77 Comments

1. Lifeofthemind:

Thank you for this thread Wretchard. My comment on the WaPo article that I posted on the bottom of the Mad Men thread belongs here.

The best comment I read was to the effect that we started this war with Clinton’s generals and that Obama and company will conduct another purge in favor of the morally dubious who specialize in politically connected projects at the expense of combat capability. Right now BHO is throwing resources at the new team that the Congress would have fought giving the old team but there is no credibility in the American regime. The smell of defeat hangs over us and the allies that were cultivated by Bush and his generals, even as they carped and foot dragged, will now cut and run. The partisans of the left are shrill and desperate in their efforts to assign responsibility for their disasters to Booooosh.

The question that remains is what are the of new team like? Is McChrystal another Weasley Clark? Is he a good man who just wants his shot at getting a job done? Does anybody know?

Aug 17, 2009 - 4:21 am 2. Posts about Barack Obama as of August 17, 2009 » The Daily Parr:

[...] it By Phillip BrownleePosted at Just now Filed under Congress, President ObamaPermalinkComments Just attacking in another direction – pajamasmedia.com 08/17/2009 The events are not in dispute. Wikipedia says that “On May 11, [...]

Aug 17, 2009 - 4:34 am 3. Don51:

That just goes to show that the modern general must know how to conduct a 360 degree defense if he is ever to succeed.

All wars are fought on two fronts. The problem with the general officer corps since WWII is that they’ve abrogated the second front at home. They still ‘outsource’ the story telling to the MSM which since Korea hasn’t been on board and is defacto in the other camp. When given the tools, internet and blogs, creative people in the lower ranks [which was the source of thousands of effective company clerks for generations], instead of taking advantage of the technological opportunity to steal a march on MSM and outflank them into America’s homes, they instead spent their effort to throttle the means of their potential deliverance. It’s like after 1918, the victorious allies parked the technological developments to sideshows as the old established order reasserted itself when it came to budget and garrison time while it was the losers who’d innovate in a practical sense the technology for the next war. It’s a sociological and organizational deficiency. Generalship, its causes and its cures.

Aug 17, 2009 - 5:29 am 4. Lucy:

It’s the most obscene of obscenities that our soldiers, our brave patriots, are over there fighting a war under this incompetent president who doesn’t even have the character to respect their sacrifices for our country.

Aug 17, 2009 - 6:22 am 5. Gordon:

Generals and politics … for some reason made me think of Lincoln and McClellan. Re MacArthur: he was so well-connected politically he got away with unbelievable incompetence in Korea for the longest time. Basically, a general who satisfies his CinC has good politics–think of Grant.

Aug 17, 2009 - 6:29 am 6. Wadeusaf:

From the WAPO article, Gen. McChrystal has done less to change the way things are done and more to change the pace at which things are being accomplished.

Also he has increased the awareness of the opportunities (cough) and issues presented today. Nothing Gen. McChrystal has accomplished on the battlefield is that dramatically different from his predecessor with the sole exception that he has pushed Afghan and Nato forces into the villages faster. If this strategy will work in Afghanistan we will know soon enough.

However the very elections we hope to solidify the Afghanistan government may also work against us. It is not easy, I do not envy any man in command in Afghanistan.

Aug 17, 2009 - 6:31 am 7. programmer:

WaPo says:
“McChrystal has moved with alacrity to shift the focus of U.S. and NATO troops from chasing the Taliban to protecting cities and towns, reasoning that expanding areas of population security would have greater impact on the insurgency than a series of raids. … McChrystal said bombs could be dropped only when solid intelligence showed that high-level militants were present or U.S. forces were in imminent danger.”

Programmer says: The Brits used somewhat similar tactics successfully in Malyasia. HOWEVER, the key word is “expanding areas of population security”, otherwise each city and town becomes, in essence, a besieged fortress. Hmmmm……

Aug 17, 2009 - 6:35 am 8. RWE:

I think the biggest problem our military has suffered from for some 20 years now is that we entered the post-Cold War world with the wrong kind of senior leadership.

The 1980’s were a time that focused on technological advancements, R&D, systems acquisition. This naturally led to officer promotions that focused on those areas, and that in turn sparked a deep dissatisfaction among the “operators” – the people that drove, flew and sailed stuff, who felt they were on the back burner. But they figured their turn would come, when the new capabilities developed in the 80’s gave way to the Ultimate Showdown with the USSR.

As it turned out the Ultimate Showdown was over very, very fast indeed. Desert Storm was fought in February and March of 1991 and the USSR folded on Christmas of that year. They got their turn and it was over before they caught their breath.

Logically, the thing to do was to reset to the R&D stage and start planning for the postwar world. But that was not in keeping with the way those at the top had come to think over the preceding decade. It was THEIR turn now, dammit! The focus became preserving existing capabilities – that would never be needed.

Bill Clinton gave them the excuse they needed with his Invasion of The Month Club foreign policy approach. We really have never gotten away from that attitude, and of course 9/11/01 merely reinforced it. Last year the SECAF and CSAF were fired for daring to spend time thinking about the future.

Aug 17, 2009 - 6:50 am 9. Doug:

“HOWEVER, the key word is “expanding areas of population security”, otherwise each city and town becomes, in essence, a besieged fortress. Hmmmm……”
—
Much like Russia under Kathy the Great.
Solution:
BHO appoints a Czar for each city.

Aug 17, 2009 - 6:54 am 10. JFSanders031:

McChrystal’s roots are in SOG. He is a pusher by nature. Which means he will always take the initiative. He will instigate. This will not always work but it works more than enough for the statistics to be in his favor. He also plays politics through the media. He learned a great deal from his fiasco and cover up. Being that he survived that and even procured a promotion speaks to his political acumen.

I don’t see him making any large mistakes. I also don’t see him changing the landscape culturally or politically in the Stan. These folks are a hillbilly’s hillbilly. Think Scots-Irish on steroids. You want a different culture in Afghanistan? Then you have to depopulate and then repopulate the place with another culture. And I am not sure anyone else could make it there. Might have to leave it empty.

And then you hope that none of those previous people come back.

Aug 17, 2009 - 7:09 am 11. Whitehall:

As I stated here at the time of the original news, this was not a direct move against McKiernan. It was a move to neutralize Petraeus, the war hero of the Iraq Surge.

McChrystal holds his position thanks to Obama and Gates. Petraeus is out of the loop, at least politically. His authority has been undercut.

Of course, I don’t know if Petraeus asked for the reassignment – that is a possibility. But since Gates gave the public order, not Petraeus, I doubt that.

Aug 17, 2009 - 7:16 am 12. Gordon:

#10: RE your last two paragraphs: you’re right; the people there are perfectly adapted to their environment–they’re the same as Alexander’s day. Right off hand it’s hard to think of a mountainous area that has what we’d think of as a ‘central government’. Establishing a democracy in Afghanistan is hopeless.

Aug 17, 2009 - 7:22 am 13. Lorenzo (from downunder):

If your CnC, Deputy CnC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Theatre Commander do not have confidence that you are the right person for the job, then you are not the right person for the job.

Counter-insurgency is deeply political by its nature. It is profoundly mistaken to see it as a “military” problem. It is a security problem.

One can apply a bit of medieval wisdom. The Norse raiders going a-viking had secure areas to raid from. The solution was to build up local defenses, forcing them to operate in bigger groups that could be brought to battle and destroyed, such as at Ethadun, Clontarf and Stamford Bridge.

Or co-opt them as the new defenders. As, of course, was done in Iraq with the Sons of Iraq.

Building up locally patrolled secure areas where troops have a connection with the locals so they know what is going on and can provide the security the locals actually want and need was the basis of British/Commonwealth success in Malaya, Borneo and Oman before Petraeus did it in Iraq.

