Spengler asks the crucial question. If the candidates in Iran did not represent “reform” versus the “status quo” (even though the election itself was used as a vehicle for protest) then why didn’t the Ayatollah’s put forward the candidate the media insists on describing as “reformist” instead of Ahmadinejad. “The mystery about the Iranian elections, writes my old friend Daniel Pipes, is why the religious authorities who run the country decided to declare a massive victory for the crude and brutal Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, rather than advance the slick and deceptive Hossein Moussavi.”
Mousavi is no more a “moderate” than Ahmadinejad according to a former Indian diplomat, M K Bhadrakumar. “Most likely, he had a hand in the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Ali Akbar Mohtashami, Hezbollah’s patron saint, served as his interior minister.” That’s Mousavi, who Michael Ledeen called one the architects of the some of the most repressive features of the current Iranian regime. So why, with the elections fundamentally rigged by the state and in fact a disguised process of appointment between two members of the Iranian establishment, did the clerics choose Ahmadinejad over the man who so artfully depicted himself as a reformer and who captured the protest vote of the Iranian youth and intelligensia?
The probable answer is one word: money. Within Iranian ruling circles, Mousavi represented the economic enemies of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad according to Bhadrakumar. While Mousavi could package himself as a ‘reformer’ and to some extent genuinely capture the enthusiasm of the dissidents, the choice of between him and Ahmadinejad was really over who would get to control the economy. It was a battle between two factions of the ruling elite for the chairmanship of the board. Bhadrakumar explains:
If we are to leave out the largely inconsequential “Gucci crowd” of north Tehran, who no doubt imparted a lot of color, verve and mirth to Mousavi’s campaign, the hardcore of his political platform comprised powerful vested interests who were making a last-ditch attempt to grab power from the Khamenei-led regime. On the one hand, these interest groups were severely opposed to the economic policies under Ahmadinejad, which threatened their control of key sectors such as foreign trade, private education and agriculture.
For those who do not know Iran better, suffice to say that the Rafsanjani family clan owns vast financial empires in Iran, including foreign trade, vast landholdings and the largest network of private universities in Iran. Known as Azad there are 300 branches spread over the country, they are not only money-spinners but could also press into Mousavi’s election campaign an active cadre of student activists numbering some 3 million.
But it wasn’t just who could give the most to the whom, it was also about who could advance what is left of the Islamic Revolution most effectively. Spengler argues that by casting himself as the knuckle-dragging Islamist radical in contrast to the “reformist” Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s selection positions Teheran better in terms of its struggle against it’s Sunni Islam rivals. The Islamic Revolution in Iran has always been aimed as much against its sectarian rivals as it has been against the West.
But I see a deeper issue at work, namely the way in which the disintegration of Pakistan threatens the Islamic Republic of Iran. The insurgent Taliban in Pakistan claim legitimacy on the grounds that the Sunni establishment is insufficiently committed to crushing Shia heresy. Given that 15% of the world’s Shia live in Pakistan, Iran’s hope for a Shia revival cannot ignore them. If it were simply a matter of a two-sided chess game between Tehran and Washington, Moussavi would have been better suited for the Iranian chair. But Iran has to show street credibility to rough and backward men elsewhere than Washington, and the tougher image of Ahmadinejad is what it needs.
At the intersection of both of money and sectarian politics is Washington. Control over the Iranian economy acquired crucial importance in the light of Barack Obama’s proposed “engagement”. Engagement offered the Iranian regime a guaranteed existence, the lifting of sanctions and a possible withdrawal of opposition to their nuclear ambitions. As Michael Rubin noted in the NRO, “in his Iranian New Year’s greeting, he recognized the Islamic Republic’s leaders as the legitimate representatives of the Iranian people”. But Obama wasn’t just New Year, he was Christmas to the Iranian tycoons. The prospect of the ending the sanctions meant a killing to those positioned to receive the flood of Western investment and conclude the partnerships that would become possible once Iran left the “axis of evil”. Ahmadinejad was not only the man who could best appeal to the hard men of the Shi’ite militancy but the person who was willing to dish out the most slops to the ruling faction with the most alacrity.
