31 Comments

1. Bill Bradley:

Vietnam started with the Kennedys?

Damn, I may have to renounce my membership in that national history honor society.

It was all so long ago …

Jan 9, 2007 - 10:40 pm 2. Orson2:

It’s Vietnam, Roger! It’s Vietnam Morning noon and overnight! It’s always Vietnam! Don’t you get it? Everywar is Vietnam! Vietnam is the elite’s ruling paradigm for all military invasions.

So why isn’t Afghanistan also Vietnam? One word: NATO.

Jan 10, 2007 - 1:30 am 3. Terrye:

I turned on the TV yesterday and there was Kennedy all earnest and self righteous yammering away about VietNam and how we lost the war and we are going to lose again because because because, we are Americans and losing is all we are good at.

I wonder if all these years in the Senate have given that man delusions of grandeur. He is not the CinC, however, trying to destroy morale, surrender, cut off funds for the military, undercut the man who actually got the job fair and sqaure in an election while at the same time signalling defeat to the enemy and senility to the world…seems to be the best Ted Kennedy can do at this point in his career.

So much for politics ending at the waters edge.

And so much for Viet Nam. I bet there is a lot of 30 year olds out there who wish everyone over 50 would just die off so that they never have to hear this crap again.

You see the reason we hear it now is that the Democrats must live with the burden of cutting of the funding and precipitating the fall of south east Asia and the slaughter that went with it. The only way to live with such an act is to see it as noble. To constantly defend it as the right thing to do, the answer to hubris. We had to do run doncha know. We were after all the army of Genghis Khan.

And now we are in a long war and once again the Democrats of that generation feel the need to cast about for someone to surrender to. Ahh the misguided terrorists and the mullahs. Of course, fighting them is folly. After all they are strong and we are weak. They are good and we are bad.

And anyone who doubts this is either a war criminal or deluded because after all it is impossible to win in Iraq. In fact the Democrats have built an entire foreign policy on the notion that there is no such thing as winning.

Unless it is Bill bombing Kosovo ofcourse. Now that was glorious. But stopping Saddam from ulitmately carrying out his goal to wipe the Kurds out? None of our business, only a fool would do such a thing and so we must break our word and run away. Just like Vietnam.

We are losing about 800 men a year in Iraq. To be like Viet Nam we would have to be over there for 72 years. That is probably about the same length time that Kennedy has been in the Senate. Forever. Seems like it anyway.

Jan 10, 2007 - 2:54 am 4. Terrye:

And btw Roger, just like it was the Kennedys that got the whole Viet Nam really going, it was Bill Clinton who swore that Saddam Hussein not only had weapons of mass destruction he would use them. He also decided in 1998 that Saddam would have to be removed from power. So we go from Diem to the Iraqi Liberation Act and the bombing of Baghdad in 1998.

But none of that counts.

Jan 10, 2007 - 2:58 am 5. Lola:

Terrye, exactly. I’m at the very end of the “baby boom” generation and I wish they’d just die off. Even better, take a vow of silence, retire from public life and just shut the heck up. Hear that, Teddy and Jimmy?

Jan 10, 2007 - 3:12 am 6. Rhod:

I want to understand the psychology behind this. It can’t all be political gain, even with someone as morally demented as Kennedy. Some, like Chris Matthews, seem to regret not having served in a war he still thinks was wrong, but I don’t think it goes very deep with him either… or others who took Matthews decision.

About 75% of us who served there would do it again, even knowing what we know now. Vietnam is probably just a symbol, a shorthand code for lefties that has an (”insert meaning here) option. I’ve read that the Pharisees often painted their faces to express gloom and suffering…about what? Vietnam is the left’s facepaint.

Jan 10, 2007 - 4:12 am 7. Terrye:

Well Roger looking at your correction I could note that the real war began as soon as WW2 was over the French promised that if the British and Americans did not support them in Viet Nam they would not support us in Europe against the expansion of the Soviet Union and communism. Some things never change.

Jan 10, 2007 - 4:31 am 8. Rhod:

Terrye:

The joker in that deck is that the French attempted to reinstate their colonial malevolence in Indochina after the Japanese were gone.

But look at the bright side. As long as Vietnam occupies the liberal mind, we won’t have to suffer through any Spanish Civil War reenactments.

Jan 10, 2007 - 4:50 am 9. photoncourier.blogspot.com:

In a research scenario, one group subjects was given cues subtly remniniscent of Vietnam, while another group was given cues subtly reminiscent of WWII. The groups came up with very different recommmendations on how the scenario should be handled, even though there was no substantive difference in the situations. More here.