Aug 17, 2009 - 7:25 am 14. John Work:

In a time of confusion and turmoil, and especially if things get dramatically worse, we could be very vulnerable to the rise of our own Caesar (Napoleon, Hitler, etc.). We would be wise to be very wary of politically savvy generals.

Aug 17, 2009 - 7:55 am 15. exhelodrvr:

RWE,
“The 1980’s were a time that focused on technological advancements, R&D, systems acquisition.”

And being able to pass inspections. Those who were really good at that were promoted, those who weren’t weren’t. Sometimes those who were really good at that were also really good operators, sometimes they were just adequate operators. And so some of those who were just adequate operators made it pretty high up.

Aug 17, 2009 - 8:02 am 16. Whitehall:

For an analog from US history, think of Grant and Halleck. “Old Brains” was still the titulary boss even though Grant had effective control of all forces.

Petraeus = Halleck

Aug 17, 2009 - 8:22 am 17. Mad Fiddler:

Thanks for the reference, Whitehall.

It’s an interesting coincidence, if you believe in that sort of thing, that Grant’s early “test” as a new Brigadier General in the War of Northern Aggression was an operation in Mississippi County, Missouri that is recorded as “the Battle of Belmont.”

Aug 17, 2009 - 9:00 am 18. Marzouq the Redneck Muslim:

Gordon #12,

You are correct IMHO. It is not only because of physical terrain but also human (tribal) terrain. It is not good when all that focus is on technology. When the U.S. military has more band members than linguists expert in needed language skills, there is something wrong with priorities. The late Col. John Boyd’s quote, “people, ideas and hardware in that order”, seems appropriate here.

I believe the current strategy and team of Mullen, Gates, Petreaus, McChrystal has the potential to achieve what can realistically be achieved in the ME/EA theatre. The goal is to neutralize and innoculate against violent extemism. Transforming the region into a Jeffersonian democracy is impossible. Adjusting Sharia is possible.

After 9 years in Afghanistan we are finally adjusting our strategy and have a chance of achieving our goal. It can work if we focus more on the people/ideas and less on hardware.

Lorenzo #13,

Good points! The CRS (can’t remember stuff) syndrone is well illustrated in your post.

IMHO, the strategic adjustment from chacing insurgents to securing population is a good one. The 360 degree awareness is also required. Means other than military are an appropriate course to take in solving the Afghan/Pakistan problem. Most do not seem to understand unconventional wars, those low intensity “dirty” wars take much more time to win and success is achieved by changing the political dynamic.

All three cases you mentioned: Malaya, Borneo, Oman are qualified successes achieved in this manner.

Salaam eleikum Y’all!

Aug 17, 2009 - 9:10 am 19. Barry 0351:

I understand Gates wants to arrest the Taliban and send them to trial while the military wants to just kill them.
Fortified Hamlets did not work the first time around and this expanding zones of security sounds like massing forces together for a mass casualty event.
cavalry tactics from the Indian wars sounds like the best options.

Aug 17, 2009 - 9:11 am 20. always right:

We had some very ‘heated discussions’ on The BlackFive (blackfive.net) about the recent change of ROE wrt Afghan operation before.

No matter how ‘compassionate’ the libs want us to believe, the end results (imho) is counter-ROE from the Taliban/AQ guys will involve more civilian collateral damage, not less because of our self-restriction.

In effect, we are going to create another Hamas/Pali situation in that region.

Aug 17, 2009 - 9:45 am 21. Josh:

Strictly on a military basis, if the war is going as poorly as recent events suggest then new leadership is needed.

And I do not accept any political limitations on the generals as an excuse – if they are so constrained they cannot fight effectively, they need to say so, up to resignation.

A teachable moment for Obama, methinks.

Aug 17, 2009 - 10:43 am 22. exhelodrvr:

21,
Actually, the war has been going better lately. It has just entered a different, more active phase.

A lot depends on continued cooperation from Pakistan.

Aug 17, 2009 - 11:47 am 23. Dave Katz:

Excerpt from my most recent, as of yet unpublished, article – the three strategic phases of Afghanistan with some criticism of both State and DoD:

“…Eight years later, how has US strategy changed? Can it achieve victory and what will that victory look like? US strategy implemented by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has progressed through three phases:

The First Strategy

The first strategy started as a counterinsurgency and developed into an offensive war of maneuver waged unconventionally, utilizing local competitors to the Taliban, supported by the CIA, US Army Green Berets and US airpower. This strategy drove the Taliban from power in a rapid, and cost effective manner. The Taliban’s overthrow, December 22nd, 2001, marked the height of unconventional warfare waged through local competitors. It also marked end of the US allied strategic offensive in Afghanistan.

The Second Strategy

The second strategy of Operation Enduring Support has been a logistical build-out and strategic defense waged through a conventional war of attrition. The newly created, NATO led, International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) assumed authority and troop strength went from roughly 600 at the end of unconventional war to 90,000. Special operations forces were reoriented from unconventional warfare and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) using local forces to Direct Action (DA) missions. The demarcation between the first and second strategy began with Operation Anaconda in March 2002, when more than 1,000 conventional US soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division were deployed into fierce firefights in the Tora Bora region, inflicting hundreds of casualties on the Taliban, their Pashtun tribal backers, and their Al Qaida allies. As bloody as the results were, Operation Anaconda was not decisive. It did not, in any strategic sense, destroy the enemy’s forces, seize their terrain or populations, nor break their will to fight. In fact, Operation Anaconda marked the beginning of the strategic defensive, because the US would not pursue the enemy over the Pakistani border and by consequence allowed for the creation and growth of sanctuaries in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP), FATA and Baluchistan. The local Afghan militias did not effectively block the Taliban’s retreat. Conventional US and local Afghan commanders did not coordinate nor manage expectations adequately, leading to finger-pointing and mistrust. As a result, ISAF increasingly carried out operations through conventional warfare waged directly by US and allied forces. Since Operation Anaconda, the Taliban has withdrawn or dissolved its large conventional formations in Afghanistan, returning to sporadic and diffuse guerilla warfare. ISAF, for its part, has grown a presence and logistic footprint requiring large numbers of conventional troops and supporting multiple general officer commands.

The second strategy imposed a conventional framework on what had been a chaotic tribal counterinsurgency run by Green Berets, and funded by CIA paramilitaries. This strategy established a large scale, logistical infrastructure with the construction and expansion of ISAF bases around the country. Troop strength increased. Numerous tactical operations were launched. The Afghan National Government, Army, Police and Border Forces were created. Twenty-six Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were dispatched to the provinces . Civil and public works have been commissioned and funded by the international community.

Where a conventional counterparty in Afghanistan did not exist, it was created. The creation of a representative, Afghan nation state was a foreign invention. Afghanistan has encompassed empires, been part of other empires, a monarchy and included several variant city states but has never been a representative nation state. Endowing that state with a military and police force far beyond its means rendered it a proxy dependant upon foreign funding for its continuation. ISAF’s reconstruction and stabilization operations were, likewise, based upon a fictitious premise. Reconstruction presumes prior construction. Stabilization presumes a societal framework within which there is an acceptable accommodation. Neither of these existed across Afghanistan.

An Afghan national government putting troops into the provinces is almost as foreign an exercise as Western nations doing the same thing. Imposing sovereignty on Afghan tribal entities historically resulted in insurrection. Abdur Rahman (1880-1900), the “Iron Amir”, endured over 40 tribal revolts during his rule. Eventually, he had to forcibly relocate over 10,000 Pashtun Ghilzai tribesmen. The PDPA’s 1978 attempt at rural reformation resulted in civil war. The concept of an extra-tribal national police exercising intra-tribal jurisdiction is foreign. The nation state is a Western reformation and renaissance-derived political and social concept. The Pashtuns are an Eastern Islamic tribal society. Imposing the state on the tribe generates a reaction both secular and sacred which may unify and motivate the current and possibly future generation of Pashtuns against the US, its allies and the Government of Afghanistan.