Maybe the roles between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad can be reversed. STRATFOR argues that it was Mousavi who offered the Ayatollahs most in terms of corruption. But that is no matter. This was never about Candidate A versus Candidate B per se. This was about distributing spoils within the Iranian system. And the spoils are now expected to increase in the shape of engagement.
What the Khamenei faction failed to appreciate was the degree to which Mousavi’s public relations gambit would succeed in the West. They underestimated the ugliness of the face they presented to the world. Eager to portray events in Iran as sparked by Obama’s speech in Cairo, with expectations of a Velvet Revolution was raised to a fever pitch, the press was on hand to capture every wrinkle and every crease. That’s when the Ayatollahs strode forward, ready for their close-ups. Instead of capturing a rapturous response to Obama’s Cairo speech the press caught on video the true face of his partners for peace. That created the unintended consequence of endangering the very gravy train the Ayatollahs expected to enjoy. They pulled the rug — at least temporarily — from underneath the feet of the “engagement” faction in Washington. Michael Totten wrote about how even the advocates of engagement were momentarily disgusted. “A refreshing bipartisan consensus is emerging in the liberal and conservative halves of the blogosphere and the media in general. Visceral detestation of the Islamic Republic regime in Iran is all but universal.” Michael Goldfarb observed that even Roger Cohen was having second thoughts about supping with the devil.
There’s an amazing thing happening in the blogs over the last few days that one assumes is a fair reflection of a broader shift in attitudes towards Iran. Six months ago, few Americans would have disputed that Ahmadinejad was a thug and a tyrant, but there were many on the left who supported Obama’s push for direct engagement with the Iranian president anyway. America deals with all kinds of thugs and authoritarian leaders, and Obama and his supporters made the case that we should deal with this one, too. But the left, I think a little to their own surprise, became deeply invested in the Mousavi campaign. Perhaps you could see it most clearly on Andrew Sullivan’s blog, but much of the media liked the simple narrative of Mousavi the Obama-like reformer against Ahmadinejad the Bush-like ideologue. And after the Lebanese elections, the media was primed for a story on the “Obama Effect” in the Middle East.
When things went the other way, something changed. The left, which may have reviled Ahmadinejad but was willing to do business with him anyway, seems to have become deeply hostile to any kind of diplomacy that could be seen as legitimizing this election result. The administration hasn’t quite caught up to this reality, offering weak statements about “irregularities” in the voting but no real sign that it will stand up and support the Iranian kids who are pleading for help as they’re beaten in the streets. I suspect it will soon. If Roger Cohen can”t stomach seeing Obama reach out to this regime after what has happened and what is happening, then who can?
The Obama policy of “engagement” was at least one of the pieces of meat over which the Iranian wolves fought such an unseemly battle to devour; ironically it may now undermine it, hoist as it were on its own petard. But despite the global revulsion to their brutal crackdown, the Ayatollah’s aren’t finished yet. The hook in Obama’s throat has gone in deep. Washington is as invested in engagement as the Ayatollahs are because it is the cornerstone of the Administration’s plan to remake the Middle East. That plan is based on the idea that it is better to buy off Teheran than to fight it. And on that buyoff going forward depends a number of things ranging from the Israeli-Palestinian roadmap to Iraq and Afghanistan. The state of play, amoral as it is, was succintly expressed in Roger Cohen’s advice to Obama in the NYT: “I’ve argued for engagement with Iran and I still believe in it, although, in the name of the millions defrauded, President Obama’s outreach must now await a decent interval.” It’s not a question of if, but when.
Taken as a whole events in Iran suggest that its rulers are unwilling to back away from their basic interests, whatever Washington may imagine. But despite the fact the growing suspicion even in Leftist circles that they untrustworthy partners, the Ayatollahs can afford to wait. They know that the One has decided not to fight them. He will come, whatever they do, with the bag, to buy whatever hope he can.
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35 Comments
1. Fabius:Tough to decide if this is unsettling news, or optimistic. The idea of Iran losing what little rocker it has isn’t a fun one to contemplate, but the West ought to realize that the situation can be exploited to good effect, if we’re willing to change tack away from straight up “engagement.”
I suppose the fun scenario would be to wholeheartedly back the Iranian populace while behind the scenes playing the two factions off each other. Mousavi doesn’t sound like a much better customer than Ahmedinejad, but if we backed him, he’d more likely be beholden to us.
