But is this what we did in Korea, or in Vietnam, or is it what we are presently doing in the Middle East or Afghanistan? I think not. Instead for political or other reasons, in each of those conflicts we have ignored the rights of those citizens that are placed in harms way, and endowed our enemies and those in the area of conflict with rights which per force should belong to our soldiers. We have done this by enacting rules of engagements that create constraints on our soldiers which are at odd with the responsibility which the country has to them.

I for one firmly believe and declare that the life of one American soldier is priceless, and thus, worth more than the life of any enemy regardless of the place he chooses to fight from or run to. There should not be any sanctuary when an enemy attacks our soldiers, and if collateral damage happens so be it! To think and act otherwise is to discriminate against our soldiers by assigning more value to the enemy or to those caught up in the fog of war than to our fellow citizens, and no one has or should have that right.

If we are not willing to adhere to the above principle, we should not fight a war.

(wonder if this Bobby Horton is kin to Johnny “You Fought All the Way” Horton ?)

As much as I liked Hackworth, he was known to embellish things more than a little bit.

Most “jams” in the M16 were caused by magazine failure when the twin ends of the spring slid to one side because the floorplate had no receptacle to stop them.

Other problems were related to a failure to chrome the chamber and by a change in gunpowder after overly-restrictive specifications had mated the weapon to previous propellants.

All of these were a direct result of the incessant micro-managing associated with the McNamara regime. As was maintaining the delicate plastics used in the stocking and the side to side foregrips instead of top-to bottom.

The latter exaberated the one real design weakness in the M16; using a long thin gas tube instead of a piston.

The decision to make the 5.56 round general issue may have been on McNamaras watch or it may have come in the closing days of the Eisenhower Administration. I have learned that the decision to replace the .45ACP pistol with a 9mm (eventually) came on Ike’s watch.

Can’t blame everything on Strange, you know—–as tempting as that may be.

PS: The NVA may have buried a body outside Hack’s perimiter. But they certainly did not deliberately leave a weapon behind.

PPS: While the Kalishnikov was a vast improvement over the PPSH41 and PPSH43 submachine guns common in the WWII Red Army,
neither I nor the late Jeff Cooper (among others) consider it inherently desirable.

Me, if I had my way I believe I would issue our guys a Ruger Mini-14 chambered for the new 6.8mm SP and loaded with a Mannlicher en bloc clip. Then you would have a sturdy weapon with the rapid reload of the Garand,
the weight of the M16, superior handling characteristics and the ballistics of a Winchest 270. FWTW.

I recommend the book to everyone. Hackworth’s experiences in the Army during the time being discussed here are sure to resonate.

The War in Vietnam was from 1949 onward, about containing China, not North Vietnam. The first Indochina War followed directly on the heels of Korea, which itself directly followed the absorption of Eastern Europe by the Soviets. Off to one side were the Malayan Emergency and the Huk insurgency. It was unquestionably regarded as a proxy war against the West. This is why Robert McNamara et al refused to defeat the North Vietnamese. They did not want to “bring China in” as MacArthur had brought China into the Korean War. Inflicting defeat, in the context of containment, was too risky. What the policymakers were aiming for was a kind of stalemate in which China would quit because it had been ‘punished’ enough. Hence, the gradualism of Vietnam; hence the idea that the war was about “sending signals”. One classic line from the 1960s was that if “Johnson wanted to send a message, why not use Western Union”. Western Union sent telegrams, a popular form of communication at the time.

So, the story goes, LBJ fought a war he had no intention, never had any intention, of winning. To send a signal. To send a message. Now this narrative is a simplification, but it appears to be true in many essential respects. However it may be, this is the strategy that found in Robert Strange McNamara the perfect vessel for its implementation. He was the ultimate bean counter in a world where blood was money and lives were currency to send “signals”.

Also met an older couple. She had worked for VietNam Airline: “Air Nuoc Mam”? inquired I.
Chuckles all around.

He was ARVN officer who had survived 10 years in re-education camps. Before leaving, he wrung my hand and thanked me for trying. Now that was a humbling experience.

Yes, we did manage to win something substantial in spite of the geo-political outcome not to mention our winsome ways. Or was that because of our winsome ways?
Hmmm?

It seems that those who paid a direct price
for the McNamara era feel no need to indulge in rhetorical vengeance, especially ex post mortem.

Those who sat to one side and were offended, I tell you, OFFENDED, tend to be a different story.

I am pleased to be able to associate with the former via these pages and elsewhere. The latter shall keep a civil tongue in their heads should they and I meet face-to-face.

I put McNamaras problem down to a personality disorder. Looks like he suffered from a compulstion to torpedo the functional and impose the dysfunctional.

Witness his refusal to even file charges against the joker who tried to murder him. Stands in contrast to how he treated those Generals and others who dissented from his hubris. WE all do that from time to time, but Strange made a career of it, and then went into denial for the rest of his days.

Oh well, I imagine that our friend Fred will
get McNamara off with a Heavenly Horsewhipping
a few few centuries in purgatory.