State actors, like the US, possess and project power predominately through developed means, such as: diplomats, armies, navies and air forces. Tribal actors, like the Ghilzai, have manpower, familial identification and native means, such as: local knowledge, language, culture and permanence. Non-state, non-tribal actors, like Al Qaeda, have neither the means nor the limitations of the state or the tribe. Tribal-based conflicts, like Afghanistan, are outside the conventional framework and mindset of the US State Department and its European equivalents. The foundational assumption of any ‘State’ department is that the nation state is the apex of social-political development. Policy, career development, and leadership positions go to those who manage international or inter ‘nation state’ affairs, not tribal ones. Because of this, ‘State’ departments are implicitly under-equipped to deal with non-nation, non-state entities, particularly Islamic tribal societies that view the very concept of a nation state as an unholy competitor to Islam. In Afghanistan, the US and its allies did not have a counterparty nation state. So, they created one. Likewise, conventional forces, like the US military, organize, train and equip to fight other conventional forces. Their focus is on defeating the means: armies, navies, and air forces of competitor states and supporting the armies, navies, and air forces of allied states. In Afghanistan, the US and its allies did not have a counterparty military, so they created one.

The change from tribal-based counterinsurgency, the first strategy, to the imposition of a western conventional diplomatic and military framework, the second strategy, has been an abrupt and radical change for Afghanistan. Although enormously expensive, it conformed the Afghan conflict to ISAF member nations diplomatic and military norms. The imposition of a western derived, proxy state supplied reactionary tribal and religious elements with a rallying focus. The conventional strategy ignored those elements present in native society which were already in competition with militant Islam: ideological and religious competitors, industrial, agricultural, logistical, cultural and political competitors. Rather, it introduced and used foreign concepts at enormous expense, requiring extensive education and social preparation with no guarantee of success.

The second strategy, a strategic defense waged through a conventional war of attrition, was not working. Despite US tactical successes, the Taliban continued to attack and did so in increasing numbers. ISAF could inflict cumulative casualties numbering in the tens of thousands on the Taliban without deterring them, their Pashtun tribal backers or their Al Qaeda allies. The reason for this is simple arithmetic. The total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children born to a woman over her reproductive lifetime, in the Taliban’s sanctuary of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP) is 5.1 . In Afghanistan, the TFR is 6.53 . If these rates bracket the actual rates on either side of the border, the NWFP population of 17,735,912 doubles every 11 to 14 years. An increase of 17–18 million to the NWFP’s population means 8-9 million additional males for jihad. This birth rate, this regenerative capacity trumps any casualty rate ISAF can inflict on the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban needs to protract the conflict in order to realize its strategic advantage provided by birth rate. ISAF’s strategy provided the Taliban with time.

The Taliban has a strategic advantage in moral purpose. For the individual US soldier as well as the nation, the moral purpose of the Afghan war erodes as the attacks of September 11th, 2001 recede from memory. For the indigenous jihadist, the presence of foreign troops on tribal soil are a daily means of inciting and reinforcing nativist chauvinism and religious war. Taliban paramilitaries, and involved tribal populations, are motivated to expel foreign invaders, secure Afghanistan for their brand of Islam, and revenge the deaths of their relatives. The ISAF troops and their home countries’ moral purpose, and consequent motivation are attrited over time. Moral purpose provides the Taliban a growing comparative advantage. ISAF’s strategic defense surrendered time to the Taliban allowing them to capitalize this advantage.

The strategic goal of denying Al Qaeda a base of operations gave way to compelling Afghanistan to accept sovereign responsibility over its territory. ISAF tactical victories previously oriented toward denying Al Qaeda sanctuary, had little direct context to this new strategic goal. ISAF’s conventional war of attrition did not gain permanent control of indigenous populations, instead, it focused on kinetic operations against enemy forces in Afghanistan, to the exclusion of Pakistani sanctuaries, militant madrassas, and Pashtun tribal and religious imperatives. Moreover, the second strategy surrendered the strategic offensive to the enemy. The Taliban decided if and when to engage. This conventional war of attrition mismatched US tactical advantages of: speed, communication and firepower against Pashtun strategic advantages of permanence, religious and tribal will, moral purpose, local knowledge, language and culture. Ultimately, the second strategy failed because it lacked a way to convert tactical victory into strategic victory. It depended upon open-ended, direct tactical engagement by conventional US allied forces, in a guerrilla war, merely to forestall strategic defeat.

The second strategy was, at best, a muddled bureaucratic substitution of maintenance of the status quo for victory. ISAF’s tactical-strategic disconnect manifest itself in emergent bad habits, timid generalship where avoidance of casualties allowed force protection to trump maneuver. It fixated on personalities not war goals. Remote, periodic culling of the Taliban’s leadership through Predator strikes and commando raids achieved ‘silver bullet’ status of a command substituting tactical victory for strategic victory. Lastly, tactical metrics, body and bean counting, predominated strategic metrics.

The second strategic phase closed with the elevation of General Petraeus as commander of US Central Command, in October 2008, and the replacement of General McKiernan with General McChrystal on June 14th, 2009.

The Third Strategy

The third strategy was summed up by Gen. Petraeus in his statement to the Senate Armed Forces Committee on April 1st, 2009.:

“In order to address the situation in Afghanistan, we will implement a comprehensive counter-insurgency approach that works to defeat existing insurgent groups, develops the institutions required to address the root causes of the conflict, maintains relentless pressure on terrorist organizations affiliated with the insurgency, dismantles illegal drug networks, and prevents the emergence of safe havens for those transnational extremist groups.”
“A properly sized, trained, and equipped Afghanistan National Security Force is a prerequisite for any eventual drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan.”
“In addition, we will bolster the capabilities and the legitimacy of the other elements of the Afghan government – an effort in which, in much of Afghanistan, we will be building not rebuilding.”

To his credit, Gen. Petraeus recognized the inevitable, and instituted a modified third strategy. As opposed to a conventional war of attrition, this strategic phase employs a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach. This commenced with the insertion of 4,000 marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, into the Helmand river valley on June 30th, 2009. The Marines are part of a clear and hold strategy which de-emphasizes force protection for force distribution. The third strategy, as explained in his address to the US Senate, maintains the conventional frameworks, which defined the second strategy:

• Develop the size and capabilities of the Afghan national security forces
• Bolster the legitimacy and capability of other components of the Afghan government
• Maintain direct tactical engagement with the Taliban, other insurgents, and terrorist organizations
• Deny al Qaida sanctuary
• Dismantle illegal drug networks

The strategic goal of compelling Afghanistan to exercise sovereign control over its territory remains preeminent. Open-ended direct tactical engagement remains the means. Gen. Petraeus specifically mentions an endpoint where ISAF’s security responsibilities will be transferred to the Afghans and its forces drawn down. The question remains whether a foreign war can evolve, or devolve, into a Afghan war.

Aug 17, 2009 - 12:16 pm 24. wretchard:

There are apparently two directions in marketing. The most familiar is outbound marketing where a message is taken to the consumer. Of greater importance is inbound marketing, when a message is taken from the consumers into the firm in order to create the right product. Similarly, “outbound” in a campaign can be thought of as the act of implementing strategy, while “inbound” is the idea of formulating strategy correctly by bringing into leadership an awareness of the reality and opportunity it is facing.