Ah well, in any event, more information in one of Wretchard’s posts than two hours of watching CNN/FOX.
Jun 15, 2009 - 9:50 pm 2. John Lynch:Maybe they just guessed wrong.
Obviously the regime miscalculated. I don’t think they planned a confrontation like this. Prepared for one, yes. But to risk the entire government like this?
Every revolution happens because the government makes a mistake. Louis XVI called the Estates General, then tried to disband them. Parliament tried one too many taxes on America. Perhaps the mullahs stole one too many elections.
We should remember Burma, though. Nothing is certain.
Jun 15, 2009 - 10:05 pm 3. wretchard:Nothing must be allowed to poop the party. Haaretz speculates on why Dennis Ross is no longer Barack Obama’s envoy to Iran.
Heavy duty geopolitics — but also money — is inextricably woven into this tapestry. There is a tremendous incentive to cheat on Iranian containment. They are a huge source of natural gas, something which Europe needs to counter their growing dependency on the Russians. And with huge egos and agendas driving engagement forward like a freight train, expressing sudden doubts about the reliability of Teheran is like farting just when the choir is nearing the high note.
This scares me more than anything else. There is no reason why “engagement” — for ‘regime change’ or ‘behavior change’ should be inherently good or bad. But once things acquire a constituency in a bureaucracy, the moment careers become dependent on them, they acquire a life of their own. If you think that’s good, think Frankenstein.
Jun 15, 2009 - 10:09 pm 4. Marcus Aurelius:Thanks for looking & writinhg this up Wretchard. I was wondering as I noted in the last comment I left Roger Cohen did have one sentence worth reading and that was the Mullahs having a change of heart wrt Mousavi. At least they did if we are to believe as we do that they pick the candidates so all candidates should in general be acceptable to them.
Clearly, I have understood Mousavi is no liberal (in the traditional sense of the word) and is not a guy who will fundamentally shake up Iran. However, if this unrest leads to the unraveling of the current way of governing Iran who knows where it all ends?
Jun 15, 2009 - 10:13 pm 5. Marie Claude:seems that the Mullahs, after having opened the Pandora box of these fake elections, while also having initiated the contestation of the results, (30 000 of their “student” agents were sent at the front the past days) can’t contain their mobs anymore.
I fear that that’ll finish like Tiananmen !
Jun 15, 2009 - 10:55 pm 6. In the Industry:To my untrained eye, Iran has benefitted from the opacity of the regime. With splits emerging, I would imagine there could be a real intelligence windfall as we learn more about who is alligned with whom. Not to mention educated Iranians providing sensitive information to the West to harm their rivals.
Jun 15, 2009 - 11:06 pm 7. feeblemind:I have been led to understand that all presidential candidates are preapproved by Khamenei. If the above analysis is correct, why was Mousavi allowed to run at all? Or did the calculus somehow change between the time he became candidate and the election??
Jun 15, 2009 - 11:23 pm 8. wretchard:Iran has shot itself in the foot, creating a weakness than can be exploited — if one is determined to exploit it. The problem with the approach of front loading offerings to Iran, recognizing them as legitimate, understanding their nuclear aspirations, apologizing to them, is that you give away what you can charge for. The basic strategic problem, is that there will be people who will want someone to talk to at all costs; who need an address and will always be helpless without one. If you recall, even when the Tamil Tigers were down to their last trench and bunker some diplomats wanted to keep them alive to talk to them.
Right now the basic question is a strategic question: regime change or behavior change. What is the strategic goal? Unless than can be answered decisively inside the minds of the administration no weakness can be exploited.
Jun 15, 2009 - 11:26 pm 9. Desert Pig:It really doesn’t matter which group of primitive Muslim savages gains power. They are all Muslims and will behave as such.
Jun 15, 2009 - 11:42 pm 10. Marie Claude:Desert pig, yes !
I have arguing on german blog with young Iranians last year, they are persuaded that their religion is rightful, and that we are decadent
Jun 15, 2009 - 11:49 pm 11. Karen Yvonne:If Mousavi is far from moderate and it’s only a fight over which power group gets to control the spoils, then somebody needs to tell all those hordes of Iranian street protesters: “Go home, it’s all for nothing.”