Jan 10, 2007 - 8:36 am 10. dclydew:

I think that similarities between Iraq and Vietnam are notable. Primarily, the fact that they are both “4th Generation Wars” and the enemy seems to be following a very similar strategy.

The first major example of 4th Gen warfare can be traced back to Mao and his improvements to the traditional communist revolution. The Communists, particularly in the USSR, promoted revolution in urban areas designed to dislodge the Czarist regime. It worked there, not because it was the right way to run a revolution, but rather that the Czar’s government and power would have been distablized by a really good sneeze.

Mao tried the Bolshevik method and it failed. So he went counter to the Communist plan and began his revolution in the rural areas. He followed a multi-tiered approach in the war.

1) Build political capital among the rural people (the most likely to be disenfranchised, poor and not well monitored by police). Do not fight battles, but only take assassinations where possible and only if they further the goals of the revolution/insurgency.

2) Fight where you can win, even temporarily. If you can take a small town, take it. Once taken, completely govern the area. Be very fair/just and make sure that the people like your rule. (In fact Mao made all of their military pay for anything the appropriated from the rural people). When the enemy advances, retreat and melt into the countryside. When the enemy leaves, take back over.

Mao did this quite well, and continually harassed the Japanese and later the ruling Chinese.

3) Engage the enemy fully in war.

Mao also realized that the way to win was political, not military. Thus his PR and and international relations were most effective in combating the will of the enemy.

————–

This system was further refined by the Vietnamese, against both the French and later the Americans. The insurgents were fighting a 4th Gen war, while the French and Americans were still trying to use 3rd Gen tactics. Incidents like the Tet offensive, did exactly what they were intended to do. The American military believed that they won the Tet offensive, because they killed a lot of people. However, 4th Gen warfare doesn’t work that way. Causalities don’t matter, battles don’t matter, all of it is designed to continually wear down the enemy and more importantly the enemy’s will to continue fighting. Tet is a perfect example of 4th gen tactics.

The South American insurgencies refined the ideas further and the current situation in Afghanistan and Iraq appear as yet further refinement of 4th Gen Warfare.

Iraq and Vietnam are similar, they are both 4th Gen wars which America approached from a 3rd Gen perspective. In both cases, we completely misunderstood the type of war that we were fighting, thus misunderstanding what it would take to win.

We would not have won in Vietnam, using the strategies that we had in place. The same is true of Iraq… battles don’t win 4th gen wars, more troops don’t win 4th gen wars. 4th gen wars must be won in the minds of the Iraqis, in the hearts of the Americans and in a political landscape, not a military one.

If you’re interested in an excellent dissection of 4th Gen Wars, read “The Sling and The Stone” by Col. Hammes USMC.

Jan 10, 2007 - 10:24 am 11. Rhod:

An awful lot of boilerplace to describe an insurgency. You’d think a Marine would be more direct…not you, DCW. Hadrian’s Wall was constructed in large part for the same reason. The Durand Line, the same. If you don’t plan to leave, whom you cannot defeat, you excludem and pacify or Romanize the areas you occupy.

The only mystery is why the Pentagon has resisted learning more about it, since we encountered it in Vietnam and other places.

The Marine strategy from the very beginning in 1965 in Vietnam differed from Westmoreland’s hideous S & D, and without calling it 4th generation, that’s what it was. Abrams tried the same thing later on, and was winning when we withdrew.

This isn’t difficult. And it doesn’t take a truckload of theorizing to put it in place.

Jan 10, 2007 - 11:17 am 12. mrbones:

Why about a plane crash makes you think of a car crash? This isn’t the first time, as I recall you also thought of Mary Jo Kopechne during the Alito hearing, too.

Seems like an unhealthy obsession, no?

PS: Similarly, it would be unfair of me to remark about President Bush each time I refer to something alcohol-related.

Jan 10, 2007 - 11:45 am 13. dclydew:

Rhod,

Don’t ascribe to the poor Col. my simplified Blog post ;-). The book goes into far more detail in both discussion of how 4GW developed and the specific instances (China, Vietnam, Sandinistas) where 4GW was applied. He also discusses the difference between what some on the ground thought necessary and what those in charge actually decided to do.

If we had gone into Baghdad with the understanding that we live in an era where 4GW warfare should be expected… we probably would have approached it from a very different perspective. Gen. Zinni probably had it right. If we had dumped 300,000 troops into Iraq, to cover the entire nation… then there would have been no rural areas or outlying cities where an insurgency could have made early wins. Beyond that, an understanding of 4GW would have predicted that the trip to Baghdad would have been easy. It would have assumed that the military would simply disappear into the crowds before the advancing superior forces could target them. In fact, if they had listened to Zinni and Hammes, they would also have realized that the insurgency was much more complex than Saddam loyalists.

