/IP networks than most would imagine these days or via the same media (FO cable). Now that there is an &#8216;0bamanation&#8217; and they are in power, they have other means of communication. They don&#8217;t need no stinkin&#8217; internet. &#8216;The Won&#8217; IS the MAN now.</p>
<p>Be afraid.</p>
<p>Now, as far as the Chicoms and 5GW. They have lots and lots of people. Not much infrastructure. But they have built out their networks. So, because they are poor and lagging in high tech and know it, they have found ways to leverage the battlespace. Fight differently as it were. Makes the others you may have to fight adapt or really, really struggle in the battlespace. Lots of hackers can map lots of &#8216;other&#8217; network just by knocking on doors and seeing who answers as it were.</p>
<p>Everyone is scared of the nasty old EMP nuke. That science is settled. Really. Your computer may die but your car will run. The good old gov&#8217;t will continue as will weapons systems. I can talk more via private conversations if wretchard pings me but do not want to say too much. Some things may still be dark.</p>
<p>The more interesting thing is that I am either becoming more and more paranoid OR the guys I used to call &#8216;nutters&#8217; were right. You know, those conspiracy theorists like infowars (Alex Jones). The &#8216;0bamanation&#8217; keeps checking off the things that really scare me. Not building camps in Kansas but things like this. Sheesh.</p>
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		<title>By: markb</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45073</link>
		<dc:creator>markb</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 04:20:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45073</guid>
		<description>Re:76. Doug:
Invisible Shield, if available.

I have several extras available, in hermetically sealed bags. I can put them on ebay for your convenience. I accept paypal.

73</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Re:76. Doug:<br />
Invisible Shield, if available.</p>
<p>I have several extras available, in hermetically sealed bags. I can put them on ebay for your convenience. I accept paypal.</p>
<p>73</p>
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		<title>By: Doug</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45040</link>
		<dc:creator>Doug</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 02:02:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45040</guid>
		<description>re: Privacy,
I am reminded of the Chicago ABC News Crew that got the Ryan&#039;s Sealed Divorce Records opened.
One of many instances of eliminating The One&#039;s opposition.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>re: Privacy,<br />
I am reminded of the Chicago ABC News Crew that got the Ryan&#8217;s Sealed Divorce Records opened.<br />
One of many instances of eliminating The One&#8217;s opposition.</p>
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		<title>By: wretchard</title>
		<link>http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2009/04/03/your-telescreen-is-calling/comment-page-3/#comment-45018</link>
		<dc:creator>wretchard</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 01:15:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/?p=3029#comment-45018</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;There are many potential problems with that and while it could provide the backdoor to eavesdropping and shutdown, it is not in and of itself either of those.&lt;/i&gt;

I am not averse to necessary wiretapping and my reservations in the post have almost nothing to do with privacy, but with control over the networks. Exposing the network architecture to facilitate contingent wiretapping is fine by me, but again, it carries certain costs. For example, many cell phone systems now have wiretapping utilities built in so that they can be activated on the presentation of a proper warrant, and the comms routed to a &quot;shadow phone&quot;. But a recent case of illegal wiretapping in Greece, I believe, revealed that unauthorized persons had written software to call those wiretapping utilities surreptitiously. That&#039;s to say, they used utilities supposedly reserved for legal wiretapping for illegal wiretapping. What are the odds that the requirement to expose network interfaces are aimed at creating standards which are for the purpose of authorized surveillance?

But those things are like a set of keys. They provide security provided only the right persons have access to the keys. If the wrong people get the keys, they open all doors.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>There are many potential problems with that and while it could provide the backdoor to eavesdropping and shutdown, it is not in and of itself either of those.</i></p>
<p>I am not averse to necessary wiretapping and my reservations in the post have almost nothing to do with privacy, but with control over the networks. Exposing the network architecture to facilitate contingent wiretapping is fine by me, but again, it carries certain costs. For example, many cell phone systems now have wiretapping utilities built in so that they can be activated on the presentation of a proper warrant, and the comms routed to a &#8220;shadow phone&#8221;. But a recent case of illegal wiretapping in Greece, I believe, revealed that unauthorized persons had written software to call those wiretapping utilities surreptitiously. That&#8217;s to say, they used utilities supposedly reserved for legal wiretapping for illegal wiretapping. What are the odds that the requirement to expose network interfaces are aimed at creating standards which are for the purpose of authorized surveillance?</p>
<p>But those things are like a set of keys. They provide security provided only the right persons have access to the keys. If the wrong people get the keys, they open all doors.</p>
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