In Afghanistan achieving the key goal requires flows in both directions, and Dave Katz’s formulation is an excellent place to see this. He writes: “The strategic goal of compelling Afghanistan to exercise sovereign control over its territory remains preeminent. Open-ended direct tactical engagement remains the means. Gen. Petraeus specifically mentions an endpoint where ISAF’s security responsibilities will be transferred to the Afghans and its forces drawn down. The question remains whether a foreign war can evolve, or devolve, into a Afghan war.” The unresolved issues inherent in this paragraph, which I think the US is trying to resolve are:

1.How do you create and simultaneously extend sovereign control? In particular, who exercises sovereignty, and how do the Pashtuns and other aliented or excluded groups find their way in? This is very similar to the problem of the Sunni/Shia/Kurds in Iraq. One answer is to “talk to the Taliban”; the other is to find a way to bring elements of the Taliban in. This speaks to the elections and political process. A foreign war cannot devolve into an Afghan war unless an Afghanistan is constituted.

2. “Open-ended direct tactical engagement remains the means” by which goal number 1 is to be achieved. That includes engaging the Taliban, denying al-Qaeda sanctuary, dealing with the cocaine opium trade issue. Here as well as in number 1, getting the support of Washington will be crucial, because whether one wants to “deal with the Taliban” or whether it is better to create a heterogenous Afghan state whose sovereignty will be extended, a long-term commitment to tactical engagement remains the only means of achieving it, but to different degrees, and herein may lie the areas of skirmish with Washington.

This goes to the heart of whether one should, or can only implement an “exit strategy” or whether it is possible to impose a victory strategy. Here feasibility and desirability are two sides of the same coin. Washington can only be enticed into going for victory if they see it as attainable. Otherwise their own political exposure becomes unacceptable. Essentially anyone in charge of the Afghan campaign has to help Washington decide which way to resolve the Afghan political problem and convince them to invest the resources necessary to achieve whichever political option they choose. This is particularly difficult because the military, traditionally speaking, ought not to lead in politics. Yet here, for obvious reasons, it must play an important role in both the inbound and outbound aspects of it. The Afghan elections, the negotiations with fractious groups, etc must be successfully solved to “extend sovereignty” or at least to pass it one to someone. And the only means to manage this is tactical engagement.

In a way, any successful commander must manipulate both the ground in Washington and in Afghanistan, as both feed into each other. He must convince the Afghans it is in their best interest to achieve a definite political status; he must feed back to Washington the achievability or lack thereof of that political effort and do so in such a way that motivates Washington to support him. Look at it this way: if the Afghan commanders can’t convince Washington it’s going to work they won’t get support. If they can’t get support it’s not going to work.

Now is Washington playing games by neutralizing Petraeus and dealing directly with McChrystal? Or is McChrystal making them think they’re dealing with him, but really dealing with the hand of Petraeus? Who knows. But soldiering has gotten a little more complicated. It’s gotten political in unavoidable ways. I think this is, to some extent, a failure of leadership on the part of Washington if they need a man facing both ways, who will tell them what to do and convince them to do it. If the WaPo story is basically correct about the politics, then to some degree Washington fired itself.

Aug 17, 2009 - 12:46 pm 25. annoymouse:

Seems to me that if the lession in Iraq Counter-insurgency is to embed with the locals and play to thier politics then a tacile domestic political strategy would follow. Arguably this is where GW failed early on in Iraq. How to win a war by acceding to the lessons of the last still applys.

Aug 17, 2009 - 1:00 pm 26. annoymouse:

W- “cocaine trade issue”

Just so you can see I am paying attention that should read ‘heroine or poppy issue’

Aug 17, 2009 - 1:11 pm 27. exhelodrvr:

“In a way, any successful commander must manipulate both the ground in Washington and in Afghanistan”

The President should be addressing the first part of that.

Aug 17, 2009 - 1:16 pm 28. steeple:

somewhat off-thread, but posting on behalf of my fellow Texans (and honorary Texans) here at BC.

Richard, if you could put this into link form, I would be most grateful

Welcoming Home a Hero – Fallen Marine LCpl Brandon Lara — (Done)

Aug 17, 2009 - 1:26 pm 29. 49erDweet:

There are generals and then there are generals. Thomas Jefferson once said, “I think with the Romans, that the general of today should be a soldier tomorrow if necessary.” The current few that would indeed be worthwhile adversaries on a battlefield seem far outnumbered by the politician-bureaucrat-uniformed “suits” haunting the upper echelons of today’s pentagon, I fear.

Aug 17, 2009 - 1:36 pm 30. wretchard:

President Obama says:

Because in the 21st century, military strength will be measured not only by the weapons our troops carry, but by the languages they speak and the cultures they understand,” the president said.

That probably includes being able to speak the dialect in Washington.

Aug 17, 2009 - 1:45 pm 31. Gordon:

#23,24–excellent essays; Katz is great. The takeaways for me were: 1) forces from Kabul are as foreign as Americans or Macedonians and, 2) how the original effort morphed into a huge social facelift to create opposite institutions to deal with (our State Dept, the Afghan Foreign Ministry). We always do this, want to start remaking things to look more like us (after all, don’t they all want our way of life? Answer: sometimes, often not).

The fundamental goal is to kill or neutralize those who wish for another 9/11–that’s hard enough. Let’s stick to the blocking and tackling.

Aug 17, 2009 - 1:46 pm 32. Whitehall:

I thought the REAL target was Pakistan.

That’s the place with the nukes and the safe harbor for the Taliban and the much larger population.

That means the problem is MUCH bigger than a backwaters tribal territory that’s not really a nation.

Aug 17, 2009 - 1:55 pm 33. wretchard:

According to Byron York, the Netroots have practically eliminated the requirement for military action from their agenda in favor of domestic programs like healthcare. That’s the gator at the bottom of the pit waiting to swallow any failure in Afghanistan and yet another reason why political adeptness is so important to a commander.

Aug 17, 2009 - 1:56 pm 34. JMH:

No matter how ‘compassionate’ the libs want us to believe, the end results (imho) is counter-ROE from the Taliban/AQ guys will involve more civilian collateral damage, not less because of our self-restriction.

It is easy enough to predict. The Taliban/AQ guys see civilian deaths as almost 100% beneficial to their cause. If we kill civilians, it’s fodder for the international news media calling the US baby killers. If they kill civilians, it’s encouragement for the remaining civilians to fall into line. One way or another, Taliban/AQ will work to encourage civilian deaths.

So, the more Taliban/AQ guys there are and the more freedom they have to operate without getting killed, the more civilian deaths there will be. Any ROE that reduces attrition rates among Taliban/AQ will increase civilian deaths. Want fewer civilian deaths? Kill more Taliban.

Not very nuanced, I know.

Aug 17, 2009 - 2:06 pm 35. Habu:

I know it builds time to gather a number of comments on any particular thread, however the last two have as of this writing gathered 46 total while the thread on the soap opera garnered well over what? 120+,(I’m not going to look back)…

Wonder what that says wnen you have serious threads such as the firing of a General Officer (the first since MacArthur) and one on China, our main money nation faltering.

I guess these are serious times and the contributors are focusing on the serious issues. Bully, bully for keeping things in perspective.

I suppose we could talk about obama “green tsar” Van Jones, who is co-founder of ColorofChange.org, an activist organization and a self avowed communist but naw, why go there, hell we might end up on obamas tell-tell list that he dropped but of course is lying and will simple impliment it in another way..

Anyone know what happen on “As the World Turns today?”

Aug 17, 2009 - 2:41 pm 36. Habu:

Just how long are we going to hammer on the anvil that is Afghanistan?

We can’t control it without pulling a French and Jacques Necker circa a priori the French Revolution.

We’re not going to stop opium from being grown in that area and exported to OUR junkies here.

Just how many have to die in an action that NO ONE has ever successfully completed…subduing Afghanistan.

The chimera of believing we can is truly awesome in it’s hutzpah.

Aug 17, 2009 - 2:50 pm 37. Tony:

It says something about elections when you need US Marines to secure the polling places.

