That’s right, they’re Democrat talking points… not critiques of the situation.

They already knew they had dropped the ball, and were already shifting blame. But *even then*, they were not prepared to relinquish their authority to the military.

Err, according to the sources we have publicly available, the State Dept was told not to work on a plan and that it would all be handled by the Pentagon (perhaps the cutting through the Red Tape). I’m not a fan of either side in this, but if they were told not to work on it, I would guess they would have had a hard time dropping the ball.

Blaming Rumsfeld seems to miss the point that a lot the heat he generated was because he was trying to cut through that bureaucracy. Zinni’s sour grapes over that are also well established, IMHO.

The point is that there had been a fairly competent strategy already reviewed. Maybe Zinni has sour grapes, but the data he wrote in 1999 would have been very useful if applied. Zinni and Rumsfeld might not like each other, Rumsfeld may have been cutting through red tape, but it doesn’t change the fact that he chose not to implement the existing work and instead went off on his own set of ideas. It can be argued that his plan created an environment where extremist groups were able to foment insurgency. It’s fine to say that he was trying something new, or taking a new approach. However, the approach didn’t work out as he had hoped and therefore, it was a mistake. Perhaps, if we had used 300,000 troops, had the provisional authority spread across all provinces, had a plan for rebuilding ready to go etc. we still would find ourselves in the mess we’re in today. However, the SecDef must take responsibility when his plan doesn’t work as he’d hoped. I think Rumsfeld was very zealous and wanted a quick and decisive engagement. I applaud that. However, in his zeal, he neglected to plan for several problems, most of which had been documented already (by the State Dept, by ‘Desert Crossing’). Thus either he read and decided against preparing for those issues, or he didn’t bother to review them and went on his own ideas. Either way, it was a mistake.

In short, you are blaming Rumsfeld and the administration for doing the *kind* of things that were necessary in order to have less mistakes of this nature. I charge hindsight, because you aren’t giving them any credit for the ennormity of the task, or their positive achievements, because you are not considering what *could* have gone wrong, and often has historically, but didn’t in this case. You hold them to a standard that would have had FDR and his administration lynched.

Your intellect is truly dizzying.

It was not necessary for Rumsfeld and the administration to ignore the risk of insurgency (which was being talked about before the invasion). It was not necessary for Rumsfeld and the administration to ignore the risk of not being able to do reconstruction. It was not necessary for Rumsfeld and the administration to ignore the fact that since the 50’s, the most common tactic for an army facing overpowering odds, is to melt away and hide among civilians, waiting for the chance to strike through an insurgency or guerrilla warfare.

I recommend a broader reading in American history, so you know whey you are being fed a bunch of hooey.

I consider myslef rather well read on both American, European and World history, with a specific focus on war and politics. However, I am always looking for new information, what do you recommend?

A perfect example of something completely unexpected going (in hindsight) somewhat *wrong* was that the invasion portion of the war far outstripped the most wildly optimistic plans.

Gosh, if only I had studied history!! I mean, its not like the Vietnamese, the Sandinista and every other overpowered military unit since the 60’s have simply melted in the face of an army, only to pop up from within the civilian population.

I think that your loyalty to the Administration may be affecting your critical eye. I’m not anti-Bush. I don’t want to see him impeached or anything else. However, I do think that we must be able to admit when we (and our government) make mistakes. If not, then we simply “stay the course” and improve nothing. If however, we can critically look at our actions, then we can find mistakes and begin to consider how to correct them both now and in the future.

It’s called, no plan survives contact with the enemy. Picking out a plan after the fact, that would have “worked better” is why Monday morning quarterbacking is not a generally considered a positive thing.

Yes, I know that maxim well (another story). However, I have not said “If only they had done X it would have worked better”. I have only said that the plan (at least all the public data we have on the plan) and its execution did not account for known risks and failed to execute anywhere close to what had been promised ahead of time. This isn’t because anyone is evil, or Hitler… its probably because the Administration (at that time) felt as though they were under siege and only trusted a few insiders.

We must be able to review and critique all military action. Otherwise, what value is there to history? Your post argues that I haven’t studied enough history, but then complains that hindsight is not valuable. These two points seem rather at odds.

I’ve provided you with direct quotes from documents that are publicly available (so we don’t have to worry about them being out of context) in order to support my position. You have made weak analogies and excuses, with no actual data to back it up. If that’s how you choose to argue this, thats fine, but I’m probably not going to change my position without at least some evidence to support your position.