Jun 16, 2009 - 12:20 am 12. wretchard:“Go home, it’s all for nothing.”
I don’t think it’s all for nothing. Someone wrote that Mousavi’s great qualification was that he is not Ahmadinejad. Someone should tell Obama, who keeps trying to talk to Ahmadinejad, that that a current of illegitimacy runs through the current political structure. So the protests aren’t all for nothing. But they are not about putting one candidate in power.
I hate to interpolate my own experiences into current events because the parallels are inexact, but back in 1986, when Marcos’ Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile rebelled against the dictator, a million people rushed out to build a human wall around a man who only weeks before, was their arch-enemy. That was the EDSA Revolution. In the strange calculus of conflict, the enemy of the enemy is my friend. Yet the fundamentals remain. Enrile was no democrat and he was soon marginalized because most people understood that opportunism, not principle, led him to turn away from his dark master. He was forgiven his trespasses, but never trusted.
The right lesson to draw here is that the character of the current Iranian regime is suspect. You can trust it as far as the people of Iran trust it; that you can rely on any agreement with it that the people of Iran would rely on themselves. Which is to say, hardly at all. The wrong lesson would be to assume that simply if Mousavi took office, then a Velvet Revolution had taken place.
Jun 16, 2009 - 1:47 am 13. Fred2:So?
Should we actively help the Iranian protestors, if we can?
There are things we can do. Like organize support protests in the US or all over the world.
Jun 16, 2009 - 3:09 am 14. wretchard:I think we should help the demonstrators, and to the extent that denouncing the election irregularities helps one candidate or the other, then so be it. But I think it is important to make the mental distinction between supporting a particular candidate and supporting the democratic process.
Jun 16, 2009 - 3:15 am 15. Doug:Ali Alfoneh’s Prescience on Iran [Michael Rubin]
My colleague, Ali Alfoneh, has been perhaps the most accurate analyst ahead of the Iranian elections. Those on press calls with him know he predicted heavy fraud would give the election to Ahmadinejad.
See also his piece immediately preceeding the elections, here.
And as unrest spread, his September 2008 essay on the reorganization of the Revolutionary Guards to counter velvet revolutions is also a must read.
Jun 16, 2009 - 3:25 am 16. blogstrop:Given the hard core nature of the regime – notwithstanding their love of money, a sin in many religions outside the Middle East, leaving Christianity aside for the moment – it’s been long regarded as a noxious weed in the ME! Anyway, “behaviour change” looks like a dim prospect. For “regime change” to be attractive you need to have some candidates likely to be better than the ones you are replacing. Iran has the potential to provide these, since it is (rumour has it) full of well-educated young people wanting a change from the ossified theocracy. But then, we were told that Iraq was a modern secular (at least by ME standards) country, and that has been a bit of a marathon. Tribal cultures are notoriously recidivist – just look at the state of Victoria in Australia. The Moran tribe … need I go on? Let’s hope Iran has more of the Polish and less of the Iraqi character when it comes to reshaping itself – but I’m not really that hopeful.
Jun 16, 2009 - 5:01 am 17. Doug:Twitter Joins the Revolution:
Faster, Please! » So How’s it Going in Iran
But the key element is the people. They are only just beginning to understand the reality of their situation. Virtually none of them imagined that they would be in a revolutionary confrontation with the regime just two days after the electoral circus, and few of them can realize, so soon, that they can actually change the world. I think the Mousavis now understand it (they know that they are either going to win or be destroyed). It remains to be seen if they can instruct and inspire the movement.
Much will depend on their ability to communicate. The regime has been waging a cyberwar against the dissidents, shutting down websites, cell phones, Facebook, and the like. As most people have learned, the basic communiations tool is Twitter, which somehow continues to function. Bigtime Kudos to Twitter, by the way, for postponing its planned maintenance so that the Iranians can continue to Tweet. Would that Google were so solicitous of freedom.
We don’t know who’s going to win. The Iranian people know that they’re on their own; they aren’t going to get any help from us, or the United Nations, or the Europeans. But paradoxically, this lack of support may strengthen their will. There is no cavalry on the horizon. If they are going to prevail, they and their unlikely leaders will have to gut it out by themselves. God be with them.