Immediately after our invasion of Afghanistan (in a timely manner!), my most ardently liberal friends declared “Once we are in there, we can’t leave until we provide a fair court systems, free elections and a fair society.”

@33 Prof Wretchard brings up what to many of us would be woundingly embarrassing – whither the earnest and saintly Anti-War Movement now?

Today’s front page articles condemning the protests against the proposed new health laws bring to mind the large-scale peace movement that was active during the Bush Administration. Raucous crowds followed the President everywhere, calling him Hitler, war criminal and liar, and dissent was the highest form of patriotism. But now, with the casualty rates in Afghanistan proportionally equal to the worst months of the Iraq War in April and Nov, ’04 and during the Surge in Spring ’07, there is no visible peace movement or any antiwar demonstrations.

Of course, there was no peace movement during the Clinton Administration either. Even though we were constantly at war in the skies over Iraq for every day of Clinton’s presidency, I don’t recall any antiwar sentiment. We were at war in Somalia (Black Hawk Down) in ’93, we invaded Haiti in ’94, bombed Sudan to break up WMD cooperation between Al Qaeda and Saddam and conducted the massive Operation Desert Fox to attack Saddam’s WMD’s in ’98, and we bombed and overthrew the government in Serbia in ’99. Apparently, there is no peace movement during Democratic presidencies. And now we hear that peaceful dissent is a threat to America.

+ + +

Finally, Afghanistan is becoming the Next Vietnam. How sad is that?Our President has already said our goal is not victory. God bless our troops.

Aug 17, 2009 - 3:21 pm 38. Habu:

Amen Tony ..

Aug 17, 2009 - 3:32 pm 39. Tcobb:

My father was in the US Army for over twenty years. He fought in active combat both in WWII and Korea. He was against the Vietnam war. Why? In his opinion, never fight a war that you don’t intend to win, and never fight a war when your soldiers have one or both arms tied behind their backs because otherwise it would be “unfair” to the enemy. When you have leaders that even can even envision “unfairness” to the enemy, you have “friends” and “leaders” that are willing to stab you in the back. And they most always do.

I think he was right, and the same principles apply today.

Aug 17, 2009 - 4:20 pm 40. Subotai Bahadur:

HABU!

Welcome back!

Don’t be too discouraged about the thread size issue. While you were gone, we were more than passing busy on serious matters.

Returning to Afghanistan, I am fairly sure that somewhere in the background on staff, McChrystal has the equivalent of a Zampolit reporting to Axelrod or Emmanuel, and knows it.

That said, I am a staunch believer in the First Rule of Logistics. “The Logistician draws the line beyond which the Tactician dare not tread.” All of our supply lines, primary and alternate, depend on the acquiesence and active cooperation of parties who are our sworn enemies and wish us nothing but ill. The logistics requirements for a force the size of that deployed in Afghanistan is not inconsiderable and cannot be met by airlift [figure the weight and volume of POL involved alone]. The trap is obvious, and only a fool would make strategic plans based on the assumption that it will never be sprung. I grant that Buraq Hussein may be a strategic fool. I will also not rule out the other possibility that he may be a knave of the worst order.

Best case scenario, Xenophon. Worst case? Look up the name Dr. William Brydon.

Subotai Bahadur

Aug 17, 2009 - 4:33 pm 41. Tony:

@40 I’ll see you your Xenophon, and raise you Linebacker II (III).

Aug 17, 2009 - 4:50 pm 42. RWE:

One more thing to think about, folks.

It has become something of a tradition for new administrations to fire general officers, just to show who is boss.

Back as the Bush 1 admin was slowly spooling up, a USAF General went over to the Hill to address some questions Congress had. They fired him. Later before Desert Storm started the Bush Admin fired the CSAF for some intemperate remarks about blowing Baghdad away. Then Clinton Admin wanted to blame the Kobahr Towers bombing on a USAF general and when they overrode the CASF’s recommendation he quit.

Then the Bush II admin fired the CASAF and SECAF last year. At least they did not do it just to point out who is boss. Anyway, it’s a tradition.

Aug 17, 2009 - 5:14 pm 43. Bob Smith:

It also demonstrates their zeal to respond to President Obama’s demand for rapid success in a place where foreign armies have failed for centuries.

Not all of them. We think of them as native now, but at one time Muslim armies were foreign to that land. Somehow they managed to conquer and conduct forcible religious conversion on pretty much everybody. If you want to win, perhaps there’s a lesson in there somewhere.

Aug 17, 2009 - 6:21 pm 44. wretchard:

Not all of them. We think of them as native now, but at one time Muslim armies were foreign to that land. Somehow they managed to conquer and conduct forcible religious conversion on pretty much everybody. If you want to win, perhaps there’s a lesson in there somewhere.

I think that to some extent people look to religion to make their lives easier. Some people join up to become “better persons”; overcome vices, learn equanimity. There’s a school of thought among preachers that if you are a good Christian you ought to have blessings both spiritual and temporal. But imagine if you were a bandit, or a pirate, or a lived a kind of passive life beneath a pitiless sky. Becoming a kind, caring, giving sort of person in that environment would be like putting your head in a noose. You want something to see you through the raids, something to help you divide the spoils, a religion that will allow you to produce dozens of kids to replace those lost in combat. Christianity would be a hindrance in that setting. If I had to live the life of a desert raider, Christianity would be the last religion I’d take up. You’d get the guilts from morn till night. A particular sort of Islam, and not the liberal variety either, would be much better adapted to guide that kind of existence.

So I think there’s a good reason why certain types of folk Christianity (in Latin America) and certain kinds of Islam take root in particular societies. In fact, the phenomenon of African gangs which profess a bizarre variant of Christianity to justify their depredations suggests that if the Ten Commandments don’t suit, they simply rewrite them. Ultimately beliefs help people make it through their mode of life. If you suppose that Afghanistan ever became a prosperous commercial country, where raiding and feuding went out of style, and it became far more important to do unto others as they did unto you, instead of before they did unto you, then people would look to a belief system that would support that.

Aug 17, 2009 - 7:05 pm 45. luddy barsen:

throw me in ther with those who have a sinking feeling about the combination of this administration and an expeditionary force ‘raid’ –which is what it is if you consider that supply lines are at sufferance of adversaries teetering on the edge of enemies.

The difference between Von Paulus and McAuliffe was Patton, and Patton was Patton because of Third Army.

Aug 17, 2009 - 7:32 pm 46. Willie G:

At this point we are just along for the ride – whatever is planned (or not planned as the case may be) will happen. You only need to look at the Sec State to see the disarray that is prevalent throughout this administration. Those in charge have no clue. Factions jostle for power. Our betters resent us – clinging as we do to our guns and religion.

What matters now is that we organize and plan to wrest control of our country back. Failure is no longer an option.

Aug 17, 2009 - 7:43 pm 47. bogie wheel:

Habu,

Welcome back, you grump. (said in the most collegial of tones)

First of all, I don’t think the # of comments on a particular thread are always an indication of interest in the topic. They are at their most basic an indication of how many feel they have something to say on the topic. (and then there’s Doug…!) Some topics (esp. ones like this one) get quite wonky and exclude from commentary the layperson who is relegated to the role of observing & learning. I cannot contribute to this thread, ergo, I am reading only. But that doesn’t mean I’m not interested.

Second … in the big picture, it’s all connected. The culture that created “Mad Men” is the culture that created the current TOTUS and his cronies who fired McKiernan. I’m not trying to be glib. I think it’s the culture that produces the political structure, not vice versa. So cultural discussions (which necessarily will sometimes include popular, or semi-popular, entertainment) are relevant, and may draw more comments simply by virtue of the culture being the (polluted) stream we all swim in.

Now if we devolve into bickering over Don Draper’s choice of hats or obsessing over the soap opera’s plot points, then I would join you in the grump-fest.