The State Department offends me. And their taking of authority without responsibility, and then wasting so much time and effort in CYA, before, during, and after–offends me most of all.

‘Three months before the war, “weenies” at the State Dept warned that there were “serious planning gaps for post-conflict public security and humanitarian assistance”, they further stated that “a failure to address short-term public security and humanitarian assistance concerns could result in serious human rights abuses which would undermine an otherwise successful military campaign, and our reputation internationally.”‘

Classic example. They already knew they had dropped the ball, and were already shifting blame. But *even then*, they were not prepared to relinquish their authority to the military.

Anytime the military seems to really screw something this basic up, you can bet one of two things happened, if not both:

1. General McClellan’s spiritual twin is in a crucial command spot.

2. A civilian, bureaucracy is taking authority without responsibility.

That’s been true since before George Washington took the first oath of office. (Why people don’t understand how much trouble Washington had keeping his cabinet off of each others’ throats, is a gross failure of current American education.)

If you want to argue that the Pentagon has bureaucracy problems of its own, you’ll get no complaint from me. Blaming Rumsfeld seems to miss the point that a lot the heat he generated was because he was trying to cut through that bureaucracy. Zinni’s sour grapes over that are also well established, IMHO.

In short, you are blaming Rumsfeld and the administration for doing the *kind* of things that were necessary in order to have less mistakes of this nature. I charge hindsight, because you aren’t giving them any credit for the ennormity of the task, or their positive achievements, because you are not considering what *could* have gone wrong, and often has historically, but didn’t in this case. You hold them to a standard that would have had FDR and his administration lynched.

Or to use an extreme analogy, it’s as if the quarterback passed for 300 yards, ran for 150, caught a pass from the halfback for a TD, blocked on two reverses–despite being hampered by a substandard offensive line–and then some silly fan blamed the loss of the game on one fumble, where the QB was depending on that offensive line to, you know, maybe block or something. If the silly fan wants to do that, it doesn’t help any when people that should know better throw him some red meat. (And if the team wants to win next week, focus on the real problem would be a good thing.)

“I recommend you take a look at the several documents now publicly available on exactly what was planned by whom and how it flew in the face of very sound advice from both the military and the State Dept.”

I recommend a broader reading in American history, so you know whey you are being fed a bunch of hooey.

“Finally, I encourage you to consider the possibility that, though the desire, the goals and the hopes of the administration and more importantly the Pentagon may have been noble, their plan was not based on anything but a Best Case Scenario, something that no responsible SecDef should ever have done.”

This is flat out not true. A perfect example of something completely unexpected going (in hindsight) somewhat *wrong* was that the invasion portion of the war far outstripped the most wildly optimistic plans. *At the time*, this was noted as a problem for the occupation, because occupation resources were not yet readily available. From the very beginning, the occupation had to play catchup. OTOH, that the invasion was so wildly successful meant that less Americans died during it. Yet, this also seems to have raised totally unreasonable expectations on the part of some Americans, and also led to the Iraqi troublesome elements not being as royally smashed up as they should have been.

It’s called, no plan survives contact with the enemy. Picking out a plan after the fact, that would have “worked better” is why Monday morning quarterbacking is not a generally considered a positive thing.

Well, you might be right… perhaps my responses have not been useful. After all, I haven’t provided proof. So, I think its only appropriate that I either provide evidence for my position, or retract it.

So here’s what I base my view that the plan for the Iraq War, the resulting occupation and the transition to democracy was built on optimism and not fact.

In 1999 the War game “Desert Crossing” was performed to take a look at what an Iraqi Invasion would require, what post-war would look like and what sort of plan would be necessary. The conclusions were that a very large military force (over 300,000) would be necessary to invade, overthrow and occupy Iraq. It also concluded that more than a military plan would be necessary, it recommended a plan for invasion and reconstruction developed by the Defense, State, Foreign Disaster and Commerce departments. It further came to the conclusion that an invasion would very likely face multiple insurgencies based along ethnic and religious lines, cautioned that there would likely be support from outsiders like Iran and Syria and concluded that a completely civilian occupation authority would be needed with offices in all 18 provinces.