Jun 16, 2009 - 5:59 am 18. Herb:Islam is inconsistent with modernity. Im sorry but I dont see any way that Iran will become more than a superficially modern state. Any democratic/republican govt form must be reconciled with the vast hordes of the peasantry who according to Stratfor are all in favor of that guy in the well. They’ll elect an ayatollah.
Jun 16, 2009 - 6:06 am 19. joe buzz:The mullahs may be thieves, but they keep the population happy. A secular modern govt would not. The population is like Momma: When Momma aint happy . . .
If the mullahs call all of the shots, how much does it mater which mouthpiece they use? If they stand up Mousavi as the people’s choice, Ahmadinejad will likely be tasked with a background roll(think SoD or SoS) with a large chip on his little shoulder.
Jun 16, 2009 - 6:49 am 20. Papabear:joe: re If the mullahs call all of the shots, how much does it mater which mouthpiece they use?
Your comment assumes that the “mullahs” are all united. The current conflict indicates the possibility that they are splitting into factions, struggling against each other for dominance.
Jun 16, 2009 - 8:33 am 21. Herb:Papa # 20: Mullahs are mullahs – they chop off heads and hands. Does it matter which type of sword they use?
Jun 16, 2009 - 8:37 am 22. joe buzz:Thanks P-bear I obviously had not considered dissension in the ranks of the robes and Herb has a good but equally bad point…
Jun 16, 2009 - 8:49 am 23. The Wobbly Guy:Tweets now (11:40 EDT) indicating that the military is on the move in large numbers. Not much discussion of it but I find it amazing that tens of millions of paper ballots could have been counted and results compiled overnight.
I’m sorry, but the only outcome I see is Moussavi cutting a deal with the mullahs, under the guise of saving the lives of those who perceived themselves fighting for freedom.
The mullahs win – the revolution loses its nominal figurehead.
Moussavi wins – whatever deals and concessions he can extract out of the mullahs.
The revolutionaries? They lose.
In their world, the only thing that matters is “I win”.
Jun 16, 2009 - 9:48 am 24. nilsonian:I think the most important thing to understand about Iran–it is an ‘empire’, with huge and important minority groups. If the revolutionary guards are all fighting rioters in Tehran for more than a few weeks, they could lose provinces all around the Persian core: Baluchistan, Arab/oil regions, Azeri and Kurdish areas. Controlling Tehran may produce real civil wars in two or more non-Persian regions. A ‘victory’ in Tehran that takes eight weeks may bring the country to breakup. Like the old USSR–the amount of ethnic tinder is generally not understood, and greatly underestimated.
Jun 16, 2009 - 10:11 am 25. dan:I agree with John Bolton’s recent op-ed: there are no fundamental quarrels between “moderates” and “hardliners” in the upper reaches of the Iranian power structures – or any totalitarian government. How do you think someone becomes a member of one of those elect conspiracies? This is not a Parliament or even a Congress. Its members are the vanguard of the revolution, under the discipline required by the revolution’s tactical and strategic goals. Mousavi is a darling of that revolution – how else could he have been appointed one of its first prime ministers during the 1980s, under conditions of mortal warfare? Only mirroring – presuming one’s enemy resembles one’s self – can ellide such suggestive facts. Even if sections of the Guards turn on Ahmadinejad and join Mousavi – the Revolution will be victorious. The people remain pawns, however exakted the part they have been given to play may seem. Only if the Council itself is deposed, its members tried, and Hezbollah, Hamas and nuclear weapons abandoned, its relationships with Russia and China abandoned, will this be a genuine revolution. Otherwise, it’s just high-grade political theater intended to elicit a certain response from its audience.
Jun 16, 2009 - 10:35 am 26. Karen Yvonne:In my post @11 I didn’t mean to come off sounding totally heartless. I feel sorry for those Iranians who would be free from, as blogstop put it, the “ossified theocracy.” And yes, in general, support for the democratic process is important even if for the moment it’s more symbolic than substantive. It’s just that it’s hard to believe democracy is necessarily a good thing in a majority Islamic country. After all, as Herb @21 noted, they still chop off heads and hands – does it matter if the sword they use is a democratic one? Democratic or not, the sword will always be a prominent feature.
