8 Comments

Roger,

Before dismissing it too quickly, consider the following:

You and your friend Michael Ledeen have regularly written about how unpopular the mullahs are. Their economy is not doing well, the population’s demographics are flowing against them (more and more young people who don’t even remember the Shah), the mullahs’ anti-pop culture stance is unpopular.

What if the mullahocracy recognizes their unpopularity? More to the point, what if, like General Galtieri in Argentina, they figure that, by starting a war, they can rally the population back to them?

Especially if they are not yet ready with a nuclear weapon (which arguably would have been a popular capability for them)?

Sun-Tzu,

I don’t know. The points to consider are as the following: Do they have

(1) the means (money)
(2) the opportunities (proximity to AQ Khan & Co)
(3) the desire

to acquire nuclear technology?

I’d rather not bet on the chance that the mullahs thinking/behaving rationally.

Always:

I’m sorry if I wasn’t clear. I am most certainly not suggesting that the Iranian leadership is not interested in nuclear weapons, not seeking them, or is likely to be dissuaded from obtaining them by anything short of a show of force (and more likely the actual application of force).

But, after all, Iranian nuclear development doesn’t occur in a vacuum. The Iranian leadership, given the other problems it confronts, presumably views the Bomb as a solution (or at least a partial solution).

It could be sheer nationalism: WE are the leaders who developed the Bomb, cheer us, celebrate us, fellow Iranians!

It could be akin to Ike’s “New Look”: With a few Bombs, we can reduce our military expenditures and reform the economy. (Khrushchev tried the same thing.)

In either case, it’s addressing domestic problems—i.e., the unpopularity of the mullahs.

So, let’s take it one step further—what if they’re not close to a Bomb, yet?

My point was focused on this possibility, as posed by Posse Incitatus: If the Iranians haven’t got a working Bomb, why in the world are they so intent on alienating so many different nations? Why not lie low, get their nuclear ducks in a row, and then rattle sabers, make threats, etc.?

I’m suggesting that they may be weaker at home than we realize. And therefore prepared to risk all, in the (mistaken) belief that either they’ll bluff their way out, or else that a war will ultimately serve their interests.

But, Always, I agree w/ you. They have the motive and the means to develop nukes, and certainly appear intent on getting one.

It’s entirely possible that the analysis posted by the posse is essentially correct, except for the notion that they “can’t” produce a nuke, sooner or later. Their actions do suggest a desire to precipitate an attack, and this may well relate to internal instability. However, it may also be a bold gamble to race for bomb production, hoping (so far, justifiably) that they can finish before the west acts. If they are attacked, they are no worse off than they would be with an internal revolt. If not, they get the bomb, and America loses face (soon to be followed by New York).

What resonates about the Posse Incitatus piece is the idea that Iran’s saber-rattling is motivated largely by domestic (to Iran) political considerations. I suspect there is much truth to this but unfortunately it does not dispel the possibility that they may actually be near to having nuclear capability. And if they consider saber-rattling effective, they may consider saber-thrusting even more effective. Unless proven otherwise, national security – hell, WORLD security – demands we assume the worst-case scenario.

The desire of the mullahcracy to acquire nuclear weapons is hugely popular in Iran. They have the money, they have or are developing the technology [some of which came via Khan and Pakistan], and there is abundant evidence that they are working hard towards that means. There is little actual evidence that they have attained the capability or are even especially close: they have built a small cascade of centrifuges, but it’s not clear how well the cascade is working. They will surely get there, barring regime change [very unlikely] or military intervention [who knows?]. The uranium enrichment facility constructed near Natanz since about 2002 is huge [capacity for ~50,000 centrifuges], and is thoughtfully built underground beneath what some estimate to be a 10-m thick “burster slab” for protection for conventional bombs.

Perhaps we should get used to the idea of an Iran with nuclear weapons? It’s likely going to happen: how will we choose to deal with it?

If I was leading Iran I would have bought a couple of nukes from Russia or China before I started working on my own nuclear program to ensure nobody could bomb me out of business before I’m done.

Since there is no way of knowing the status of Nukes in Iran the only prudent course is to believe all the saber rattling and rhetoric. We must have a plan to take it out, and I’m certain we do. It would be criminal if we haven’t been studying this issue for the past 25 years.The question is timing, do we wait for an attack on Israel or the US or do we preemptively strike? I bet all the scenarios are being gamed daily.