In 2001, General Zinni directed the Pentagon to this study and its findings ans was told, “We’ve been told not to do any of the planning. It will all be done in the Pentagon.” (Weenies at the State Dept I guess…)

In the end, all of the recommendations in this War Game were ignored. Rumsfeld went forward with less than a third of the recommended force, the CPA was a joint venture between civilian and military and it was only based in Baghdad. The risks about sectarian insurgency were ignored and the warnings about Iran and Syria were likewise ignored.

Three months before the war, “weenies” at the State Dept warned that there were “serious planning gaps for post-conflict public security and humanitarian assistance”, they further stated that “a failure to address short-term public security and humanitarian assistance concerns could result in serious human rights abuses which would undermine an otherwise successful military campaign, and our reputation internationally.”

Indeed, even General Wallace admitted that the War Plan was based on faulty assumptions that the Iraqis would immediately join in reconstruction and that the infrastructure of the country would be in good working order. It also, according to the General that led the invasion, did not take into account that the Bathist party was very integrated into Iraqi society.

I recommend you take a look at the several documents now publicly available on exactly what was planned by whom and how it flew in the face of very sound advice from both the military and the State Dept. Further, I recommend you read “The Sling and the Stone” for an overview of insurgency and the lessons that weren’t learned ahead of this war.

Finally, I encourage you to consider the possibility that, though the desire, the goals and the hopes of the administration and more importantly the Pentagon may have been noble, their plan was not based on anything but a Best Case Scenario, something that no responsible SecDef should ever have done.

I’m really sorry if this offends you, its not my goal to do so.

Well, there was a plan. Unfortunately, it was a plan by the wienies in the State Department. When they dropped the ball completely, the military had to make do with what they could, after having the rug pulled out from under them. Meanwhile, the State Department was busy leaking like crazy to give the impression that it wasn’t their fault.

I eagerly await your support for the long-overdue purge of Foggy Bottom.

“That’s not a useful response. ”

Ditto, everything you’ve said in this topic.

Saudi Arabia intervenes on behalf of the Sunni’s and Iran intervenes on behalf of the Shiites.

The Iran/Iraq war resulted in a combined 1 million+ KIA. Which works out to be somewhere north of 2,000 a week.(Any idea of which country supported Saddam during the Iran/Iraq war…might it have been Saudi Arabia?)

So the recent history of a million plus casualty war between the Sunni and Shiite is not a theoretical worst case scenario….it is a historical reality.

Refusing to listen when Bush and company said it would be hard, and why, and then lying* about what they say afterwards to justify your own position is also very irresponsible.

That’s not a useful response.

Bush said that “The War on Terror” would be hard. I don’t disagree with that. However, all evidence that we have available in the public sector, the speeches, testimony, presentations to Congress, to the public in interviews and from the data that has since been released through FOIA, indicates that the war “Iraqi Freedom” (not the GWoT), had only a single plan, which relied on several Best Case Scenarios. There was no plan in place for occupation. There was no plan in place for an insurgency. There was no plan in place for funding outside of Iraq paying for the costs with its own oil revenues. There was no plan for anything long-term in Iraq… only a short term plan, wherein Iraqis would magically take over their own government in a fit of democratic fervor.

This, in hindsight, was an error. Trying to ignore it, as you seem wont to do, won’t make it any less an error. Trying to confound the military plan for War in Iraq with the GWoT also won’t fly. Bush planned for a long hard struggle in the GWoT, but somehow Rumsfeld and Company planned for Operation Iraqi Freedom, as only a short term, easy piece of the overall war.

Sorry.

Refusing to listen when Bush and company said it would be hard, and why, and then lying* about what they say afterwards to justify your own position is also very irresponsible. That also includes placing blame for “mistakes” based on who took responsibility versus those who carefully avoided it. To wit, more support by those that voted for it when it mattered would mean that things would be better now. (Not “perfect”, but “better”.) Crass opportunism for political gain *is* exploited by the terrorists political wing, no matter how much certain members of the appeasement wing of our political and media classes would like to pretend otherwise.

* By this I mean in a variety of formats, including “lying to yourself” to the point that you really believe you are right.

The biggest mistake Bush made was attributing more goodwill and patriotism to his political opponents than was warranted. I think if he has more trouble living with his conscience for the rest of his life, it will be because some people apparently don’t ever listen to theirs.