BC is the last forum I would accuse of lacking gravitas. Richard does a remarkable job at trying to look beyond the superficial on every topic he posts. (Go back to the Michael Jackson stuff; Wretchard was brilliant.)

Aug 17, 2009 - 7:56 pm 48. E. Nigma:

bogie wheel,

I thought your comments and insights on the “Mad Men” thread were all home runs. You pegged it clearly and to the point. Were we all so lucid and insightful in our comments.
You put clear words to a lot of similar but disparate thoughts that were rolling around in my head.

Aug 17, 2009 - 8:16 pm 49. Lifeofthemind:

Habu,
We need a moral purpose for our struggle here at home as much as the Pashtun do in Afghanistan. The thread about “Mad Men” was to me a discussion of, “What are we fighting for?” Any topic is instantly transubstantiated into a higher cause by being discussed in the Belmont Club. This place purifies by contact, Honi soit qui mal y pense.

Gay Talese related the story in The Kingdom and the Power of how appalled some people were by the Times’ coverage of a tabloid ready scandal in New Jersey, complete with politicians, girlfriends and money. When challenged at a cocktail party with a “How could you?” a senior Timesman drew himself up and proclaimed, “When they do it, it is sex. When we do it, it is sociology.”

Aug 17, 2009 - 8:34 pm 50. luddy barsen:

re quality vs quantity, i’d like to say that without remarking on any of the several dozen great commenters here who produce gems rather more or less sporadically, for quality and quantity both the host, LotM, Bogie, and Fiddler, box the thematic compass reliably and excellently in very distinct directions, and now is good a time as any to say “thanks”.

Aug 17, 2009 - 8:52 pm 51. Wadeusaf:

My own take on the matter addressed so well by Dave Katz, and the response by wretchard. The price of control in Afghanistan has been the willingness to conform to the requirements of the strongest of your neighbors. In the give and take way of tribalism the Pahtun have developed and perfected over time the necessary skills and world view necessary to sustain their tribal world view. Enter Osama Bin Ladin, and the Taliban protected Al Queda racketeers. from what we have witnessed the people of Afghanistan did not bless either the Al Queda or the Taliban, but had not the means to toss them off much less destroy one or the other. 9/11 gave them the means. However the Taliban, its financiers, it spiritual roots and its actual birthplace being all a part of Pakistan are in many respects as much a foreign element as Al Queda, and given their harsh measures, nearly as unwanted as the Russians. That Omar adopted the taliban as his own was not a Afghan accomplishment, it wasn’t even so much a Pashto accomplishment as much as it was a feat of the Pakistani ISI.
There need be little illusion why the Al Queda and Taliban leadership and faithful were not crushed at Tora Bora, and the successes and failure of the Afghanistan campaign ever since have been a measure of the Pakistani Governments on again off again commitment to the GWOT. I think the battle for the hearts and minds of the Pakistani Government is as important if not more important than the fight for Afghanistan.

If we want to make Afghanistan in to a area where Al Qaeda will not be tolerated, then it is a simple task to buy the Taliban or support the Northern Alliance in a bloody winner take all of Afghanistan. But so long as Pakistan remains half modern and half stone aged in its support of Taliban Pashtun tribalism, the Taliban and by extension Al Qaeda, will not be evicted.

Aug 17, 2009 - 8:53 pm 52. Mad Fiddler:

He said “GRAVITAS!”

AAAARRRGGGGH!

Sorry, Bogie Wheel. I’m just remembering the spasm of the mainstream alleged News media when every single news reader kept using that term in the same day, telling us that Kerry had it and Bush didn’t.

What a pack of urine-soaked morons.

Doesn’t it ever occur to them that people might notice they’re all parroting exactly the same script?????????

I wonder how many of those tapered bowel products even had heard the word prior to the circulation of that DNC memo…

Aug 17, 2009 - 9:08 pm 53. Lifeofthemind:

luddy barsen,
Aww Gee, right back at you Big Guy.
Now if only I can get myself taken seriously by a man with a job, or at least money, or a woman with, well anything. That reminds me of my college roommate who one night yelled up at the ceiling, “Two eyes and a lung XXX. Two eyes and a lung. That’s all I’m asking for.” Considering who he ended up marrying he can’t complain that the Lord wasn’t listening.
—

Has anyone been following this story? Russia: Missing ship found, crew OK. Anyone in Hollywood who isn’t seeing a movie in this should be fired. The “Pitch Session” could be right out of Robert Altman’s The Player. “We can’t miss, I’m thinking of Angelina Jolie as The Slippery SEAL.”

Aug 17, 2009 - 9:15 pm 54. Mad Fiddler:

First, mr. luddyb, thanks, but I feel like I ramble and twitch and dance around a point, and then someone comes along like herb in his post 145 in the “Good People Go Bad” comment stream manages to express in one sentence what I couldn’t spit out in three or four paragraphs.

145. herb:
Robohobo and others who trade with TJ and WF: Dont take me wrong. $3Chuck is ok. and if you like your bacon tofu based free range inorganic its fine with me. Im into pig-based bacon. I can tell from here that your head is on straight.
WF and TJ have just recognized a good chunk of the population will respond to the flattery of their moral vanity.[my bolding]

Salutes to you , herb.

Aug 17, 2009 - 10:24 pm 55. Subotai Bahadur:

#53 LOTM

Thanks for the link on the ARCTIC SEA. I missed it, and I have been watching for any news. I am awaiting the cover story that will come out. When the details of her ownership/registration are looked at, it gives the appearance of an SVR dummy company. If she was taken [and there is a not unreasonable suspicion as to who by if she really was] the perpetrators are now probably shark excreta. Both because the Russians are not nearly as understanding and compassionate as we are when it is their own people taken by terrorists, and because I suspect that they may have accidentally interrupted an SVR operation.

Subotai Bahadur

Aug 17, 2009 - 10:25 pm 56. luddy barsen:

I’m afraid there is another obvious lesson in there, and I don’t even wanna say it –yes, i agree, beware that apple –a bite of it and you wake up in 1960 talking philosophy in a Paris coffeehouse.

***
subotai, come back and say, if and when you get a hunch, wouldja?

Aug 17, 2009 - 10:38 pm 57. Robohobo:

Habu – Welcome back from vacation or break or whatever it was. Please do not disparage us for being tardy commenting at this thread. My attention to the web and the BC has shifted and become smaller because some things in life have changed. But the victory/depression garden has done famously this summer. I am freezing yellow tomato sauce lately. The 2nd crop of beans is sprouting. I have Christmas lima beans coming up and they are looking good. The chilis are setting fruit again now that daytime temps have moderated a few degrees.

Now to the Afghanistan questions and Pakistan issues:

I always wondered why we (the US) through GWB wanted to try nation building in Afghanistan. That place is the ultimate tarbaby, as the Russians found out. Many have marched thru there, conquered and been ultimately absorbed much to their own astonishment. We are just the latest to try. That we did not hunt down OBL immediately then RUN! still boggles my mind.

From Wadeusaf @ 51:

There need be little illusion why the Al Queda and Taliban leadership and faithful were not crushed at Tora Bora, and the successes and failure of the Afghanistan campaign ever since have been a measure of the Pakistani Governments on again off again commitment to the GWOT. I think the battle for the hearts and minds of the Pakistani Government is as important if not more important than the fight for Afghanistan.

The bolded part is what makes me wonder, Wade. The folks from that part of the world I know (India & Nepal) say that Pakistan IS the problem not part of the solution. Of course, they may have some bias, you know. I think their commitment is based upon how much not why but that is just me. But it makes sense to me.