I have no idea why the Pentagon ignored 4GW. Hammes was and still is active military, and has written quite extensively (long before the civilian book was published). In fact, his work with 4GW was what spurred Zinni to argue for the very high troop levels.

I don’t think we can blame Rumsfeld alone, though I think he certainly deserves some criticism for his lack of foresight and inability to understand what we were to face. However, every other SecDef since Vietnam should also be criticized, for not being prepared for the next 4GW war. The success in Desert Storm really seemed to fool the military leadership into thinking that future wars would be high technology and overpowering force. Interestingly, Desert Storm may have been one of the last examples of 3GW warfare.

When you look at “The Sling and the Stone” then at “Imaginary Weapons” (also a fantastic book), you begin to see a picture that predicted failure in our management of Iraq. Our government spent insane amounts of money on hafnium experiments which most of their scientific experts considered bullshit. Instead of cutting funding, they cut out the scientists. The focus shown in that book was on High Tech weaponry, with high tech controls, designed to deal with battlefield wars. Those that tried to focus on ‘terrorists and insurgencies’ were considered fools.

This seems to have been the case through both the Clinton and Bush II administrations (though the hafnium bit was a farce post 9/11).

I think that the Pentagon may have become an echo chamber at some point and they shut out any arguments against what they thought was best. Odd that it may have been our first war with Iraq that undermined our second one.

Jan 10, 2007 - 11:53 am 14. Terrye:

mr bones:

Well remember that the next time a lefty starts going on about Bush and TANG. and on and on and on.

It is also worth noting that if Ted’s last name had not been Kennedy he would have ended up in prsion after that and not the US Senate.

Jan 10, 2007 - 1:14 pm 15. Rhod:

Well, Mr. Bones, when alcohol dependency becomes morally equivalent to the Events of Edgartown, then you’ll have a point. One can overcome the first, but the conduct associated with the second will never be relieved when the man in question is still known as The Liberal Lion by people like you. What a crock.

Jan 10, 2007 - 1:19 pm 16. calvinist:

You’ll need to credit Little Richard, not Buddy Holly, for bringing us the first version of Blackwell/Marascalco’s Ready Teddy in 1956.

It charted #8 on Billboard’s R&B Chart and #44 on the Top 100.

I think Holly covered it on one of his albums, but didn’t release it as a single.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here’s_Little_Richard

Jan 10, 2007 - 4:03 pm 17. Steven Mitchell:

I saw this: “http://asecondhandconjecture.com/?p=391″ and realized that it would apply to someone like Mr. Bones currently posting here. I Immediately came here, and voila!

Directly on topic, there are two problems with the Vietnam blather, especially as related to, “we should have started counter-insurgency in Iraq” sooner bit:

1. The Marines have known how to do it for a long time. Read about Nicarauga in the 1920s. Or for a more entertaining introduction, try a Chester Puller biography. The Pentagon has always had bureaucrats, but it’s not nearly as bad as it was in the pre-WWII years. But for there to be counter-insurgency, there has to be a functional government with which to ally. Saddam did not *merely* instruct his forces to perform counter-insurgency, but also left a political hole. *Now* that the Iraqi government has formed (in fits and starts), real counter-insurgency can succeed.

It’s as if a lot of the Dems were screaming for D-Day from Jan 1942 in stead of June 1944, and as soon as the war was over, claimed that we could have ended 2 1/2 years sooner if only the generals had listed to them. (It would help if the press had a better grasp of basic military history, or even logical cause and effect.) And of course had their advice been followed, they’d be complaining about that.

2. Even if you assume a counter-insurgency could start in Baghdad on day one, a USA that will not stand for what we have done thus far would have stood even less for a true counter-insurgency. Effective counter-insurgencies are ugly, a lot uglier than Guantanamo. And I suppose that brings us back full circle to that quote above.

P.S. The Washington Post is engaging in projection on this one. They’ve advocated military means for partisan political reasons. They can’t conceive that someone would be above that.

Jan 10, 2007 - 5:02 pm 18. Luther McLeod:

Steven

You made the light blink. Rhod had mentioned the support forces the other night, as well as folks being comfortable.

I am taking advantage of Roger’s bandwidth here…but, between;

“The Marines have known how to do it for a long time. Read about Nicaragua in the 1920’s. Or for a more entertaining introduction, try a Chester Puller biography,” and then Rhod post’s, it finally clicked.