All wars are immensely messy. (Though I’m appalled at the lack of knowledge that would even comptemplate saying that Iraq was worse than the American Civil War.) Sometimes not fighting a war now leads to an even messier war later–as anyone with even a shred of intellectual honesty and a brief study of WWII could attest. We dont’ get do-overs when we fail to act, either.

Anyone convinced that the actions at the time were wrong had the responsibility to say so at the time. If they didn’t, they should have the decency to now shut up.

Indeed, this seems like a good point to me. America has, since early in the 20th century, had great power… yet, it seems that we have yet to understand how to use it well.

If you supported the invasion of Iraq, it is irresponsible to believe that we should simply pull out. It betrays a lack of understanding of the responsibility that comes with the power that we as a nation have. Of course, going into a War while planning only for the most optimistic outcome, also betrays a similar lack.

Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and all those that signed on to the plan for this war were Wrong. They were very, very, very (insert about 3000 or so more very’s) wrong. Yet, they still seem to act as though they were justified. The senators and congressmen that voted for this war, in hindsight, were probably wrong. It now appears that our data was flawed, our plan was flawed and thus they made the wrong decision.

Everyone makes bad and wrong decisions, everyone. From Moses to King David, from Peter to well, Peter again and every major historical leader… everyone makes mistakes, errors and bad decisions. The problem it seems, may be that we as a people have serious problems saying simply, “I was wrong”. Being wrong doesn’t make you unfit to lead, or to be in congress. It makes you human. However, it doesn’t mean that you can simply take back the wrong. You must deal with the consequences (just ask Duke Cunningham).

Bush, for the rest of his life will probably be haunted by the errors he’s made. Rumsfeld, as McCain noted, will probably be remembered in history as incompetent and he’ll probably have a lot on his conscience until the day he dies. This is real life and we don’t get “do-overs”. The same is true of Congress. I don’t doubt that many members of the US congress (even some who are now retired) sincerely regret authorizing this war. There are probably some that feel a level of responsibility for the deaths that are going on right now (both military and civilian).

However, once a person or nation makes a bad decision, they have to deal with the result. That doesn’t mean “staying the course” (or even modifying our rules of engagement on a daily basis)… In this case, it may mean figuring out how to pacify the situation and extricate ourselves, even at the expense of their “democracy”. If we can leave them with a functioning government that can maintain some level of control, we may have to be satisfied with that. Those are consequences.

If we stay, blindly determined to see a democratic Iraq and things continue as they are now, or if we pull out and leave behind a Civil War,the situation would have been better if Saddam had simply stayed in power.

Jefferson warned that democracy wasn’t a gift that could simply be handed to a nation. It couldn’t be bloodless (as our dear friends in Lebanon are learning), it couldn’t be easy and it couldn’t come from anywhere but the hearts and minds of the citizens of the nation. Our plan for the democratization of Iraq was, in hindsight, probably a bit silly. However, having used our power in a silly way… means we now must take responsibility for that act.

Of course, we’ll probably end up pulling out, because we Americans don’t seem to hate anything quite as much as responsibility (except maybe admitting that we were wrong)

While giving my son a ride home from school a few months ago he told me something that really stuck in my mind. Apparently, one of his classmates had commented, regarding a particularly bloody Civil War battle, that it was “almost as bad as Iraq.” Granted this is a high school kid but, still, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a lot of people are entirely ignorant of the history of human conflict and the risks that we would take should we turn our backs on the Islamist movement.

Need I add the caveat about the sacrifices of our troops? The fact is that the troops, more than any other group of Americans, understand just how much is at stake here and just how heroic their sacrifices have been. We owe it to them to do everything in our power to minimize their risks. But we also owe them the respect due their sacrifice and a loyalty to their cause. Treating them like children, or worse, as uneducated dupes dying for nothing – when they *know* better due to their daily contact with the enemy of all civilization – betrays a corrupt and decadent arrogance unworthy of us as Americans.

Nice try of stealing a march. “We” didn’t make it horrible. “We” tried to make a bad situation better (and have somewhat, when a reasonable person takes a minute out of his navel gazing to really think about what Saddam’s Iraq was like).

Once you take on a chore, you are somewhat responsible for the outcome. That includes all the Congress critters that voted for the invasion, even if they only did it to keep their seats at the time. It also includes every citizen that supported that decision. To act otherwise, it to act like a toddler throwing a tantrum–or the logical equivalent of saying that “we” made it horrible.