Jun 16, 2009 - 11:31 am 27. Roderick Reilly:Two observations:
On the light side: Conan O’Brian on the “Tonight” show probably came closer than the entire MSM when he ran a clip of the Iranian Presidential debate with his own subtitles, where he had Amahdinejahd and Mousavi each claiming that they were the more evil of the two.
Now, I’m going to go out on a limb and be devil’s advocate: could the Obama administration’s tardy and limpid reaction to the post-election events be due to them actually knowing what a sham this whole election process in Iran was? Why fulminate against the winner if the loser himself was a fraud?
Just asking.
Jun 16, 2009 - 11:36 am 28. Karen Yvonne:Is Obama embarrassed that he made such a big deal about unconditional talks with the now obviously not-so-popular Ahmadinejad? I don’t think so, not at all. He doesn’t care who’s in charge as long as he get to talk to whoever it is. Some might be embarrassed on Obama’s behalf, but Obama himself isn’t. As far as he’s concerned, there’s no reason why it should redound to his discredit.
Jun 16, 2009 - 12:07 pm 29. The Ethereal Voice:[...] What’s the game? [...]
Jun 16, 2009 - 4:08 pm 30. oMan:Karen Yvonne (#28): made me laugh. So true, Obama doesn’t care about fundamentals, only about the theater. With, always, Himself at center stage. Meanwhile the poor kids and average voters in Iran are going to get so hurt. If they are smart they will not count on anything he says.
Jun 16, 2009 - 4:38 pm 31. blert:It’s stage craft over statecraft every time with the 0.
H’s brought hollywood to the white house.
Jun 16, 2009 - 4:44 pm 32. Derek:The US has won wars for two reasons; they could afford space and time to win, and they learned quickly by moving the fighting men back to teach the next wave. And they have been able to harness overwhelming force eventually to overcome any mistakes.
Obama has oddly enough gotten to where he is by being able to afford time and space to win. His opponents fell apart before him. Clinton and McCain both lost their contests as opposed to Obama winning.
I wonder if he has the capability to learn from events.
Everything we see happening, the stimulus, the treasury actions, even health care, and foreign policy are almost to a detail old established positions that long time washington insiders have nurtured for years. The reaction to Iran is pure and genuine State Department, the same State Department that has been wrong on almost every issue, with a good dose of CIA ‘intelligence’, who also have been wrong on nearly everything.
I don’t think that Obama has a clue what to do, and those surrounding him haven’t had a fresh idea for two decades.
Iran may self destruct, probably ending up not with some strongman, but societal collapse, a festering sore that will cultivate pathologies that will extend far beyond it’s borders. We’ve seen this before, and it didn’t turn out well. I’m predicting that the US will do the wrong, obtuse, destructive, infuriating thing in every turn in this event. Washington has become so parochial, so detached from reality. They couldn’t make a good decision if someone nailed it to their forehead.
I pity those poor sods in Iran. They will fight, they will be shot at, beaten. They will cry out worthy words, pleas for decency and uprightness.
Derek
Jun 16, 2009 - 11:10 pm 33. Belmont Club » What goes around:[...] article entitled “Obama, Siding With the Regime” makes the point expressed in the post Follow the Money, but in a more scholarly and better documented way. In that post I wrote that Obama was a man with [...]
Jun 17, 2009 - 3:07 pm 34. EdGi:“Partners for Peace”, the be-all of deal making, will inevitably lead us to appeasement of evil and then to massive violense in self defense when the evildoers do the evil they will do. Amazingly, Spenglers article is almost a duplicate of the same things said about the German corruption after Hitler came to power and the Shibatsu corruption in pre-Pearl Harbor Japan. The opposition is corrupt, no doubt, but our delusion of “partners” will lead us to the horrors of the past if we do not change the regime. Wretchard, your analogy of the support for Enrile is “write-on”; I suspect the people in the streets are well aware of Spengler’s point of the corrupt power struggle, and are motivated by their hatred of the regime and love of freedom, not naive loyalty to the sleazoids. Sadly, Obi is not with them, but with his “partners”, the evil-doers.
Jun 17, 2009 - 4:07 pm 35. Belmont Club » Who am I speaking to?:[...] made the same point explicitly some posts ago in response to the question of whether we should help the demonstrators as private persons. The key [...]
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