No units larger than 30-35 men in the field. An augmented squad IOW’s. But they stay there. No going back to the ‘fort’ at night. Unless they have wireless, no e-mails at home every night, no reading blog’s to see the defeatist crap from Kennedy. They stay there for at least 12 months. They learn their territory, they learn the people, the people learn them. They stay on the enemy’s ass, day in and day out.

All the other ’support’ functions are on a ship off the coast. I’ll concede a 5 day R&R in the middle of the tour, as I had. Otherwise it is war. 24/7/365. The only American’s in Iraq are essential personnel. All with a weapon on their shoulder, and trained to use it. Puller went against command, to a degree, but he was right to do so. Proved in the end.

BTW Rhod, I think your thought about motivation is very interesting. I have wondered about that myself. Why does Kennedy do what he does? Legacy, paving the way for future Kennedy’s, making up for his old man’s transgressions or maybe simple guilt from that fateful night?

Jan 10, 2007 - 6:51 pm 19. Rhod:

Luther:

SF today are very close to what you describe. The old A-Team sort of war-making hasn’t disappeared, but Civil Affairs is their emphasis now. One of my sons is a Ranger, and has crossed paths with them here and there.

They’re hard to recognize, too, because they’re in mufti of all kinds. They’re trained in horsemanship, veterinary sciences and other unusual disciplines.

I know you don’t mean “go-native” in your analysis, but I have other info which indicates that men at some of the small FOB’s in Iraq and Afghanistan are doing just what you suggest.

The Iraq and Afghan Wars have been reduced to cartoons by both parties, the simpletons of the media, and by incurious Americans. One could pick up a NYT in 1944 and see a full broadsheet description, with two-color maps and legends describing the battle of the day. Not any more.

Jan 11, 2007 - 4:56 am 20. Rhod:

And by all means, get the pogues offshore somewhere. They’re only an irritant to everyone, especially the locals.

Jan 11, 2007 - 4:59 am 21. Steven Mitchell:

Luther,

“They stay on the enemy’s ass, day in and day out.”

And if a frantic Sunni gets on camera in a hotel somewhere and claims that such and such unit did some atrocity, we investigate it while the country remains calm. Because it will happen, very rarely. And it will be claimed frequently. And if the “atrocity” is nothing more than “stay on the enemy’s ass” and only seems like an atrocity to people that couldn’t place the civil war in the right decade (average 20 year old in U.S.), then the country ignores them. Pipe dream, I know.

“Why does Kennedy do what he does?”

He behaves much lot like George Wallace in his later years. I think it’s that sice realization that you’ve done something really wrong, and can never truly make amends, but don’t have the self will to go quitely into the wilderness. Some people are just political creatures.

Jan 11, 2007 - 7:30 am 22. Steven Mitchell:

Sheesh, should be: “sick”, not “sice” and “quietly”, not “quitely”.

Jan 11, 2007 - 7:33 am 23. dclydew:

Steven,

I’m not sure if the ‘blather’ you mentioned was directed at me… if it was I think you may have misunderstood what I wrote. I did not say that we should have started a “counter-insurgency” earlier. I said that we should have planned around the potential problem from the beginning. However, its obvious from statements made before the invasion that the decision makers didn’t believe that there would be an insurgency, despite plenty of evidence to the contrary. So, as I said, like Vietnam, the powers that be failed to recognize the sort of war we were dealing with. The Marines (then and now) seem to get it. The SecDef and Generals didn’t.

Gen Zinni’s position would have probably resulted in an environment that was far less likely to support the necessary ingredients for an insurgency to have gained momentum.

However, now that we’re stuck, we need to understand the situation. Insurgencies, particularly the sort that are considered 4GW, don’t have the same criteria for victory as 3GW did. It doesn’t matter if we put 100,000,000 troops in Iraq, an insurgency is not a war of attrition. The insurgents will simply rejoin the civilian population until they can again assert their power. Its how Mao, Ho, the Sandinista and all the rest worked… we have to be smarter than in the past.

That being said, I’m not against Bush’s current plan to raise troop levels. At least its an attempt to do something. Based on what I understand about the situation, I’m not sure that it will help… but I’m often wrong, so maybe it will…

However, beyond all of that… my initial point stands. Vietnam and Iraq do share some similarities, particularly that we failed to understand who the enemy was, we failed to understand how the enemy fought and we failed to understand what the requirements for victory were.

Iraq is not like Vietnam in two very important ways. 1) We don’t have nearly the dead and wounded that we did in Vietnam. 2) All of the boys there are volunteers and thus chose to be in harm’s way.