Makes Sense To Me
(Daniel Hutchens of Bloodkin)

I was talking to a homeless drunk about religion
He said “It’s all I got, but it ain’t much
‘Cause the way I feel these days,
I’d rather have a gun than a crutch”

Well, that makes sense to me
It makes sense to me, I must confess
That makes sense to me
It makes sense to me, I must confess

Listen to a little girl, she was a runaway.
She said “My daddy treated me like a slave.
Soiled me in my momma bed when I was just 15.
That’s why I had to lay him in his grave!”

Well, that makes sense to me
It makes sense to me, I must confess
That makes sense to me
It makes sense to me, I must confess

Talking to a black man from Atlanta.
He said “The time has come to take what’s mine.
And if I must bust a few heads to achieve justice,
My righteous cause will well explain the crime!”

Well, that makes sense to me
It makes sense to me, I must confess
That makes sense to me
It makes sense to me, I must confess

RWE @ 42:

It has become something of a tradition for new administrations to fire general officers, just to show who is boss.

If that was the case for the firing then The 0bamanation is not only not the supposed agent of “Change” he claims but the naif I believe he is (at the best) OR the sinister basterd I suspect he is (at the worst).

Things are getting interesting on so many fronts it makes me feel like a one-armed paperhanger just trying to keep up.

Aug 17, 2009 - 10:51 pm 58. luddy barsen:

…or a one-legged man in a ass-kicking contest

Aug 17, 2009 - 11:22 pm 59. Beverly:

“. . . a leader who can also win the confidence of Congress and the American public.”

In the Navy, they call this quality “grease.”

Aug 18, 2009 - 12:10 am 60. Beverly:

This is where we went wrong.

“The War Department existed from 1789 until September 18, 1947, when it was renamed as the Department of the Army, and became part of the new, joint National Military Establishment (NME). Shortly after, in 1949, the NME was renamed to the Department of Defense, which the Dept of the Army is part of today.”

Oh, we mustn’t be beastly to the Germans,
When we our victory have won!

We’ve let our mortal enemies, the international Left, name all the animals in the Garden. THEY realize the potency of naming.

When will we?

Aug 18, 2009 - 12:15 am 61. ledger:

I think the supply lines are extremely important to fighting and winning in Afghanistan. It will take time – a long time. Those lines are key.

When 0bama, the commander of the military says, “Don’t worry, victory is not everything” I grow extremely concerned. When Lower and lower amounts Al-Qaeda/Taliban terrorists are killed in recent battles with I smell ever increasing ROEs.

When I hear 0bama state to Veterans of Foreign Wars that he has found wasteful military spending and will veto any bill with said waste I picture death by a thousand financial cuts.

Put those all together, and I sense a “cut-n-run” and the disastrous consequences. But, its 0bama’s war.

Cut and Run?
http://tinyurl.com/qsmo6p

0bama finds spending he doesn’t like
http://tinyurl.com/r5545l

Aug 18, 2009 - 12:59 am 62. ledger:

As for the Russian ship hijacked in European waters Eagle1 has kept tabs on the pirates. He thinks it could be fraud – who knows:

[Eagle Speak]

“I smell insurance fraud. Unsuccessful insurance fraud.”

http://tinyurl.com/qkl5rx

Aug 18, 2009 - 1:04 am 63. Wadeusaf:

RoboHobo,

Pakistan IS the problem, on that we agree with your biased Indian friends. But Pakistan is in many respects Iran only with the bomb. In many ways many of its people are our allies. Like Afghanistan it is not a whole entity and the parts are ill fit for the job we’ve asked of them. There is a real Civil War in Pakistan, on going. The danger of Pakistan is the government cannot get out of its own way, allowing people to call en mass for the reinstatement of a Supreme Court Justice who would release Al Queda and unleash the Taliban upon his own country. Why? Why is it so difficult to make the case that no matter how awful the presence of American and Nato Troops and Supplies, the alternative, life under the Taliban and love Al Qaeda style, is no life at all.
That some love money more than liberty describes the state of our politics here in this country means that even if we could clean up the corruption and deal only with the pure, there is a large vacuum that will to fill with what ever is there. Our diplomatic and military efforts in Pakistan and in Afghanistan have to ensure that the Taliban and Al Qaeda, do not fill the spaces of power in either state.
A job filled with fits starts and snorts, even if the plan is right, explaining it to the DNC has got to be the toughest combat role a commanding officer has ever encountered.

Especially the group in office at this time, who cannot be trusted to read much less understand, the legislation they are voting yea or nay or even realize that most of it was blank during the first reading. Certainly they understand and manipulate the means for so many politicos to become millionaire when not in office, doing the job and using the skills they trained so hard to perfect. Pirouettes, Grand Pliet and spin.

The bottom line is Pakistan the problem will have to be solved without our invading. Glass is not a viable alternative.

Aug 18, 2009 - 3:29 am 64. bogie wheel:

He said “GRAVITAS!”

AAAARRRGGGGH!

I don’t get to listen to Rush much, working daytime hrs as I do & no radio practical in the office, but on the occasions when I have tuned in, he has often done segments where he will play back-to-back clips of MSM parroting. All quite funny (in a dismaying, disgusting kind of way). Because it’s not just 2, 3 or even 4 parrot squawks he comes up with, but a dozen or more. When it gets to that amount of parroting you really do see how the emperor has no clothes. When it was just Cronkite and the Big 3 talking at us, we were supposed to believe them because they were the only game in town. With the proliferation of cable etc. and 24/7 news, we’re *still* supposed to believe them, not because they’re the only game in town, but because there are so darn many of them. A flock of parrots can’t be wrong, can they?

On parroted phrases themselves: I got pretty sick of the phrase “run the table” when the Patriots had their 19-1 season not too long ago. After hearing the phrase, ohhhhhh, maybe only once every couple years, and not missing it whatsoever for being so infrequent, suddenly it was everywhere. Every time anyone did any kind of story or commentary on the Pats. Run the table, run the table, run the table. Like all the sports ‘taters were plugged into the Borg brain. It was even more repulsive than seeing the Pats go all the way to 19. ([insert appropriate adjective] Steelers fan here.)

On Kerry and “gravitas”: Gee, thanks for that flashback. *shudder* I try to alleviate the unpleasant memories of that year by telling myself that when they said (for the umpeenth-thousandth time) that Kerry had “gravitas,” what they really meant was that gravity had pulled his face towards the floor to a degree far superior than the gravitational effect on Bush’s face.

Aug 18, 2009 - 3:51 am 65. Pseudo-Polymath » Blog Archive » Tuesday Highlights:

[...] the change? Why, with promises of the “most open administration ever” are we [...]

Aug 18, 2009 - 5:57 am 66. Stones Cry Out - If they keep silent… » Things Heard: e81v2:

[...] the change? Why, with promises of the “most open administration ever” are we [...]

Aug 18, 2009 - 5:57 am 67. Jay:

Given Katz’s fine analysis and the threats to our logistic train, how can we achieve a victory in the way this evil admin is pursing international relations? Perhaps Obama’s goal is to bleed our army and see reups go way down. He lets the Chicago gangsters run the domestic policy agenda and Queen Hillary talk like a SecState while he works the internationalists to destroy our social system.

Aug 18, 2009 - 7:36 am 68. Doug:

Michael Yon
17 August 2009
Sangin, Afghanistan

The roads are so littered with enemy bombs that nearly all transport and resupply to this base occurs by helicopter. The pilots roar through the darkness, swoop into small bases nestled in the saddle of enemy territory, and quickly rumble off into the night.

A witness must spend only a short time in the darkness to know we are at war. Flares arc into the night, or mortar illumination rounds drift and swing under parachutes, orange and eerily in the distance, casting long, flickering but sharply defined shadows. The worst that can happen is that you will be caught in an open field, covered by nothing and concealed only by darkness, when the illumination suddenly bathes you in light. Best is to stay low and freeze and prepare to fire, or in the case of a writer, to stay low and freeze and prepare to watch the firing.

Explosions from unknown causes rumble through the cool nights while above drifts the Milky Way, punctuated by more shooting stars than one can remember. The Afghanistan nights will grant a wish to wish upon a shooting star. And while waiting for the next meteor, the eyes are likely to catch tracer bullets.
—

The ramp lifts in preparation for takeoff and the halo begins to rematerialize before the helicopter lifts into the darkness and disappears. Soldiers call the medevac flights to Camp Bastion, “Nightingales” or “Nightingale flights.” Shortly after sunrise on the morning of 13 August, an element from this unit was ambushed nearby, killing three and wounding two others. Despite the immediate danger, the helicopter came straight onto the battlefield.

After the initial ambush, and another successful ambush during the evacuation, the British soldiers did not return to base but continued with the mission. Later that evening they were twice ambushed again, sustaining more fatalities as two interpreters were killed. Soldiers asked me to go on that mission but I was busy assembling this dispatch. One of the killed soldiers, shortly before the mission, had looked over my shoulder as I selected the photos. Captain Mark Hale was killed while aiding a wounded soldier. Mark had particularly liked the next three images:
—
Epilogue:

The following men and women sacrificed their lives in Afghanistan since the time that Benjamin Kopp and Joseph Etchells passed on. I am told that more names will soon be added to the list:

Aug 18, 2009 - 8:48 am 69. Mad Fiddler:

Bogie Wheel,

For a guffaw and a chuckle (I can’t guarantee an actual belly laugh) check my slumbering blog for the post of Tuesday, August 24, 2004 “Remember Gravitas?

(That was in the days before I swore off listening to the network alleged “news” casts.)

Aug 18, 2009 - 9:01 am 70. luddy barsen:

heh –i remember the Kerry gravitas –and as well the day of the botox –when overnite he went from that bloodhound look to that surprised, alarmed, bloodhound look.

Aug 18, 2009 - 9:38 am 71. Dan Ford:

As it happens, I have spent the last six months trying to work out how John Boyd would have coped with Osama bin Laden. See an early draft of my thesis. It seems that OBL is all the time operating inside our OODA Loop when it ought to be the other way around. Blue skies! — Dan Ford
6

Aug 18, 2009 - 9:48 am 72. Subotai Bahadur:

#70 Dan Ford

I cannot use the appropriate superlatives, as our language must match the rules of Wretchard’s house; but please, finish this analysis. I learned much about Boyd that I had not encountered before, and I look forward to the analysis of how his work can be applied to the current war.

Also, since I am more than enamored of the AVG, I suspect I am going to have to find money to budget for a few books on your sidebar. As a kid who is of Chinese ancestry, the idea of Americans volunteering to help a free China defend itself was dear to my heart. [yeah, I know now it was more complex than that] That, and one of my favorite teachers in high school was a Chinese member of their ground crews who immigrated after the war.

Subotai Bahadur

Aug 18, 2009 - 10:21 am 73. luddy barsen:

Subotai, “God is My Copilot” –read when i was about 8 or 10, was seminal –the ‘gung ho’ attitude in the subtext, i realized much later.

Aug 18, 2009 - 11:14 am 74. Robohobo:

Wadeusaf @ 63:

I do not disagree in any way. I guess what I was trying to say is this:

Af-Pak is a tarbaby of the worst sort because we can do one of two things:
1. Kick it’s ass then RUN!. IOW, do the Conan thing and leave them with the lamentations of their women.
OR
2. Go in for the whole enchilada and do what Petraeus (I think) would do. Hearts and minds and city councils. Civilian security. Military security. All in Af. and hoping the zeitgeist spills to the neighborhood.

However, what we do have is feckless children of the CCCP playing at world politics. They are only in it for the photo-ops not the notion that they may have some adult level responsibilities to those ramen in Af-Pak.

Aug 18, 2009 - 12:28 pm 75. Mad Fiddler:

Thanks Dan Ford,

I’m sending the link to some friends. Bill Whittle was first to bring Boyd to my attention, but your thesis fills in a lot of the picture.

Seems you have a few titles for us to investigate – judging from your writing sample, it will be most gratifying.

Aug 18, 2009 - 12:49 pm 76. Greifer:

Fascinating that McChrystal and Gates are viewed as radically reshaping the war in Afghanistan.
Fascinating too the contrasts with Rumsfeld. I hope a really fantastic historian will be able to
make the Rumsfeld DoD clear for us all in a few decades, but until then, we have to go with what we know.

Rumsfeld, thinking that the military brass were too conventional in thinking, in strategy, in goals, in operations, in procurement, etc. revolutionized more of the Pentagon than anyone ever, and was clearly the best SecDef ever. Accounts of the days after Sept 11 and of the invasion of Iraq relate that he ripped up battle plan after battle plan for being too conventional.
He –without the backing of the joint chiefs–was interested in changing the metrics, the methods, the tactics, the strategies our forces used. He reached out to every other nation to builda world wide network to fight the islamists, and truly enlisted all of NATO, and created new relationships
with dozens of other nations, enlarging our allied relationships at every turn, utilizing whatever he couldto create cohesion.

Yet he did it without ever firing an active commander.

My guess is he knew how poorly that would play with the military command and with rank and file,
and he actually understoodthe chain of command quite well. So he worked with them, demanding more of them, demandingcreative work, creative results, pushing pushing to the limit. He wanted them to tell him something he hadn’t thought of himself.
And when they didn’t want to work with him, he let them retire.

Now, of course, the generals hated him (for it), and they kept attacking and attacking until they destroyed him–though they did destroy themselves
in the process.One way that they did that was by screaming to anyone who would listen that MORE TROOPS were needed–as if Rumsfeld, not Bush, were the limiting factor on troops. But they didn’t really want more troops. “we’d need 350k” was a sentence spoken to shut down political pressure for the military to do something. They didn’t really envisionit happening, and of course, they weren’t going to do anything interesting with the additional troops anyway.

Rumsfeld over and over again was about the nonconventional methods but he still went to war with the generals he had. He didn’t intervene (did he?) to move Petraeus to the center stage out of Kansas, even though (didn’t he?) he must have known about his successes in Iraq. When the Surge finally camee it was wrongly described publicly
as a change in troop numbers, not in tactics, but Petraeus’ elevation meant those old generals that hated Rumsfeld were mostly marginalized, not elevated, so they got what was coming.

And now here’s Gates and McChrystal. They don’t want to do any interesting counterinsurgency work different thanMcKieran was doing. They want to standardize the fight despite McKieran doing what one would expect–having autonomy
for different regions, and fighting appropriately differently accordingly. They don’t want new battle plans that work with NATO.
They want the old ones, and they don’t want to rethink the ROE, just limit it . They want a politically astutue fellow to do what they want.

And they were willing to publicly fire a general to get it.

The antithesis of Rumsfeld, no?

Will the troops love McChrystal?

Aug 18, 2009 - 9:45 pm 77. Dan Ford:

Thanks for the comments on the John Boyd dissertation. I now have a more or less complete draft, but I probably won’t put it online until I’ve had a chance to look it over. I’d be glad of your comments. You can find my email address here. If you send me a note, I’ll send you a plain-text version of it.

By the way, Bill Lind (one of Boyd’s acolytes) has published a draft of his counterinsurgency manual. It’s slyly called FMFM 3-25 and is posted here. I’ll probably be working his thoughts into my thesis. Blue skies! — Dan Ford

(I am a late-blooming student in War Studies at King’s College London. My classmates were mostly majors in the British Army, with a sprinkling from other services and some civilians from around the world. Thus the dissertation, 55 years after I got my B.A.)

Aug 19, 2009 - 3:13 am

Sorry, comments for this entry are closed at this time.