Jan 11, 2007 - 8:57 am 24. Steven Mitchell:

“I’m not sure if the ‘blather’ you mentioned was directed at me… ”

Only a little bit. I think you are only edging into “blather” territory on this issue. I was commenting more on the Wash Post take, and their fellow travelers. I have developed a strong, *personal* dislike for the kind of people that will consign thousands of people to misery and death for the sake of their own vanity, ignorance, and will to power. Note I’m talking about the crowd that refuses to confront the reality of our opposition–not the nature of the opposition, but the fact that it is opposition of a kind that cannot be reasoned with–and then accept what that means.

“However, beyond all of that… my initial point stands. Vietnam and Iraq do share some similarities, particularly that we failed to understand who the enemy was, we failed to understand how the enemy fought and we failed to understand what the requirements for victory were.

Iraq is not like Vietnam in two very important ways. 1) We don’t have nearly the dead and wounded that we did in Vietnam. 2) All of the boys there are volunteers and thus chose to be in harm’s way.”

And I guess I’d add a couple of ways, that somewhat lesson the relevance of the ones you listed:

1. It’s similar in that I now understand why certain people in the 60’s developed a personal dislike for each other. I understood it academically as soon as I read enough history, but I didn’t really feel it until recently.

2. For a variety of reasons, the populace as a whole refuses to face up to reality. In short, as a country, we aren’t serious yet. In my terms, Biden is wrong about Iraq, but is still serious about. Kennedy is not serious about Iraq, and thus can only be fundamentally correct by accident.

The more we succeed in Iraq, the less serious Americans will be about it. The less serious they are about it, the more people will get away the preening and ignorance and will to power. Iraq can only become Vietnam if we fail to understand ourselves. And I guess that’s another similarity, since that’s what did it in Vietnam, too.

And to reiterate, I don’t think the Pentagan, Rumsfeld, etc. failed to understand what you are talking about, at least not the big picture. They understood that they couldn’t act on that understanding. I know people say that Bush should have prepared the country better. I don’t think there is anything Bush could have said that would have worked around the extreme historical and military ignorance of large blocks of the public.

Jan 11, 2007 - 11:09 am 25. Mikey:

“And so much for Viet Nam. I bet there is a lot of 30 year olds out there who wish everyone over 50 would just die off so that they never have to hear this crap again.”

I’ll be 41 next month Terrye, and yes, from time to time I have wished the boomers would either shut-up or just die already. Not out of evilness, but simply out of 1960’s fatigue.

Jan 11, 2007 - 11:19 am 26. Rhod:

Mikey:

I was present at the creation (1945-to today), and I’m g-damnned sick of Them, too. Have been for forty years.

Jan 11, 2007 - 12:04 pm 27. PeterUK:

What makes Teddy run? It is guilt pure and simple, or rather ,impure and complex.The man has a deep feeling of guilt about the death of Mary Jo,this can only be borne is if others are guilty also,his ego will permit no less,thus his entire country must make contrition for his selfish folly.

Jan 11, 2007 - 2:24 pm 28. Rhod:

Peter:

Your interpretation is more charitable than mine. I think he’s incapable of remorse, except where his acts deprive him of the perfect and complete adulation he expects. Maybe that’s not remorse, but a practical kind of regret for having screwed up. Guilt assumes a conscience, and I see nothing in this relentlessly mean and ugly man which proves he has one.

Jan 11, 2007 - 2:37 pm 29. PeterUK:

Could be Rhod,although this relentlessly mean and ugly man would still be compelled to remake the world in his own image.

Jan 11, 2007 - 3:23 pm 30. dclydew:

Steven,

They understood that they couldn’t act on that understanding. I know people say that Bush should have prepared the country better. I don’t think there is anything Bush could have said that would have worked around the extreme historical and military ignorance of large blocks of the public.

I recommend that you get a copy of “The Sling and The Stone”, as well as “Imaginary Weapons”. Neither have a lefty feel and both appear as mostly unbiased discussions about what was happening in the Pentagon post-9/11. It really does appear, based on those and some other discussions, that the Pentagon felt that insurgency was a low risk and that High Tech war in typical battle scenarios was the future. It’s not surprising though. Almost all nations fight the last War, not the current one. During WWI, for example, the final movements by the Germans were 2nd Gen Warfare, yet everyone was surprised when they burst into WWII with these tactics refined. The same could be seen moving from WWII to Vietnam, Korea etc. Our soldiers seem to get the shifts pretty quickly, but the Pentagon and the decision makers tend to lag way behind.

Jan 12, 2007 - 8:07 am 31. triticale:

I stopped taking Blackwell’s worst dressed list seriously when I noticed that it didn’t include that guy by the freight yards wearing three layers of totally oilstained workwear held together with safety pins. I don’t pay much attention to the bootlegger’s son either.

Jan 15, 2007 - 6:05 am

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